










The End of Power: An argument concerning the conceptual obsolescence of 
























Department of Government 
 





















The End of Power 
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contemporary political science and an introduction to dimensionless power. Doctor of Philosophy 
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Abstract 
This work will attempt to explain what shall be termed a ‘mis-understanding’ of 
power: a ‘de-conceptualisation’ that is both ‘non-dimensional’ and ‘anarchic’. The main 
arguments are as follows: 1) power is a superfluous ‘concept’ that is used to explain 
phenomena that are best served by other concepts or just left alone; 2) power is an 
anarchic concept that takes on the characteristics of whatever debate it is situated in 
and, as such, is only speciously useful; 3) power is, as a topic of science, too protean 
to have any explanatory power; 4) power has become too complex an idea to be 
scientifically, politically or sociologically utile, but its disparate elements, i.e. those 
used to define and explain it, are too scientifically, politically and sociologically 
necessary to discard; 5) terms like ‘oppression’, ‘exploitation’, ‘control’ and the like are 
not examples of power, nor of powerlessness, but, rather, scientific, social or political 
modes (of life); and, finally, 6) power is nowhere to be found, in the metaphysical or 
ontological sense, but it is too essential an ‘idea’ to abandon altogether. Power, in 
other words, as a ‘lived’ and ‘phenomenological’ human reality, exists as a sort of 
‘natural’ fact. 
In the end, ‘power’ becomes a place-holder that needs to be abandoned in 
order to allow any of its enquiries to progress, but the different disciplines that examine 
‘power’ have become so indebted to different terminologies and conceptualisations of 
power that they are unable to renounce it. Due to the nature of said ‘de-
conceptualisation’, it is not something that can be ‘proven’, but only ‘arrived at’ via an 
analysis, and de-construction, of different theories of power. Furthermore, the process, 
of ‘conceptualisation’ itself, needs to be dealt with, in order to understand the 
perniciousness of ‘the need for theory/concept’. 
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The End of Power:  




When it comes to the concept of power, theoretical chaos still reigns. While the 
existence of the phenomenon itself cannot be doubted, the concept remains altogether 
ambiguous. For some, it means repression; for others, it is a constructive element in 
communication. Legal, political and sociological notions of power remain unreconciled. 
Power is sometimes associated with freedom, sometimes with coercion. For some 
power is based on common action, for others on struggle. Some draw a sharp line 
between power and violence. For others, violence is just a more extreme form of power. 
At one moment power is associated with the law, at another with arbitrariness.1 
 
This work takes, as its premise, the idea that, as Byung-Chul Han puts it, “[when] 
it comes to power, theoretical chaos still reigns”.2 The premise is that contemporary 
and modern theories of power leave the concept of power in an “altogether 
ambiguous”3 place where, in certain situations and under certain conditions, power 
means one thing and, in other situations and under a different set of conditions, power 
means something entirely different. These discrepancies, variable interpretations and 
differentiations in explanatory power are borne from several theoretical dilemmas, but, 
primarily, three: conceptual polysemy, logical casuistry and, more simply, a general 
(misguided) reliance on inductive and deductive reasoning, over abductive. These will 
be explained in more detail, further on, but, in summary, these are: 1) a surfeit of 
definitions for the concept power, throughout the social sciences, which may or may 
not be justified, but, unquestionably, lead to a problem of explanatory ambiguity; 2) 
theories, explanations and conclusions are taken from certain examples or instances 
of what we might call power relations or ‘examples’ of power and applied to others, 
which are unrelated; 3) and, finally, an overreliance on deductive, and inductive, 
reasoning gives us false conclusions that would be better explained through abductive 
reasoning, though it may be that the use of any of these types of reasoning gives rise 
 







to our dangerously specious understandings of power and contributes, most fruitfully, 
to the more general explicatory impasse concerning power. This thesis will survey 
different contemporary modern theories of power in order to determine how and why 
this reign of ‘theoretical chaos’ has come about, as well as what solutions have been 
proposed by power theorists and critics in helping us come to some understanding of 
what power really is and how it manifests itself in political and sociological contexts. 
Following this brief introduction, the earlier chapters of the thesis focus on theorists 
whose work is framed by an analytic approach to theorisation and conceptualisation; 
this is to show a sort of historical descent in the ‘theoretical chaos’ of power and to 
show the limits and deficiencies of analytic, dimensional and violence or sovereignty-
orientated conceptualisations of power. The latter chapters of this thesis focus on 
theorists who conceptualise power in radically different ways, particularly when 
compared to the analytic theorists. These theories are grounded more in the tradition 
of continental or structuralist/post-structuralist theory and challenge, specifically, the 
shortcomings and inconsistencies of the analytic method. Finally, this thesis will also 
introduce the novel notions of ‘non-dimensional power’ and ‘de-conceptualised 
power’, which, in turn, follow from the more general notions of ‘non-dimensional’ 
prehension and the process of ‘deconceptualisation’. These critiques of power follow 
on from the more radical theories presented in the thesis and, in turn, seek to answer 











II. The Theoretical Chaos of Power 
 
There is no attempt here…to unveil some hidden condition’ nor…is there a move to 
privilege or even accept a notion of power as such, if by this we mean that ‘the real 
thing’ can actually be found. Instead, I want to examine the very nub of the paradox 
that although power does not exist ‘as such’, it nevertheless ‘makes a difference’ – or, 
perhaps, it is difference, that which cannot be conceptualized proper.4 
 
Many works begin with how important, controversial or debated the concept 
that they are discussing is, whether within their respective disciplines or in a more 
general context. Whether it be ideology, hegemony, class, technology or so many 
others, concepts are aggrandised to the point where they seem to be natural 
phenomena that are essential to the human experience, which is itself natural in a 
work that is trying to prove something either about a concept or through the utilisation 
of said concept. Power, as a look at the literature tells us, is one of the most contested 
subjects in political theory. There seems to be little consensus, if any, as to what 
‘power’ really means or what shape it takes. Theorists either build upon, and, 
ultimately, completely transform, previous theories of power, or they contest them and 
attempt to establish their own conceptualisation. What is it about power that promotes 
such fierce and interminable debate? Should we heed the words of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus and pass over power “in silence”, or can it still prove to us to be a useful 
concept whether in political, social or economic theory?  
 
III. Power Debates 
Let us argue, then, that the utility of power as a ‘concept’, in politics, sociology 
and science, is up for debate. The myriad arguments that can be found in the literature 
pull the reader from one conceptualisation to another, leaving one’s understanding 
dependent upon what theorist one read last. Is power a natural phenomenon that 
 





exemplifies the ‘natural’ struggle for supremacy, authority and relevancy that all 
animals exhibit in their lives, or is power a social phenomenon that is expressed in the 
relationships between people and groups of people and how these are formed and 
developed? Can we say that predators battle each other for prey, but humans 
cooperate in order to avoid conflict and still succeed in acquiring what they need? 
What is a more ‘natural’ understanding of power’s role: conflict versus cooperation, or 
nature versus society? Cases can be made for all of these conclusions. Whether 
humans are ‘naturally’ social or society is what separates human life from all other 
forms, and, in turn, is an ‘unnatural’ phenomenon, affects how one understands the 
concept of ‘power’. This, however, is only one example of a ‘power debate’; there are 
a plethora of discussions of power that range from whether power is mono-
dimensional or multi-dimensional, to whether power is primarily a sociological 
concern, as opposed to a purely political concern, to whether power is, instead, an 
entirely ‘biopoltical’ concept that calls for a multi-disciplinary approach in order to 
grasp how it is expressed in society. Engaging in one of these discussions does not 
necessarily exclude one from participating in the others, but many of the conclusions 
found in one are antithetical to the conclusions found in another. For example, if one 
considers that control and coercion are dimensions, or even a single dimension, of 
power, then how is one to understand self-control and self-coercion? Must power exist 
as a relation between two individuals or can power manifest itself solely in the thoughts 
and actions of a lone intellect? Another example: if power is purely a social 
phenomenon, how is it possible to distinguish between the social and the political, 
when the political claims to be above the social, as states typically do, and ‘the social’ 
is simply a consequence of political organisation? Debates that, seemingly, have 





themselves exclusively with power, ultimately depend upon our understanding of other 
concepts and disciplines. 
 
IV. Non-Dimensional Power 
This work will attempt to explain what shall be termed a ‘mis-understanding’ of 
power: a ‘de-conceptualisation’ that is both ‘non-dimensional’ and ‘anarchic’. The main 
arguments, against the utility of power, are as follows: 1) power is a superfluous 
‘concept’ that is used to explain phenomena that are best served by other concepts 
or just left alone; 2) power is an anarchic concept that takes on the characteristics of 
whatever debate it is situated in and, as such, only appears to be useful; 3) power, 
and this is an extension of the previous point, is too protean to have any explanatory 
power (considering that that is how we wish to measure the utility of any ‘scientific 
concept’, which is another matter, altogether); 4) power has become too complex an 
idea to be scientifically, politically or sociologically useful, but its disparate elements, 
i.e. those used to define and explain it, are too scientifically, politically and 
sociologically necessary to discard; 5) terms like ‘oppression’, ‘exploitation’, ‘control’ 
and the like are not examples of power, nor of powerlessness, but, rather, scientific, 
social or political modes (of life); and, finally, 6) power is nowhere to be found, in the 
metaphysical or ontological sense, but, and this is an extension of the fourth point, it 
is too essential an ‘idea’ to abandon altogether. In the end, ‘power’ becomes a place-
holder that needs to be abandoned in order to allow any of its enquiries to progress, 
but the different disciplines that examine ‘power’ have become so indebted to different 
terminologies and conceptualisations of power that they are unable to renounce it. 
Due to the nature of said ‘de-conceptualisation’, it is not something that can be 
‘proven’, but only ‘arrived at’ via an analysis of different theories of power. 






V. De-Conceptualised Power 
It will be argued that conceptualisation itself should be understood as an example of 
power and that the very act of definition should be understood as another, though 
these understandings will, in the end, have to be put aside in favour of ‘de-
conceptualised power’. Theories of power, in political science, date back as far as the 
political philosophy of Aristotle and the ethnography of Machiavelli, but it is the logic 
of the method behind these theories, behind theorisation, more generally, and behind 
their conclusions that are of interest here. This thesis will argue that any 
conceptualisation of power is, per se, an exercise of power and, perhaps more 
importantly, that the process of conceptualisation itself and the production/legitimacy 
of knowledge and of those institutions, individuals or groups that produce it constitute 
power. In other words, the question of what power is, in terms of who or what 
possesses it and in both what capacity and quantity they possess it, becomes 
irrelevant. This is because the possession of a process, of the production of knowledge 
itself, is, effectively, impossible. It is dependent on both everyone and no one person, 
which means that it is easily localised, but too generalised to theorise accurately. In 
order to reach the point where it is possible to ‘de-theorise’ power, we will start with a 
general survey of power theories and the ‘power debate’ within political theory and 
political science, in order to understand, in this context: 1) whether or not power is truly 
useful as an analytical concept in political science; and 2) whether or not there are 
more explanatorily useful concepts available that can help explain social dynamics. 
This survey will range from the theories of Plato to Lukes’s radical view of power and 
end with a focus on Kenneth Boulding’s ‘three faces of power’, which is used as an 
example of the theoretical limits of an analytical view of power. We then briefly turn to 





of Boulding’s thought. From this, we will look at Sallie Westwood’s book, ‘Power and 
the Social’, which makes the claim that power is an immanent ‘force’ in social relations 
and that “there is no social without power”. Westwood, thus, analyses the way(s) in 
which different theorists, such as Hobbes, Machiavelli, Locke et al., conceptualise 
power “in relation to the construction of the social”. This analysis affords us a unique 
perspective on how power develops in relation to the adoption, promotion or 
development of different societal practices, norms, mores and structures. Westwood 
points out how different theories of power emerge(d) directly in relation and in 
correspondence with societal, scientific and political movements and developments of 
their time. Following this brief analysis, we look at the work of Hannah Arendt and her 
understanding of the concepts of truth, opinion and power, as put forth in her 1967 
essay ‘Truth and Politics’. Arendt’s views on the antagonism between truth and power 
can serve as useful tools for making sense of current conceptions and usages of the 
same. We then move on to Byung-Chul Han’s works, ‘What Is Power?’ and 
‘Psychopolitics’, in which he attempts to formulate “a basic form of power from which 
we can, by modifying its inner structural elements, derive the different forms in which 
power may appear”. He argues that there is a sort of “theoretical chaos” that 
characterises contemporary conceptualisations of power and that this has resulted in 
the concept remaining “altogether ambiguous”. Han effectively eschews 
rationalisations of power that characterise it as a ‘three-dimensional’ concept, where 
each ‘dimension’ describes a different mode of power. After this, the thesis will move 
on to a critique of method and the development of theory itself, i.e. a critique of science 
and the scientific method, via an analysis of the work of Karl Popper and Paul 
Feyerabend in relation to the work of Foucault. While Popper attempted to ‘correct’ 





Feyerabend, on the other hand, criticised the very notion of logic, rationality and 
scientific discovery and advocated for an anarchic approach towards human 
knowledge and understanding. Foucault would argue that science itself is a mode of 
knowledge production; in other words, science does not explain and describe ‘reality’, 
but, rather, serves to define it in a recursive fashion. Epistemology, then, should be 
understood as a sort of self-contained system, rather than as a system that explains 
things outside of it; it should be understood as a sort of social, even ‘natural’, 
phenomenon, instead of as a way to explain natural phenomena. Next, we will turn to 
Deleuze and Guattari to continue our ‘de-theorisation’ of power. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, power is the foundation of the West’s structuring of truth and order, but it 
brings with it a fascist mode of thought and action; from truth and reality, as products 
of power, emerges fascism and fascist modes of life. It is only through an 
abandonment of power and a dismissal of the desire for power that a more 
responsible, freer and expressive mode of politics can emerge. We will then turn to 
Dyrberg’s ‘circular structure of power’, which develops what he calls a ‘non-derivative 
conception of power’. This conception claims that power is characterised by a circular 
logic, which means that it cannot be derived nor legitimated by any ‘external authority’ 
and must come to legitimate itself in situ, i.e. in ‘the social’. Furthermore, ‘the social’ 
cannot, like power, be understood nor legitimated by anything outside of itself; this 
means that only social interaction itself can help us understand social relations. Here, 
power is political because it operates socially, but power and ‘the political’ can only be 
expressed in social interaction. Dyrberg states that the way to understand power is to 
understand ‘processes of identification, in the most politically undecidable sense of 
the term’; knowledge of the self and socio-ontological questions can lead us to 





power works, but the logic here operates in a circular fashion. Power, then, becomes 
an “irreducible relation or process” that “cannot be derived from any form of social 
objectivity, such as free will or structural determination”; power “adheres to nothing but 
itself” and is derived from nothing but itself. This conclusion will allow us to move on 
to the study of biopolitics, which is, as Thomas Lemke explains it, a sort of ‘specific 
political knowledge’ that aims ‘at the administration and regulation of life processes on 
the level of populations’; biopolitics, then, is a science of life that is political in nature: 
a science that deals with individuals and populations as ‘living beings’ that are, at the 
same time, ‘legal subjects’. This understanding of biopolitics as a specific type of 
political knowledge, a ‘mode of politics’, allows us to see politics, knowledge, law and 
science as immanently social endeavours and phenomena. Following this we will 
engage with Jonathan Crary’s conceptualisation of what he calls “24/7”, a sort of 
universal state-of-affairs that explains how capitalism, which functions in a seemingly 
eternal and ever-present fashion, now concerns itself with fashioning individuals and 
developing subjectivities that are amenable to and, essentially, defined by ceaseless 
work and consumption. This chapter compares Crary’s analysis to the Platonic ideals 
of society and productivity, as well as to Hobbes’s conception of the commonwealth 
and Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of the ‘order-word’. Crary explains how 
contemporary life has degenerated our understanding of concepts such as ‘time’, 
‘productivity’, ‘democracy’, ‘the social’, ‘leisure’ and the like. Crary’s work allows us to 
go further in our understanding of fundamentally ‘asocial’ and ‘non-social’ modes of 
life, where the self becomes the locus of capital, society and politics. All of this leads 








VI. The End Of Power 
 This survey will allow us to proceed towards, or ‘arrive at’, a de-
conceptualisation of power that is not meant to be understood or apprehended, per 
se, but exists, rather, as a sort of ‘pure critique’ of the concept. By borrowing from 
different theories on power, but discarding each qua theories and qua systems, we 
arrive at something, though perhaps not satisfactory in the scientific sense of 
theoretical research, much better equipped to face the lacunae created by theories of 
power. The logic behind non-dimensional power is not circular, nor is it deductive or 
derivative. By adopting an anarchic/protean stance towards power, logic does not 
really play into the equation; it can function at the pure, metaphysical level, or at the 
applied, empirical level; whichever is contextually appropriate. This 
anarchy/proteanism, however, strips power of its explanatory power, as it is too fluid 
to be logically or nomically contained. Furthermore, concepts such as ‘oppression’, 
‘exploitation’, ‘control’ and many others typically associated with ‘power’, are much 
better served by not invoking ‘power’, at all, but, rather, by describing them in 
sociological, political, or even phenomenological, terms. Many forms of control, 
exploitation and dominance are not properly explained by ‘power’ and require the 
development of entirely novel, multi-disciplinary fields of study in order to even begin 
to unravel their complexity; these fields are still just as concerned with ‘power’, 
however, and, as a result, suffer from the same methodological issues that make the 
concepts under review so difficult to understand, in the first place. Eschewing power 
altogether, in favour of a more localised and specific mode of understanding these 
concepts, allows for a greater, and more creative, theoretical freedom, which would, 










 The purpose of the chapter is to survey, analyse and critique contemporary, 
analytic theories of power in political science. Many of these theories are rooted in 
traditions and concepts dating as far back as the ethnography of Machiavelli and the 
political philosophy of Aristotle; it will thus be necessary to visit these theorists, albeit 
cursorily, in order to trace the evolution of the concept of power in political science and 
philosophy. Through the work of Michael D. Parsons, Kenneth E. Boulding, Peter 
Morriss, Daniel Béland, Terry Hathaway and others, we can come to understand the 
current state of the concept of the power and trace its genealogical course from 
Aristotle to the present. The main theoretical questions that this work will seek to 
explore, other than the ontological question surrounding ‘power’, is whether or not 
power is actually useful as an analytical concept in political science and, furthermore, 
whether or not there are concepts that are more explanatorily useful than power in 
understanding related concepts such as domination, governance, cooperation, 
exploitation and the like.  
 
II. An Ontology of Power 
As Michael D. Parsons points out in his 1999 article “The Problem of Power”, 
the debate over the meaning of power is “a relatively recent event, with students of 
power apparently having operated with an implicit understanding of the concept until 
the post-World War II era”.5 Furthermore, he states that in the social sciences, “the 
concept of power did not gain currency until the 1930s and 1940s”.6 On account of the 
 
5 Parsons, Michael D. “The Problem of Power: Seeking A Methodological Solution”. Policy Studies Review, Fall/Winter, 
1999. 16:3/4, pp. 278-310.  





growing use of power as an analytical concept, social scientists “undertook a search 
for an explicit, universal definition of power”; this quest “touched off a debate that still 
rages across the social sciences” and, as Parsons claims, “social scientists have been 
unable to find a methodological solution”.7 This inability to find a ‘methodological 
solution’ to the problem of power has caused the concept to lose “considerable appeal 
as an explanatory concept within academic circles”8, which seems only to have made 
the concept of power that much more difficult to define. Parsons argues that the project 
of conceiving of a universal definition of power “has attracted researched after 
researcher, but none has been equal to the task” and “[not] even Hans J. 
Morgenthau…who claimed that “the distinctive, unifying element of politics is the 
struggle for power”…was able to solve this puzzle.”9 This general failure on the part of 
the social sciences to effectively theorise power has led to the concept’s fall “from a 
commanding theoretical resource to a very modest abstraction for which an occasional 
legitimate use can be found in theory and research”.10 Parsons believes that the timing 
of power’s ‘entry into the social science lexicon” might explain its “rise and fall as an 
explanatory concept”: when the concept was adopted from the mechanical sciences, 
“the orientation of the social sciences was firmly positivistic”. This adoption of power 
as a mechanical and positivist concept led, in turn, to the adoption of the language of 
positivism and the logic of scientific discovery in the social sciences, both of which 
“required that concepts be operationally defined and objectively measured”.11 One of 
the first to revive the “Hobbesian concept of power” in the 1950s was Herbert Simon, 
who found that he was “unable…to arrive at a satisfactory solution” when it came to 
 
7 Ibid. 








“giving power an operational definition”.12 Another theorist who “took up the challenge” 
was Robert Dahl, who, though he “sparked the lively “faces of power” debates”, was 
no more successful than Simon “in producing an uncontested, unproblematic definition 
of power”.13 As Parsons makes clear, “power could not meet the demands of a 
positivist social science.”14 Parsons, in his article, claims to offer a methodological 
approach for “reconstructing and reclaiming the concept of power for use in policy 
analysis and research.”15 He believes that this reconstruction means understanding 
power “as the thread that holds collective action together”; this means that the “precise 
definition or meaning of power emerges from the study of collective action and is 
potentially different from one social context to the [other].”16 It is through this 
reconstruction and reclamation of the concept of power that it can become “an 
explanatory concept that helps social scientists explicate collective action.”17 The 
present article will not focus so much on Parson’s ‘sociology of translation’, which he 
promotes as the methodology that can “solve the problem of power while avoiding the 
pitfalls of earlier approaches”, but will instead focus on how Parsons arrives to said 
conclusion and methodology. In his article, Parsons states that there are several steps 
required before being able to, as he claims to have done, reconstruct and reclaim the 
concept of power. First, he states, “it is necessary to review the work of Thomas 
Hobbes…and other early political philosophers in order to understand the origin and 
lineage of the debates on power.”18 Secondly, he considers “the “faces of power” 
debates that have dominated much of the discourse on power since the 1950s”.19 






16 Ibid, 280-281. 







and theorisation of the concept of power, which is why we shall now proceed to outline 
Parsons’s analysis. 
 
III. A Genealogy of Power 
 To begin with, Parsons cites Stewart Clegg, who himself draws on the work of 
Zygmunt Bauman, and his classification of power theorists as “legislators and 
interpreters”.20 The role of legislators is to “discuss, debate, theorize, and research the 
question of “What is power?”.21 Clegg holds that irrespective of what power actually 
is, “power is always legislated by some sovereignty”.22 The source of said sovereign 
power, which may be “the people, the consumer, the law, the constitution”, etc., “may 
differ from theorist to theorist”, but the focus of the legislator remains on defining power 
itself and not how and why “the sovereign rules”.23 Interpreters, on the other hand, 
“focus on the questions of how power is obtained, what power does, and how power 
is maintained”.24 Parsons suggests that under Clegg’s theory, it is Hobbes that “can 
be seen as the first legislator and as the intellectual fountainhead of legislative theories 
of power”; what Clegg conceives of as modern legislative theorists’ understanding of 
a “mechanical, causal, and atomistic concept of power” was originally articulated by 
Hobbes.25 As Parsons understands it, Hobbes’s intent was to “reconstruct political 
theory as it then existed and to lay the theoretical foundation for modern state 
power”.26 In order to realise this reconstruction and reconceptualisation of politics, 
Hobbes had to contend with the work of Aristotle, whose theories were the primary 













in any state had to be based on the will of the people and that sovereignty was 
expressed through the law and the constitution”.27 Hobbes, on the other hand, 
believed that “the true sovereign…consisted not of words on paper, but of the state 
backed by the arms and sword of men”. Hobbes went as far as to claim that Aristotle’s 
work was ‘absurd’, ‘repugnant’ and ‘ignorant’. Furthermore, he claimed that a world 
where the State was not sovereign would essentially result in the collapse and 
annihilation of human culture and society, and the humans would be doomed to live 
solitary, nasty and short lives.28 Hobbes did move, at least somewhat, beyond this 
nihilistic vision in justifying his theory. He gave his “new conception of sovereignty 
legitimacy by cloaking it in the language of the new science”, which meant that power 
would cease “to be some religious or metaphysical force that could not be understood, 
shaped, or controlled by humans”.29 Instead, power would be “a simple matter of 
mechanics in which one agent pushed (cause) another agent to act (effect)”; this 
meant that political power was simply a matter of agent interaction in a ‘perpetual’ and 
‘restless desire’ of ‘Power after power’ that would terminate only after death.30 After 
Hobbes established his “mechanical, causal concept of power”, it was taken up, first, 
by John Locke and, subsequently, by David Hume.31 Locke employed the same 
language of cause and effect as Hobbes did, but added the metaphor of billiards in 
order to illustrate the principles of “active and passive power”: 
Active agents on the table, moving balls, strike passive agents, stationary balls, causing 
them to move. Power is cause and effect with active agents demonstrating their power 
through effects on passive agents.32 
 
Locke took this idea beyond Hobbes and claimed that power “produced observable 
change and movement among the agents”; this meant that power, like other ‘natural 
 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, 282-283. 








phenomena’, could be “observed and measured” and that this was “the only way that 
one could scientifically study and prove the existence of power”.33 Hume maintained 
a nearly identical concept of power as Locke, though he used tennis balls instead of 
billiards in his illustration of power. He did, however, add scientific rigor to the study of 
power “by insisting that it should be possible to observe the events producing the 
cause and effect that constituted power”; thus, “from repeated observations of the 
events producing cause and effect”, he believed that “law-like generalizations about 
power could be produced”.34 As Parsons explains, the Hobbes, Locke, Hume 
“discourse on sovereignty and power was so forceful that it virtually eliminated any 
alternative approaches to the question of power”; said discourse transformed power 
into a “legitimate, if sometimes arbitrary, force of nature”, due to the discourse now 
being conducted in “the language of science”.35 This shift to a naturalist understanding 
of power, a shift which was seen throughout the social sciences more generally, forced 
“rival concepts of power” to either “continue along the same conceptual path of cause 
and effect, or risk being labeled irrational and unscientific”.36 As Parsons understands 
it, the “philosophical origins” of power were forgotten and its meaning became “a 
matter of implicit understanding”; this reconceptualisation explains why political 
scientists were able to: 
…operate with an implicit understanding of the meaning of power for three centuries 
after Hobbes first offered his views on the state and power without fully understanding 
the origin of that meaning or how it shaped the discourse on power.37 
 
The result of the social sciences now operating under a naturalist paradigm and power 
now being conceptualised as an observable phenomenon, was that “the problem of 












The debates that began in the 1950s, now known as the “faces of power” debates, 
represent a “reopening and continuation of legislative theory”; as Parsons charges, 
however, the faces of power theorists used “many of the same metaphors as the early 
political philosophers, but without any apparent awareness of their origin”.39 These 
debates simply advanced the legacy of Hobbesian/Lockean/Humean naturalism and 
power became “an exercise in cause and effect that in the new language of the 
behavioral sciences could be observed, measured, and predicted”.40 We shall now 
take a more in-depth look at the so-called ‘faces of power’ debates and their impact 
on political science’s understanding of power.  
 
III. The Problem Facing Power 
 Parsons begins his survey of the ‘faces of power’ debates with Floyd Hunter’s 
1953 study of the community power structure of Atlanta, Georgia, which he 
understands as reopening the “problem of power for discussion and debate in the 
intellectual community”.41 Hunter was concerned with whether or not “representational 
democracy was giving way to local community power elites” and what he found, using 
a “reputational methodology” that he himself developed, was that power was shifting 
from the people to “an elite heavily weighted towards business”.42 The publication, in 
1956, of C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite, continued the debate. Mills defined the 
power elite as those ‘whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary 
environments of ordinary men and women’ because it is they who are ‘in command of 
the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society’.43 Robert Dahl, in turn, 
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the nature of the power elite hypothesis made it ‘virtually impossible to disprove’; 
secondly, he claimed that the theory was ‘quasi-metaphysical’; and lastly, he claimed 
that theory could not be qualified as a scientific one because it ‘cannot even in principle 
be controverted by empirical evidence’.44 The last of Dahl’s claims is a glaring example 
of the naturalisation and positivistic shift of the social sciences mentioned in the 
previous section; because the ruling elite of Mills and others’ theories could not be 
“observed, measured, and analyzed”, then the concept was considered effectively 
useless on an explanatory and analytic level. Dahl even went so far as to provide his 
own definition of the ruling elite, based on Mills’ work, and presented his own method 
for testing the theory, which he then used to disprove said theory.45 As Parsons puts 
it, Dahl, like Hobbes, knew that he could not simply “discredit and dismiss rival 
theorists” and that he had to offer an alternative, adequately positivist, theory of power; 
the new theory “had to make other theories appear irrational, if not unthinkable”,46 
which is actually precisely what Hobbes claimed when he presented his own theory of 
state sovereignty. Dahl, thus, had to ground his definition of power “in the language of 
mechanics” and within the “positivist paradigm”; he did this by, first, providing a 
“precise operational definition” of power, as opposed to Mills’ “rather vague conception 
of power”.47 Dahl, continuing on from the mechanical language used by Hobbes, 
Locke and Hume, defined power as a cause and effect relation between agents; he 
held, intuitively, that ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do’ and that ‘power is a relation…a relation 
among people’.48 Furthermore, Dahl stated that “questions of the base, means, 
amount, and scope of power had to be addressed in any comprehensive study of 
 
44 Ibid. 








power”.49 Dahl’s “pluralist model of power” became, much like the theories of Hobbes, 
Locke and Hume before the 1950s, the dominant theory in power research and 
analysis throughout the 1960s; Dahl refined the “criteria and tests that competing 
theorists had to meet” to such a degree that he fundamentally limited “the range of 
alternatives…and…refinements” to his model.50 As Parsons points out, Newton’s 1969 
critique of Dahl’s pluralist model arrived at “quite different conclusions about who held 
power”, but still accepted Dahl’s definition of power and it is his methodology that 
“guides the inquiry”; Parsons argues that it is the use of Dahl’s methodology that 
explains “why Newton and other challengers…could see but one face or dimension of 
power”.51 On the other hand, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, as first stated in a 
1962 article and in direct antagonism with Dahl’s model, held that power has two faces. 
Bachrach and Baratz did not believe that Dahl was incorrect in defining power using 
his pluralist model; his overall project was flawed, however, due to his ignorance of 
what they came to refer as ‘nondecision making’. As Bachrach and Baratz put it, this 
other face of power is the extent to which ‘a person or group – consciously or 
unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts’; 
two individuals or groups “must have a conflict of interests, B must accept A’s position, 
and A must have some sanction to use against B should B fail to comply”.52 This was, 
effectively, the nondecision making process. This new process improved upon Dahl’s 
theory in three ways: first, it “allowed researchers to account for power that might be 
hidden or exercised covertly in ways that could not be directly observed or measured”; 
secondly, the use of E.E. Schattschneider’s concept of the “mobilization of bias”, first 
introduced in 1960, allowed the definition of power to be expanded beyond individuals 
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“to include structural relationships”; finally, Bachrach and Baratz claimed that power 
not only had to be observed and measured, but also interpreted.53 Bachrach and 
Baratz anticipated that their theory would be attacked for going ‘beyond an 
investigation of what is objectively measurable’ and this did, in fact, occur; their theory 
was “vigorously attacked by those who followed Dahl and those who subscribed to the 
belief that power existed only to the extent that it could be observed and measured”.54 
As Nelson Polsby put it, in his 1980 publication: 
How to study this second face of power? To what manifestations of social reality might 
the mobilization of bias refer? Are phenomena of this sort amenable to empirical 
investigation?55 
 
Bachrach and Baratz eventually caved to the pressure of these positivist attacks and 
claimed, in their 1970 publication, that ‘although absence of conflict may be a non-
event, a decision which results in prevention of conflict is very much an event – and 
an observable one…’.56 Bachrach and Baratz could not escape the influence and force 
of the positivist critiques levelled against them and had to somehow make even the 
absence of conflict between agents, where, presumably, the parties’ interests either 
align or are universally met, an observable phenomenon; Steven Lukes, on the other 
hand, “sought to reinforce nondecision making theory as a legitimate dimension of 
power” and, furthermore, he sought to move beyond nondecision making “to a third 
face or dimension of power”.57 Lukes, in his work Power: A Radical View (1974), 
directly linked his own theory of power to those of both Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz; 
he saw all three as ‘alternative interpretations and applications of one and the same 
underlying concept of power, according to which A exercises power over B when A 
affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests’.58 Parsons claims that even though 
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Lukes’s definition of power fits into the causal mould first set by Hobbes, he 
distinguished himself “from his theoretical predecessors” by introducing the “concept 
of interests”; Lukes claimed, first, that the interests involved in the first two faces of 
power are subjective and, secondly, that “the concept of interests is not fully developed 
in either of the faces”.59 The concept of subjective interests that Lukes proposes is 
similar to Marx’s conception of false consciousness; because people are operating 
“under an illusion of their real interests”, then it should be ‘objective interests’, interests 
that are presumably not illusory, that should be understood and pursued.60 These 
objective interests, as Lukes puts it, give us ‘ a license for the making of normative 
judgments of a moral and political character’; he does not, however, reference a model 
of objective interests.61 Parsons points out that what Lukes must have in mind is 
something like Jurgen Habermas’s  “ideal speech situation, i.e. when people know 
what their real interests are and are unconstrained in their participation in the 
discourse over those interests”.62 This understanding of the “concept of interests” 
allows us to flesh out fully all three faces of power: 
The first face is a primitive face in which A openly forces B to do something against 
his/her will. The second face is more sophisticated in that B does not act because 
she/he thinks or knows that A does not want him/her to act, or because A creates 
barriers that limit B. In the third face of power, A has power over B’s formation of 
interests so that B is unable to act on his/her real interests.63 
 
Lukes himself asked, ‘is not the supreme exercise of power to avert conflict and 
grievance by influencing, shaping, and determining the perceptions and preference of 
others?’; and, thus, took power to the limits of the positivist paradigm without 
renouncing it completely.64 Lukes offers an objective truth beyond the merely 
subjective truth that agents involved in a power relation are able to articulate. Ideally, 
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“subjects are able to determine their own objective interests”, but subjects are not 
always “fully aware of their own best interests”.65 As Parsons states, Lukes, ultimately, 
“accepts Hobbes’ causal definition of power and safely returns to Locke’s view that 
power must be observable”.66 Though the ‘faces of power’ were the dominant 
theories/debates on power from the 1960s on, there were other concurrent attempts 
made to define power: Nicos Poulantzas, for example, defined power, in a 1986 article, 
as ‘the capacity of a social class to realize its objective interests’; Marxists and Neo-
Marxists believed that sovereignty was “exercised by the ruling elite through the class 
system”; and Talcot Parsons, while approaching power “in a manner similar to Hobbes 
and Dahl”, attempted to fit power “into his general theory of action”.67 Most of these 
theorists sought a “singular, universal definition of power” and, as Foucault put it, none 
of them were ‘able to eschew the model of Leviathan in the study of power’.68 This 
type of search for “universal concepts and theories” was termed by C. Wright Mills as 
the search for ‘Grand Theory’, which focuses on ‘conceptions intended to be of use in 
classifying all social relations and providing insight into their supposedly invariant 
features’.69 The work of grand theorists is “virtually meaningless for other researchers 
and for the public” because it deals with “generalities” at such a high level of 
abstraction; this results in ‘an elaborate and arid formalism’ that gives these theories 
no historical or social context.70 Parsons argues that the Grand Theory search many 
“useful concepts”, but because their insights were limited to “certain settings or 
contexts”, they seemed useless to those looking for “a definition or concept of power 
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theorists, “working in a different research tradition”, were the ones to finally ‘cut off the 
King’s head’, as Foucault put it, and “advance the discourse on power beyond cause 
and effect definitions”.72  
 
IV. Power: Subject to Interpretation 
 We have so far discussed the school of power theorists that Stewart Clegg 
referred to as ‘legislators’, who are concerned with the question, “what is power?”; 
legislators, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with “how power is obtained, 
what power does, and how it is maintained”.73 As Clegg states, these theorists focus 
on ‘strategies, deals, negotiation, fraud and conflict’; while the legislators can be traced 
back to Hobbes, interpretivist thought originates in the theories of Niccolo 
Machiavelli.74 Interpreters are not interested in normatively defining power and 
identifying relations, agents, causes and actions in power relations; instead, they are 
interested in “translating the meaning of power as it appears in different social 
contexts”.75 Like Machiavelli, they employ an ‘ethnographic research method for 
uncovering the rules of the game’; however, it is not simply what questions they are 
concerned with or what methods they utilise that separates legislators and 
interpreters.76 What separates at a theoretical and foundational level, is the “choice of 
metaphors that Hobbes and Machiavelli originally used to drive their work and which 
continue to drive the work of their intellectual heirs”’; Hobbes used “the language and 
metaphors of the mechanical sciences” in his theory of power, while Machiavelli “took 
the language and metaphors of armies and war”.77 Parsons argues that “the 
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ontological approaches to the question of power”; for legislators, power is a natural 
and observable relation, while for legislators, “power is a socially constructed reality”.78 
Thus, “there is not a single foundation from which all interpreters build their theories 
of power” and there is also no single way to define power, which is both a cause and 
result of interpretivists not being linked by a “common research methodology”.79 This, 
of course, makes it difficult “to summarize and group interpretivists because different 
schools and individuals have developed their own distinct approaches” to power, with 
their only commonality being their interpretivist foundation.80 Parsons only goes on to 
survey one interpretive approach to the concept of power, which is known as the 
‘communications concept’. Parsons claims that ‘communications’ was, in fact, 
recognised as an issue “in the early mechanical conceptions of power but was ignored 
because the mechanical sciences model did not have to deal with the problem of 
communications between objects” and “political philosophers had no conceptual tools 
to account for the problem of communications between humans in their definitions of 
power”.81 John Dewey, in his 1927 work The Public and Its Problems, “implies, but 
does not fully develop, the concept of a communication community” and, as Parsons 
points out, the details “must be teased out by the reader”. Dewey’s theory: 
...starts with, rather than ends it, the process of collective action. The product of 
collective action, regardless of how well it is conceived and planned, produces 
unintended or unanticipated consequences for the public. As these consequences 
become apparent, the institutions responsible for implementing the public will and the 
public interact to produce a new decision. Of paramount importance in this process is 
communication between individuals and institutions who are either affected by a 
decision or are concerned with the consequences of any new decision.82 
 
Dewey’s philosophy is fundamentally different to that of both Hobbes and Machiavelli; 
Dewey does not see “a natural antagonism between the public and the state”, instead 
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he sees a community “bounded together by communication”.83 A “true democratic 
public” only emerges from “the communication required by group problem solving” and 
“the same is true of democratic governments which exists as a function of the collective 
action process”; communication, rather than violence, becomes the “mechanism for 
social order in the communication community”.84 The communication community is a 
“lively, free-wheeling society, but one that also places a heavy moral and political 
responsibility on its citizens”85; meaning that: 
…must be aware of community issues, the consequences of collective actions, the 
needs of society, and must make decisions based on the needs of the community 
without the possibility of passing the burden for decision making on to some higher 
authority or outside agent.86 
 
In this community, “power as domination is replaced by power as problem solving, 
thus the public must take responsibility for solving its problems”; thus, if “the public 
fails to take responsibility, there is no external system of social control, and the internal 
system of social order begins to unravel”.87 Dewey recognised that “certain 
prerequisites were necessary for consummation” of the communication community to 
occur, which entail ‘free social inquiry’ being ‘indissolubly wedded to the art of full and 
moving communication’.88 The first prerequisite was “a common language that could 
be used and understood by all of the community”; language, however, was not itself 
“enough to foster fully understood communications”.89 The second prerequisite, then, 
was the identification of “widely understood signs and symbols to convey shared 
meanings”; furthermore, groups would be required to interact in cooperative activities 
because ‘the pulls and responses of different groups reenforce [sic] one another and 
 











their values accord’.90 Emotional, intellectual and moral bonds are produced by these 
“shared activities” and they serve to “bind the community”; when all of these 
prerequisites are met, then “a community evolves that is capable of transforming the 
power of domination into the power of problem solving”.91 Dewey was criticised for 
tending “to present concepts and theories only to leave them underdeveloped as he 
raced on to new ideas”; thus, it took until the 1960s for the theory of communicative 
power to be addressed again.92 The next person to take up the concept of 
communicative power was Hannah Arendt; who developed her theory “out of her 
concern with violence”.93 Arendt believed that violence was so accepted in political 
theory that social scientists simply took it for granted and, thus, neglected the concept; 
she accused “political theorists of uncritically accepting the wedding of violence and 
power”, which was epitomised by C. Wright Mills’s claim that ‘all politics is a struggle 
for power’ and ‘the ultimate kind of power is violence’.94 Arendt’s project meant to 
“separate violence and power” and produce “a new concept of power that was not 
based on domination”; traditional political theory, however, “traces the roots of power 
back to the absolute power of kings and even back to Greek antiquity in defining power 
in terms of domination”.95 Arendt, then, meant to borrow from concepts of governance 
developed by the “Athenian city-states and the Romans” that rested ‘on the power of 
the people’, rather than on the coercion and rule of domination and violence.96 Since 
sovereignty is meant to rest “on the power of the people”, then “the state and all 
political institutions” decay and petrify ‘as soon as the living power of the people 
ceases to uphold them’; in other words, violence “could hold a government in place, 
 
90 Ibid, 293-294. 




95 Ibid, 294-295. 





but power could come only from the consent of the governed”.97 In addition to her 
theory of the sovereignty of the people, Arendt understood “the role of language and 
the need to create a new vocabulary for her discourse on power”.98 Arendt needed, 
primarily, to produce “distinct, separate definitions for power, strength, force, authority, 
and violence”, which would avoid reducing ‘public affairs to the business of 
dominion’.99 Arendt, through a careful definition of the language that she used to 
discuss power, sought to “give legitimacy to certain types of social behavior while 
making still other types of behavior socially unacceptable”.100 Parsons points out that 
Arendt’s project is similar to Talcott Parsons’ concern “with the legitimacy of the 
possession and use of power in a social system”.101 Talcott Parsons, taking his cue 
from economics, argued that power can only be legitimate if it is “accepted by 
members of a society” and the leaders of said society “had a mandate from the 
members to act in their behalf”; power, then, functioned as a “circulating medium 
generated by the political system”.102 Arendt, on the other hand, arrived at the social 
contract “as the mechanism for giving legitimacy to power” from natural law; thus, 
power is legitimate “only as long…as it comes from the governed and is expressed in 
a social contract or agreement”.103 Neither Arendt nor Talcott Parsons’s theories allow 
“a legitimate role for violence”, but both do permit “the use of force in fulfilling the goals 
of society”.104 Jurgen Habermas both praises and criticises Arendt, in turn: he praises 
her work for moving away from the teleological model proposed by positivist, causal 
power theorists and conceiving of power as something built, rather, from 
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philosophical and not sufficiently grounded in ‘well-balanced investigations’, which 
leads to her theory producing absurdities, ‘when applied to modern societies’.105 More 
specifically, Habermas claims that the three major flaws in Arendt’s theory are: her 
failure “to account for the strategic competition for political power”; “the employment 
of power within the political system”; and “her reliance on the contract theory of natural 
law”. Despite this. Habermas felt that Arendt’s communicative action concept “was 
fundamentally sound” and he used it “as the basis for developing his own theory of 
communicative action”.106 Habermas, in his theory of communicative action, focused 
on “communicative competence”, which: 
...depends on the ability and willingness of speakers to state propositional sentences 
in a way that are cognitively true, without intent to deceive the listener, and in a manner 
consistent with the normative orientation of the speaker and listener.107 
 
As an example: 
…communicative competence is reached when participants in discussions recognize 
the differences between true and false statements and accept as true statements those 
which would be accepted as true statements in the absence of coercion.108 
 
Habermas, as a part of his project to reconstruct rational society, prioritises 
communicative action “over all other forms of action”; he claims that action either takes 
the form of “strategic action” or communicative action.109 Strategic action is seen as 
“purposive-rational action in which communication is instrumental”; communicative 
action, on the other hand, is non-instrumental because that which is agreed 
communicatively ‘has a rational basis’ and it cannot be ‘imposed by either party’, 
neither ‘instrumentally through intervention in the situation directly’ nor ‘strategically 
through influencing decisions of opponents’.110 `If we take as fact that ‘the use of 
language with an orientation to reaching an understanding is the original mode of 
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language use’, then communicative action “priority over, and cannot be reduced to, 
strategic action’; thus, communicative action allows for the foundation of a 
community.111 Habermas uses these two types of action to construct a two-level 
concept of society: 
The economic system and political administration are action spheres characterized by 
strategic action. Rather than responding to normative values, these spheres are 
coordinated and driven by money, power, and success without regard for 
communicative competence. Detached from the action system is the life-world. The life-
world is characterized by the drive to reach communicative competence and is 
coordinated through full, open, and truthful communication.112 
 
It is this dualism that helps shield communication from “the distortions of power”.113 
Habermas has been criticised both for dividing the world into “separate, 
nonintersecting spheres with different foundations” and for privileging communicative 
action “over all other forms of action”.114 Axel Honneth suggested that Habermas is 
“building his project on a theoretical fiction” if he truly believes that the two spheres 
“can exist independently”; Foucault argued that “communication and knowledge, far 
from freeing us, have been servants to disciplinary power and subjection”: in other 
words, “the life-world has become the handmaiden of the action system”.115 For 
Habermas’s theory to work, the idea of “uncoerced communication between 
competent participants”116 is key; communicative competence itself rests upon “the 
ability and willingness of participants to speak without the intent to deceive” and a 
communicative community “rests on a foundation of trust” that is reinforced “by 
unrestrained communication”.117 Power, specifically the power to dominate, “interferes 
with and distorts universal communication” and is not conducive to the building of a 














Dewey, Arendt and Habermas all share the foundational link of communicative action, 
but they are all, at the same time, fundamentally different in the way they employ the 
concept theoretically. Dewey “bases his communication community on praxis”, which 
means that the community is “never complete”, but “constantly evolving, through 
collective action, in search of a more perfect community”.119 The community is power 
because it is able to engage in problem solving. Arendt, on the other hand, “envisions 
a more static community in which agreements are reached within the boundaries of a 
written social contract rather than through praxis”.120 Habermas, through an explicit 
definition of what constitutes communicative action, “creates an ideal theory to which 
a community can aspire and against which it can judge its level of communicative 
competence”. Habermas, contrary to Arendt and Dewey, does not ultimately accept 
the idea that “power can be transformed into a social good that promotes 
communicative action”; he sees power as a distorter of communication.121 Parsons 
points out that selecting simply one approach or theory “to guide the study of power 
remains problematic at best”; legislators have given themselves what would seem to 
be an impossible task, which is to find a definition of power “that applies at all times 
and in all places”.122 Defining and studying power has become such a difficult project 
that it has produced “a division among political scientists with some claiming that 
power is no longer a useful concept and others claiming that it must be the guiding 
concept for political science”.123 Parsons claims that interpreters “have avoided the 
problem of finding a universal definition of power”, but have created an entirely 











interpreters merely find whatever ‘facts’ fit their theory.124 Other critics claims that all 
theories of power, legislative or interpretive, “tend to coincide with disciplinary 
perspective and world views”: political scientists ask “how the state influences society” 
and they find that “power is pluralistic”; others see pluralism as too simplistic an answer 
“and offer non-decision making as an alternative”; sociologists, on the other hand, ask 
“how society influences the state” and they find “a power elite or ruling class”.125 Thus, 
the meaning of power “is not a matter of interpretation, but rather a function of the 
methodology and theory selected to guide the inquiry”.126 Parsons suggests that it is 
the ‘sociology of translation’ that offers a way to save “the best of the interpretivist 
approaches without becoming in tangled [sic] in the methodological problems 
associated with those approaches”.127 
 
V. Power in Translation 
 It would appear, as Parsons claims, that Dahl’s concern that power research 
would turn into a ‘bottomless swamp’ is now the case. Parsons suggests, then, that 
said ‘swamp’ can be avoided “by using an eclectic assortment of research methods to 
reconstruct and reclaim power for use in policy analysis and research”.128 This 
suggests, then, “some combination of cultural, historical, political, and sociological 
methods with the common thread being interpretation”.129 This design begins with 
Michel Callon and Bruno Latour’s sociology of translation, which “presents one with a 
clearer field of vision unimpeded by a priori interpretations or theories of power”; the 
true meaning of power can emerge only “from the social and historical context in which 













power can only be understood “by interpreting it in the social context in which it is 
situated”, they did develop a fairly novel, “explicitly stated methodological framework” 
that could be understood and followed by other researchers.131 The sociology of 
translation was born out of a concern “with the paradox inherent in the problem of 
power”, which can very roughly be described as: when one has power – ‘in potentia’ 
– nothing happens and one is powerless; when one exerts power – ‘in actu’ – others 
are acting and not oneself; this paradox presents itself methodologically when social 
scientists treat power “as both cause and effect”.132 One way out of this paradox, then, 
is “to think of power as a way to summarize collection action”; the translation model, 
as Latour argues, allows the social scientist to understand power not as a cause of 
collective action but ‘as a consequence’.133 The key to understanding power, then, is 
understanding “what holds…collective action together”; when this is understood, then 
“power can be named and defined”. Research using the sociology of translation is 
guided by three methodological principles: the first principle is “agnosticism”, which 
means that the researcher “must be an impartial observer who refrains from privileging 
any one point of view or censoring any respondent”.134 The second methodological 
principle is “generalized symmetry”, which requires that the researcher “use the same 
vocabulary and terms when describing and explaining the actors in the study”.135 
Finally, the third methodological principle is “free association”, which means that a 
researcher “must not impose and a priori grid of analysis on the actors, but must 
observe the actors to determine how” they themselves ‘define and associate 
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natural’.136 Callon and Latour use translation to refer to all of the ‘negotiations, 
intrigues, calculations’ and ‘acts of persuasion and violence’ that “actors use to gain 
the authority to speak for other actors in the political process”; this process allows 
“micro-actors to become macro-actors with the authority to speak for other actors and 
to speak with one voice”.137 The translation process “can be divided into four steps or 
“moments””: problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation; the 
process, however, is continuous and “moves forward in a never ending reenactment 
of the translation steps”.138 Problematisation involves an actor attempting to either 
convince other actors that their definition of the problem is the correct one or that their 
solution is the proper one for a given problem definition; the actor gains “the right to 
speak for other actors” when they accomplish this. Furthermore, the actor gains control 
“over the range of policy options available for responding to public problems”.139 
Interessement follows problematisation because “an actor’s definition of the problem 
and/or solution” is not enough considering that “other actors will attempt to position 
themselves to control the policy agenda”; an actor, then, must make their position 
interesting “to actors who have committed to or expressed interest in another problem 
definition/solution”.140 An actor “must come between two other actors” and persuade 
them over to their position. Enrolment follows on from interessement, as it seeks to 
“build stable alliances and coalitions around the problem definition/solution”, though 
these alliances and/or coalitions need not last any longer than the realisation of policy 
decision.141 The last step in the process, following on from the first three, is 
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employed to maintain the alliance through the policy decision”; if the alliance and/or 
coalitions can be maintained even after “the policy decision is reached, then the power 
of the lead actors will be institutionalized”.142 Parsons points out that the question of 
“how to study power in a policy arena, or in any social context” is “problematic at best”; 
he believes that, instead of “actually studying power”, students are focused, rather, on 
how to study power.143 Even if one does choose to employ alternative research 
methods, there is no single method that is entirely devoid of difficulties. Parsons claims 
that Callon and Latour’s sociology of translation “in combination with other methods” 
is the “most plausible way” to go about studying power. The advantage of using this 
method is that it does not “ignore the issues and concerns identified” in other 
approaches, but simply “considers them from a different perspective”. Parsons does 
not pretend that “the debate over power, the meaning of power, operational definitions, 
and approaches to the study of power” will end any time soon, if ever, but he does 
believe that the sociology of translation “provides a sturdy framework” for 
reconstructing and reclaiming power “for use in policy analysis and research”.144 The 
meaning of power, when one uses the sociology of translation, “emerges from the 
study of what holds collective action together” and when this is understood, then power 
is given “meaning and definition”.145 Finally, when this is complete, “power can be 
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V. Soft Power 
 Joseph Nye’s work deals with the concept of ‘soft power’, which is concerned 
with what he calls the “soft dimensions of power”: influence, persuasion, allegiance 
and propaganda and the spread of information. This type of power is in contrast, 
relatively, to what is defined as ‘hard power’, which concerns itself with military and 
economic strength. An analysis of this apparent dichotomy in the ways in which power 
takes shape and expresses itself allows us to understand ‘the political’, particularly 
‘the geopolitical’, in novel and more acute ways. The question, here, is whether or not 
the concept of ‘soft power’ still retains its supposed explanatory power in the face of 
biopolitical theories and understandings of power. 
VI. The Changing Nature of Power 
…power depends on context, and the distribution of power differs greatly in different 
domains. We saw that in the global information age, power is distributed among 
countries in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game.147 
 
 Joseph Nye is concerned with the battle for hearts and minds and power of 
information and technology; more specifically, he is concerned with the changing 
nature of power, both presently and over the centuries. Nye refers to concepts such 
as influence, propaganda and the spread of information, persuasion and allegiance as 
the “soft dimensions” of power; he claims that, more  generally, power itself can be 
understood as “the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one 
wants”.148 Power, however, “always depends on the context in which the relationship 
exists”; this means, though difficult in praxis, somehow knowing the preferences and 
desires of others in order to accurately gauge whether or not one has really affected 
their behaviour.149 If we ask someone to do something, but they either do not mind 
doing it or they actually enjoy doing it, when we think that they otherwise would not do 
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it, then the power that we think that we have exercised is illusory. Furthermore, though 
again difficult, we would have to know how someone would act “in the absence of our 
commands”, in order to accurately gauge whether or not we have exercised power 
over them.150 Respect and legitimacy can persuade people to act on behalf of those 
whom they respect and believe in; this fact has caused some to define power as simply 
“the possession of capabilities or resources that can influence outcomes” because 
questions concerning behaviour and motivation can be regarded as “too 
complicated”.151 These same people consider state power as being measured in 
“population and territory, extensive natural resources, economic strength, military 
force, and social stability”; defining power in this way makes it seem “more concrete, 
measurable, and predictable”, but the definition becomes problematic when we try to 
understand why it is that those who are most affluent and ‘strong’, both economically 
and militarily, “do not always get the outcomes they want”.152 According to Nye, the 
conversion of power resources into power ‘realised’ requires “well-designed strategies 
and skilful leadership”; strategies often fail and leaders are often incompetent, 
however, and this stems both from a misunderstanding of context and from the 
election of leaders being based on factors that are not necessarily relevant when it 
comes to actual governance.153 Power resources, particularly at the international level, 
have become increasingly difficult to assess over the centuries; this is because the 
global nature of power does not lend itself well to simple context determination and 
there are so many dimensions to even the most casual exercise of power.154 The 
United States, for example, might be considered by many as the world’s “only 
superpower”, but why, then, does it require the consensus of other major powers in 
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matters of “trade, antitrust, or financial regulations” and those same powers’ 
cooperation to tackle issues such as “terrorism, international crime, climate change, 
and the spread of infectious diseases”?155 Nye believes that it makes no sense to label 
the United States a hegemonic or imperial power or to claim that the world is unipolar, 
if it is effectively incapable of acting unilaterally at the global level. He claims that 
“many political leaders still focus almost entirely on military assists and classic military 
solutions” and that these leaders are “one-dimensional players in a three-dimensional 
game”; this, as he claims, is “the way to lose”, since failing to incorporate soft power 
elements into one’s strategy leaves one at a massive disadvantage.156  
 
VII. The Nature of Soft Power 
 ‘Hard power’ is the power afforded by military and economic strength; it can 
rest on “inducements…or threats”; it is not, however, the only form of power.157 The 
type of power that requires neither threats nor other types of coercion, an indirect type 
of power, is known as “the second face of power”; setting the agenda and attracting 
others to you “in world politics” can be both more effective and, in a sense, more 
‘powerful’ than simply forcing others to change “by threatening military force or 
economic sanctions”.158 This is, effectively, soft power, which can be understood as 
“getting others to want the outcomes that you want” and co-opting people rather than 
coercing them; soft power is founded on “the ability to shape the preferences of others” 
and on the use of attraction and seduction.159 Nye argues that authoritarian states rely 
on coercion and threat to maintain power and carry out objectives, but democratic 
states need to rely more “on a combination of inducement and attraction”; soft power, 
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then, is an essential part of “daily democratic politics”.160 He claims that establishing 
preferences is associated with “intangible assets” like “an attractive personality, 
culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or 
having moral authority”.161 It is more economical, then, monetarily and temporally 
speaking, to lead a group, if a leader “represents values that others want to follow”; 
Nye goes on to claim that soft power and influence are not equivalent, particularly 
since influence “can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments”.162 Soft power 
is more than simply the act of persuasion “or the ability to move people by argument”; 
it is also “the ability to attract”, which can lead to “acquiescence” and obedience and 
this means that, in terms of behaviour, “soft power is attractive power”.163 The 
resources that increase soft/attractive power are whatever assets that lead to people 
being attracted to either leaders or policies and this, according to Nye, is determined 
through the use of polls and focus groups; whether or not the ‘attraction’ that is 
produced ultimately produces “desired policy outcomes” must be judged “in particular 
cases” and after the fact.164 Nye suggests that a way to understand the difference 
between hard and soft power is to take into consideration how we obtain the outcomes 
that we want: one can use command, threat, force or economic sanctions; one can 
convince others by using economic power; one can make the desires of others seem 
unrealistic and impossible to realise; and one can appeal “to a sense of attraction, 
love, or duty” or to “shared values about the justness of contributing to those shared 
values and purposes”.165 This means that soft power is involved if one can be 
persuaded to do or believe something without the need for any “explicit threat or 
 










exchange taking place”, or, as Nye explains it, if one’s behaviour is determined “by an 
observable but intangible attraction”; the currency that determines, and is exchanged 
in, soft power is “an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of 
contributing to the achievement of those values”.166 The reason that hard and soft 
power are related is the fact that they are both essentially tools that one can use to 
achieve one’s objective “by affecting the behavior of others”; Nye distinguishes 
between the two by claiming that “the nature of the behavior” and “the tangibility of the 
resources” that each type of power entails are entirely different.167 As Nye theorises: 
Command power—the ability to change what others do—can rest on coercion or 
inducement. Co-optive power—the ability to shape what others want—can rest on the 
attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of 
political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences 
because they seem to be too unrealistic.168 
 
The behaviours associated with command and co-option can be determined along a 
spectrum that ranges from “coercion to economic inducement to agenda setting to 
pure attraction”; the co-optive end of the spectrum is where we tend to find soft-power 
resources, while the command end tends toward hard-power resources.169 However, 
possessing a great deal of hard power and hard-power resources can often be a 
strategy towards possessing, in turn, soft power and soft-power resources; some 
countries, for example, are attracted to others that possess command power “by myths 
of invincibility”170 and the impression and image of strength and even, presumably, the 
promise and hope of power and strength by association. Command power can also 
be used to create institutions “that later become regarded as legitimate”171, which 
means that hard power can, essentially, be used as the means to an end, in the way 
that the violence of war purportedly promises to establish future peace. Furthermore, 
 










a strong economy provides the resources for both “sanctions and payments”, but it 
can also attract and serve as a promise or aspiration to others who may then ally 
themselves with said power.172 Soft power, in international politics, originates in the 
cultural values of an organisation or country, the “internal practices and policies” of 
said organisation or country and in the way that they associate with other countries 
and organisations; though it may be difficult to satisfactorily “control and employ” soft 
power, this does not mean that it is any less important nor does it mean that it should 
not be sought and worked towards.173 As far back as 1939, E. H. Carr argued that 
international power manifested itself in three ways: militarily, economically and as 
“power over opinion”; Hubert Védrine, a former French minister, claimed that the 
power of the Americans originates in their capacity to “inspire the dreams and desires 
of others, thanks to the mastery of global images through film and television and 
because…large numbers of students…come to the United States to finish their 
studies”.174 Nye claims that those who do not understand the importance of soft power 
are similar to those “who do not understand the power of seduction”. It is often the 
case that an increase or decline in either soft-power or hard-power resources can lead 
to an equivalent effect in the opposite type of power; for example, economic or military 
decline can lead to a loss of soft power because it is, of course, far more difficult to 
shape agendas on the international level and project various forms of strength when 
one lacks the resources to do so. Hard power can be used, as mentioned before, to 
establish institutions that can later gain the legitimacy they need to create soft power; 
these institutions can then be used to “set the agenda for smaller states”.175 Soft 
power, nevertheless, does not depend on hard power; a country, or union, may have 
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a great deal of economic and military power, but be seen as lacking in soft power 
because of its position as an aggressor or if it chooses to implement policies, either at 
home or abroad, that may be considered brutal, inhumane or unjust.176 Some nations 
hold a great deal of soft power, not because they are economically or militarily strong 
or because they are great in size, but because they have chosen to pursue policies, 
such as “economic aid or peacemaking”, that allow them to gain the respect and 
admiration of other nations and are praised, in turn.177 Nye points out that Norway has 
participated in peace talks “in the Philippines, the Balkans, Colombia, Guatemala, Sri 
Lanka, and the Middle East”, which has greatly enhanced its soft power because of its 
taking on of the role of international peacemaker and facilitator.178 Michael Ignatieff 
describes influence as being derived from three “assets”: “moral authority as a good 
citizen…military capacity…and international assistance capability”; he recognises that 
larger nations, particularly the United States, benefit from associating with nations that 
are seen as ‘more legitimate’, which is certainly the case with Canada, and this, in 
turn, provides smaller nations with bargaining power.179 The Polish government, for 
example, decided to send troops to Iraq not only for the benefit of the United States, 
but also to create “a broader positive image of Poland in world affairs”; the Indian 
foreign minister, after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, decided to welcome the 
new government not with gifts of arms or food, but rather with “tapes of Bollywood 
movies and music, which were…distributed across [Kabul]”.180 Institutions are key in 
enhancing a country’s soft power; Britain, in the nineteenth century, and the United 












…advanced their values by creating a structure of international rules and institutions 
that were consistent with the liberal and democratic nature of the British and American 
economic systems: free trade and the gold standard in the case of Britain; the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations in 
the case of the United States. 
 
These institutions allow powerful nations to essentially shape the world in their image, 
though instead of having to deal with the illegitimacy of influence through coercion, 
force and/or violence, the nations that follow them and incorporate internationally 
recognised standards and laws domestically do so willingly.181 Nye argues that a 
country’s soft power comes from three resources: “its culture…its political values…and 
its foreign policies”; for Nye, culture “is the set of values and practices that create 
meaning for a society”.182 If a country includes universal values within its culture and 
if its policies promote “values and interests that others share”, then this increases its 
soft power “because of the relationships of attraction and duty that it creates”; since 
“narrow values and parochial cultures are less likely to produce soft power”, then the 
more ‘universal’ a culture, the greater its ability to attract those from other cultures and 
recruit allies for whatever reason or purpose.183 Nye claims that some make the 
mistake of equating soft power with “popular cultural power”, which means that they 
believe that soft power behaviour is the same as “the cultural resources that 
sometimes help produce it”.184 Niall Ferguson, for example, believes that soft power 
is simply comprised of “non-traditional forces such as cultural and commercial goods” 
and that it is just too “soft” to be of any real political consequence.185 Nye suggests 
that the problem with these arguments is that popular culture, as a resource, does 
produce soft power, but, because “the effectiveness of any power resource depends 
on the context”, then it can often seem as if popular culture does not really have a 
 









significant impact on government policy or political thought, in general.186 The popular 
culture of a society, like culture itself, can be seen as attractive or repulsive depending 
on the demographic that is judging said culture; the older generation may generally 
find new tastes, fashions and trends repulsive, while the younger generation are likely 
those that generated them in the first place and will, logically, embrace them. It is not, 
however, always a case of the young against the old; the younger generation may, in 
many cases, be just as, if not even more, conservative than the older one. This point, 
in any case, may serve to highlight how important popular culture actually is, as value-
driven conflicts serve to create enmity where there might otherwise be none and these 
divisions can then be exploited politically. Culture and values are not only 
disseminated commercially; this process also occurs “through personal contacts, 
visits, and exchanges”.187 Foreign students who study in America, entrepreneurs who 
become successful investing in or starting up American businesses and expatriates 
who enjoy a comfortable lifestyle in American cities and suburbs all effectively serve 
as testaments to those back in their native country to what could be possible if they 
adopted the American way of life.188 Soft power can also come from government 
policies both at home and abroad; policies that are deemed unjust, immoral or illegal 
under certain international or domestic norms hurt the soft power of the nation that 
pursues them and the opposite is true of policies that promote universal values, 
multilateralism, inclusion, democracy and the like.189 As Nye suggests, “the 
preferences of others” are affected by “the values a government champions in its 
behavior at home…in international institutions…and in foreign policy”; governments, 
then, “can attract or repel others by the influence of their example”.190 Not all assets 
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can be entirely controlled by the state, however, and this means that soft power, as 
well as hard power, does not entirely “belong to the government”, which means that 
certain assets that can increase both belong to other organisations, groups and 
individuals.191 Popular culture and counter-cultures, generally, can often be at odds 
with the objectives and policies of the state and liberal cultures will naturally clash with 
more authoritarian and illiberal states.192  
. 
VIII. The Limits of Soft Power 
 Those who are sceptical of soft power feel this way because they believe that 
power can only be defined “in terms of commands or active control”; concepts such 
as “imitation or attraction” are not sources or types of power, but simply social truths 
and phenomena.193 It may be the case that imitation and attraction do not always 
produce “much power over policy outcomes” nor “desirable outcomes”, but those that 
choose such examples as proof that neither of these strategies are actually effective 
are ignoring the “second, or “structural”, face of power”, which is “the ability to get the 
outcomes you want without having to force people to change their behaviour through 
threats or payments”.194 The success of employing attraction and imitation in 
producing the outcomes that we desire depends to a great extent on context; all power, 
in fact “depends on context”, which can be understood as “who relates to whom under 
what circumstances”195, but the context will always be different depending on both the 
strategy employed and the objective desired. Attraction, for example, “often has a 
diffuse effect”, which serves to create “general influence rather than producing an 
easily observable specific action”; politicians, like investors, accumulate [political] 
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capital “to be drawn on in future circumstances”.196 Soft power is “likely to be more 
important when…[it] is dispersed in another country rather than concentrated”; 
furthermore, though it can sometimes have “direct effects on specific goals”…”it is 
more likely to have an impact on the general goals that a country seeks”.197 Arnold 
Wolfers, to this point, differentiated between “the specific “possession goals” that 
countries pursue” and “their broader “milieu goals””, which could include, for example, 
“shaping an environment conducive to democracy”; and, as Nye suggests, the 
“successful pursuit of both of these types of goals” is critical to an equally successful 
foreign policy.198 Nye points out that soft power may not be as effective as hard power 
when it comes to issues such as national security, policing and the like, but the 
opposite is true when it comes to promoting “democracy, human rights, and open 
markets”199; this comes down, in part, to the role of legitimacy in promoting these 
systems and institutions, i.e. if these institutions are not established and maintained in 
a legitimate way then their inherent illegitimacy subverts both the ultimate objective of 
the institutions and their everyday operation. Some sceptics who object to the claim 
that soft power has any role in international politics and in government policy argue 
that because governments “are not in full control of the attraction” then soft power is 
more a product of “civil society” rather than the state.200 Nye counters this by insisting 
that liberal societies should, as a rule, not “control the culture” and, in fact, “the 
absence of policies of control can itself be a source of attraction”.201 Cultural 
institutions and organisations, e.g. “firms, universities, foundations”, etc., are certainly 












at odds with official foreign policy goals”, but this should serve to encourage the state 
“to make sure that their own actions and policies reinforce rather than undercut their 
soft power”.202 Sources of soft power that are not associated with the state have 
become increasingly more important and influential since the power that they produce 
is so easily disseminated thanks to technological advancements and the evolution of 
information consumption.203 The popularity of a policy, government, politician or 
candidate is typically measured via some form of polling, but many argue that these 
measurements are, effectively, pseudo-political science and are far too fickle and 
“ephemeral…to be taken seriously”204. Whether or not this is actually true, which is an 
entirely separate debate altogether, it cannot truly be disputed that polls are, at least, 
“a good first approximation” of the popularity of whatever it is meant to be 
measuring.205 Military power has greatly changed both the production, employment 
and definition of hard and soft power resources, particularly with the advent of nuclear 
technologies; advancing our understanding of nuclear physics has led, on the one 
hand, to the development of the most powerful weapons the world has ever known 
and, on the other, to new sources of electric power and a myriad of consumer and 
commercial electronics.206 Information and communications technologies have 
changed the nature of agenda and policy promotion, education, warfare, commerce, 
the creation and preservation of culture, counter- and sub-culture, health, science and 
virtually anything having to do with life on Earth and even our understanding of the 
entire universe.207 Nye argues that the social changes that these technologies have 
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using military power” and that “the use of force requires an elaborate moral justification 
to ensure popular support, unless actual survival is at stake”; he claims that, for 
“advanced democracies”, war is a possibility, “but it is much less acceptable than it 
was a century, or even a half century, ago” and that these states “have lost much of 
the lust to conquer”.208 Furthermore, since effectively all domestic economies rely, in 
some way or another, on the global economy, each state, whether ‘democratic’ or 
‘nondemocratic’, must consider how declaring war might deter those investors who 
control the global flows of capital and how conflict may or may not advance global and 
domestic economic objectives.209 Nye recognises, in any case, how the 
democratisation of technology has made destruction more accessible to more 
individuals and groups than ever before, privatised war and, in the process, made 
conflict and the threat of war and terrorism constants in international politics.210 
Terrorism, which Nye defines as a method of conflict that deliberately targets non-
combatants “with the objective of spreading fear and intimidation”, has, as a result of 
the evolution of technology and the development of the basic systems that have come 
to define modern civilisation, become a global phenomenon that can be practised by 
anyone at any time and is only differentiated by motive and technique. The fact that 
communications technology has connected the entire world to the internet and other 
forms of global media means that would-be terrorists can ally themselves with any 
group around the world whose objectives they sympathise with and, at the same time, 
that terrorist groups can ally themselves with and recruit individuals who are willing to 
advance their cause; these groups may also use the same technology to claim 
responsibility for any terrorist attack that does occur, irrespective of whether or not 
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they have actually been involved, which may serve to make them look more powerful 
and influential than they actually are. Nye claims that the effectiveness of terrorism 
depends, ultimately, on soft power: it depends on “its ability to attract support from the 
crowd at least as much as its ability to destroy the enemy’s will to fight”; most terrorist 
and splinter cells may be fairly small in number but they represent larger groups and 
objectives and their size makes them both difficult to infiltrate and extremely difficult to 
identify.211 Extremist groups and individuals are able to kill millions without the explicit 
patronage of governments and without the use of, as Nye puts it, the “instruments” of 
the state; he refers to this, explicitly, as “the privatization of war”, and claims that this 
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 This chapter focuses on the work of Kenneth Boulding and his understanding 
of power as a social phenomenon and ability. He tackles his thesis via an 
interdisciplinary (political economy and sociology) analysis of how power, in the 
context of these disciplines, adapts both to the society where it is observed and to the 
context that it is observed in. Rather than relying on the concepts of ‘force’ and 
‘domination’, Boulding explains how desire, interests and potential, as ‘possibility’, 
form the definitional foundation of power. He looks at how the distribution, possession, 
application and failure(s) of power function as explanations of different social systems 
make use of a variety of different power dynamics in order to achieve desired 
objectives or ends. 
 
II. Three Faces of Power 
 Kenneth Boulding argues that the term “power” is used to describe “the ability 
to achieve common ends for families, groups, organizations of all kinds, churches, 
corporations, political parties, national states”, etc.; power, then, “is a concept without 
meaning in the absence of human valuations and human decision”.213 Decision, 
furthermore, is “a choice among a range or set of images of the future that we think 
are feasible”; power of decision, on the other hand, “relates to the size of this agenda 
of potential images of the future”.214 Boulding is quick to distance the concept of power 
from the concepts of “force”, “domination” and “victory”; these concepts are all, 
individually, small parts “of the general nature of power”, but none of them could be 
 






considered as most salient, fully representative of or synonymous with power.215 
Boulding goes as far as comparing the concept of power with the economic concept 
of a “possibility boundary”, which “divides the total set of future possibilities into those 
that a person can do and those that a person cannot do”.216 Economists, however, 
typically believe that “what we want most will be” on the boundary of possibility, which 
implies that we want most “is not within our power” and that it is “beyond the boundary”. 
Furthermore, economists commonly believe, according to Boulding, that “human 
preferences cannot be analyzed or criticized”, but this is contrary to both “human 
history and experience”, as “virtually everyone has experienced changes in their 
preference structures and their valuations”.217 Defining human power, then, turns out 
to be a rather complex task, though Boulding seems to understand it as “the ability to 
get what we want”; it becomes even more complex when we ask, first, how we know 
what it is that we want and, secondly, who we even are.218 Boulding notes that 
although decisions are made by individuals, they are nearly always made on behalf 
“of a larger entity”. Thus, power may be understood as “getting what you want”, but 
this depends entirely on who one is and how one knows what one really wants and 
neither of those things is easily understood.219 Power is furthered complicated by the 
fact that, in social systems, the “various possibility boundaries of one person are where 
they are because of some decisions and some power exercised by another person, 
persons, or organizations”. Power conflict arises, then, when some shift in the 
“possibility boundary” between two parties “reduces the power of one and increases 
the power of the other”.220 Conflict, in essence, is the shifting of said boundary toward 
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and away from each party and conflict resolution involves “the establishment of 
property lines agreed upon by both parties, so that neither attempts to increase his or 
her power…”; third parties, “especially in the form of legal systems and governments”, 
aid in resolving conflicts by “imposing further boundaries in the form of threats on any 
party who violates the property lines”.221 Boulding argues that the way “in which 
individuals evaluate the power and well-being of others” is a “significant element in the 
total structure of power”; this, of course, influences both how one perceives their own 
level of power and that of others, as well as how one engages with others in terms of 
respecting, or not, power boundaries.222 Another important question for Boulding is 
whether or not power can be measured “in regard to its aggregate in the total world 
systems” and “in regard to its distribution among individuals, groups, and 
organizations”.223 Since power is “multidimensional”, any attempt to quantify and 
measure it that focuses on only one standard of measurement would be, effectively, 
incomplete. The distribution of power in society is also a question that allows us to 
understand power more generally; as Boulding points out, the human race “tends to 
divide into a very small group of the powerful and a large group of the relatively indigent 
and powerless…and a small middle class”.224 The 19th century, however, brought 
about: 
…the rise of the middle class to a majority of the society, with political power limited b¥ 
democracy, and economic power by progressive taxation and fluctuating markets, but 
still leaving a substantial body of the poor, powerless, and impotent, who cannot fit 
themselves into the society’s expanding sectors.225 
 
As the powers of production have increased, so have, in turn, the powers of 
destruction. Humanity now has the power to destroy the entire planet, but, the power 
of destruction can also be used productively, “as it is in hunting, in the use of 
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explosives in building canals, dams”, etc., though “even these structures…can have 
disastrous, unexpected ecological and social consequences”.226 The “dark side of the 
power of destruction” is violence and war, though the used of this power has not yet 
seemed to have prevented “an extraordinary expansion in the overall powers of 
production”; Boulding estimates that warfare “rarely occupies more than 10 percent of 
human time and energy”, while the other 90 percent goes into productive ventures 
such as building, agriculture, manufacturing, etc.227 The irony here is that an increase 
in the powers of destruction is “in a sense a by-product of the strong tendency for the 
powers of production to increase”: 
[agriculture] produces a storable food surplus, which can feed armies; metallurgy 
produces weapons as well as plows; craftsmen produce chariots as well as carts, and 
nuclear fission can produce both electric power and bombs.228 
 
The future is uncertain particularly because weapons have become so cataclysmically 
destructive and the cost to transport them has decreased so drastically; Boulding 
points out that there have been a number of occasions in human history “when 
humans have abandoned some destructive power”, but one “can only hope” that this 
may occur in the future, especially “in proportion to the powers of destruction”.229 
Boulding continues his analysis by asking how it is that we can identify and categorise 
different sources of power; he goes about this by dividing power into three major 
categories from the point of view of their consequences: “destructive power, 
productive power, and integrative power”. Destructive power, first, “is the power to 
destroy things”; it has “two very different aspects”, however, which are reflected in “the 
means of destruction”.230 The two means of destruction are weapons, “whether 
directed toward killing people or destroying valued things”, and, oddly enough, things 
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that are also part of the productive process, like “bulldozers, plows, furnaces, knives”, 
etc.231 Productive power, on the other hand, is found: 
…in the fertilized egg, in the blueprint, in the idea, in the tools and machines that make 
things, in the activity of human brains and muscles that sow and reap, weave and build, 
construct, paint, and sculpt.232 
 
Integrative power, finally, can be thought of as “an aspect of productive power that 
involves the capacity to build organizations, to create families and groups, to inspire 
loyalty, to bind people together” and “to develop legitimacy”; it has both a negative and 
a productive aspect, as integrative power can be used to “create enemies” and to 
“alienate people”.233 Each type of power corresponds to a certain, characteristic 
behaviour: the behaviour that is associated with destructive power is threat; the 
behaviour that is associated with productive power is exchange, which “covers a range 
of activities, from formal and contractual trade to informal reciprocity”; integrative 
power is associated with the behaviour “love”, which, “in spite of its many meanings, 
and using it in the widest possible sense as an aspect of the integrative structure”, 
describes a type of relationship that explains a great deal of human behaviour, where 
A does something for B simply because they love, and/or respect, them.234 The love 
relationship may also be informed by destructive power, though in a small, but 
complex, way; the “capacity to create hatred” is related to this destructive power and 
this is the negative aspect of love.235 In fact, the “complex dynamics of behavior that 
underlies the growth of love or of hatred is one of the real puzzles of social systems”.236 
Political and military power “are primarily based on threat systems and destructive 
power”, though there is also an element of productive and exchange power 
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involved.237 Economic power has “a good deal to do with the distribution of property” 
and it is “particularly characteristic of institutions such as the household, the firm, the 
corporation, the business, and the financial institutions…”; its core, however, “is the 
productive and exchange power systems”, as “[productive] power and exchange are 
the basis of income”.238 There is also a certain element of threat and integrative 
behaviour in economic power, as economic institutions must generally be accepted as 
“legitimate” in order to function.239 Boulding defines social power as “the capacity to 
make people identify with some organization to which they give loyalty”, though he 
argues that “it is hard to find a general name for those institutions that are based 
primarily on integrative power”; the family, churches, religious and charitable 
organisations and international nongovernmental organisations would, however, 
certainly be consider as such.240 There are “physical, chemical and material sources 
of power”, as the exercise of power “always involves transformations of some kind, 
and many of these transformations are either physical or chemical, or both”; 
furthermore, a condition that underlies “all forms of power” is “vulnerability” in relation 
to changing environments.241 Some people, for example, are malleable while others 
are not and some institutions are malleable, while others are not; adaptability, then, 
“may lessen vulnerability in all the categories of power”: a distinction related to 
vulnerability “is that between defensive power, which is the capacity to prevent 
unwanted changed” and “the power to produce wanted change, which might be called 
“active” power”.242 The general structure of power, then, and the distribution of power 
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“often reflect the constantly shifting structures of defensive versus active power”; all 
forms of power “are subject to this very fundamental, underlying condition”.243  
 
II. The Constantly Shifting Distribution of Power 
 Power, as Boulding points out, cannot be thought of as a “stationary structure”; 
whether we are discussing the power of individuals or the distribution of power “among 
organizations”, power may rise, fall, disappear, and/or shift in “endless, almost 
kaleidoscopic patterns”.244 The question, then, for Boulding, is this:  
[can] we detect in these whirlwinds of change guiding principles that enable us to 
understand the processes better, and perhaps even improve our powers of prediction, 
even though an irreducible element of randomness in the changing patterns of power 
is likely to remain?245 
 
Economic power has, perhaps, “the simplest dynamic”; in order to become rich, 
“people, or nations, or corporations” must increase their assets “faster than their 
liabilities” and this happens via a mix of productivity, thrift, inheritance, luck and skill, 
though some elements will clearly be more important than others depending on the 
situation. Military and political power, on the other hand, are more difficult to explain, 
particularly because “threat systems seem to be more complex than exchange 
systems”; threat and counter-threat can be met with a variety of responses, depending 
on factors such as population, geography, mobility, technology, persuasion, trade and 
resources.246 The dynamics of integrative power are even more difficult to theorise; as 
Boulding notes, those that established “the great religions had far more power over 
the future than…the rulers under whom they lived”, which is an example of the “virtual 
impossibility of social prediction, particularly in integrative systems”; furthermore, it is 
difficult to say what “constitutes the potential for integrative change”.247 The essentially 
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incalculable effect and influence that religious, intellectual and social movements, 
whether Christianity, human rights, Marxism, etc., have had on the history of the world 
is an example of what Boulding refers to as the “watershed principle”, which is 
basically the idea that “very small causes can produce enormous effects”.248 Boulding 
argues that it is the “phenomenon of conversion” that serves “the spread of integrative 
structures”; said phenomenon represents: 
…in the first place, a change of identity on the part of the converted, and, second, a 
new identity that is related to an identification with an already existing integrative 
structure or group.249 
 
Boulding relates the phenomenon of conversion to the ecological concept of the 
“empty niche”, which is the theory that there are “species that would be able to persist 
and have an equilibrium population in the ecosystem” if empty niches that 
accommodated them existed.250 Boulding claims that where there are people that are 
“dissatisfied with their existing niches” and who are “questioning the legitimacy of 
existing identities and institutions”, then there is an opportunity for them to be 
‘converted’ if there is someone available to convert them, though it is unclear why self-
conversion is not possible under certain circumstances.  
 
III. Property as Power 
 The social structure and institution of ‘property’, as Boulding argues, is relevant 
to the “maintenance, possible increase, and distribution of all forms of power”, 
particularly, of course, economic power; property itself is defined as the power “to keep 
other people out of what is defined as the power to keep other people out of what is 
defined as our property”, unless it is permitted by the owner.251 If we consider, as 
Boulding does, all crime as “a denial of property rights of some sort”, then, first, we 
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must recognise that “the main object of legislation and legal decisions”, and even “the 
structure of the law” itself, is “to define what is legitimate in property”; secondly, we 
must consider that anything that we can ‘possess’, whether our bodies, freedom, 
choice, goods, etc., is a type of ‘property’.252 Property, depending on how it is defined, 
“defines and limits our power”; this simply means that “no property is absolute” and all 
property “is limited and defined by some sort of laws”.253 Property, because of its 
relationship to the law and to society, is directly tied to the “political and public sector 
of society”; this is so, in turn, because property is “the basis of exchange” and property, 
whether public or private, is regulated by external forces.254 The distribution of property 
is an important element “in the distribution of power”; power is typically, though not 
essentially, proportional to property possession, meaning that those with property 
have more power than those with none.255 The distribution of power changes in various 
ways, sometimes through revolution and other times through a further change in 
“relative values of different kinds of property”.256 An individual’s mind and body 
become part of an exchange in the employer/employee relationship; an employer 
exchanges a wage for the ‘use’ of an employees capacities for a determined period of 
time.257 Scarcity, both in terms of talents and abilities and in terms of resources, is “a 
very important source of the value of property”.258 Property, when concerned with 
political and military power, “takes the form of sovereignty”; nation states, through an 
exercise of the sovereignty granted to them on account of agreements established at 
the international level, subject their population to a “common structure of national 














from crossing their boundaries” and some even try to prevent “the passage of ideas”; 
international war, in fact, is mainly “over violations of boundaries or attempts to change 
them”.260 One of the “major conditions of stable peace” is actually that nations no 
longer dispute national boundaries, unless they mutually agree to; this agreement is 
“a mutual legitimation of property, which is the underlying essence of law”; taxation is 
also an exercise of sovereignty.261 Integrative organisations, e.g. churches, clubs, 
families, “also have some sense of property in their members”, though this need not 
be strictly defined; things such as “the right of expulsion” and “rites of initiation of 
membership” can also serve as aspects of property.262 The power of nation states 
consists of “a complex mixture of political, military, economic, and integrative power”, 
but the balance of this mix is determined by the analyst; as an example, “realists” tend 
to emphasise “destructive and military power to the exclusion of the other forms of 
power”.263 Boulding, however, argues that all forms of power are related and 
interconnected, so missing this fact greatly impairs any understanding of power that a 
theorist might claim to reach. Even though Boulding agrees to the above, he does, 
nevertheless, admit that integrative power is the most important type of power 
because, without it, “neither military power nor economic power can persist for very 
long”; he also bemoans the fact that “historians have been very insensitive to the 
realities of integrative power…hence its history largely remains to be written”.264 He 
points out that a rise in economic power often leads to an opportunity for military 
power; a nation, however, has to be able “to devote economic resources to the armed 
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terms of food, clothing, housing, and so on”.265 Military power may, and often does, 
also destroy economic power, because “it absorbs resources that otherwise might be 
devoted to investment in the economy, especially intellectual and research and 
management resources”; it also relates in a “complex and nonlinear” way to integrative 
power, as it can both create and destroy “respect and legitimacy”.266 
 
IV. The Objects of Power 
 Boulding suggests that it is possible to classify power according “to the objects 
of power”; power, then, can be classified into “power over material objects, power over 
animals and other living creatures, and power over persons”.267 Power over physical 
objects involves “very common experiences”, such as “digging with a spade, quarrying 
and blasting, shooting a gun”, etc.; these experiences “always involve the use of 
energy and the transportation and transformation of materials” and, thus, involve 
“information and human evaluation”. Even this type of power, however, involves 
“changing the world in directions that we prefer”, which means receiving information 
from the world and then ascertaining whether or not the change that one is realising 
is “going in the direction that we want”; because most information “comes through the 
eyes”, we are “guided by our own images of the future” and this is true “of all forms of 
power”.268 Power over objects does seem to follow a sort of hierarchy, where power 
over inanimate objects is relatively simple, power over non-human living beings is 
significantly more complex and power over other humans is especially and more 
generally complex. Human beings, as opposed to objects, but not necessarily other 
animals, are capable of dissent, argumentation, persuasion and exercising power over 
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others; Boulding asks the questions, then, “why should someone else do what I want 
him or her to do when that “someone else” is also a human being…who may very well 
want me to do something?”269 When people try to exercise power over others, they 
may “refuse and resist” and even counter the attempt. Boulding asks three important 
questions about this type of power: how do we organise and classify this immense 
variety of human experience; what kinds of power can we identify; and what situations 
are somewhat alike and what situations are very different?270 His answer, to a certain 
extent, is to analyse the “sources of obedience”; he claims that “situations that look 
very much alike on the surface…turn out to be very different in terms of the underlying 
relationships”.271 We are often able to choose what kind of power we will employ to 
achieve our ends and “this choice often depends on the object over which we are 
trying to exercise power and that we are trying to change”; the most basic division “is 
between productive, destructive, and integrative power” and the choice depends partly 
“on the nature of the object of power and partly on the degree to which a person or an 
organization is capable of exercising different kinds of power”.272 Boulding points out 
that destructive power is “partly employed in threat systems, partly in economic 
systems”, while “productive power is virtually all part of economic systems” and “part 
of economic systems consists of integrative power”.273 Power is often exercised “for 
its own sake, almost without regard for any object”; this is how destructive power is 
frequently employed; in fact, “many acts of wanton destruction are the response to a 
sense of powerlessness in the more productive forms of power, simply because 
destruction is easier than production…”.274 Another power that is also exercised for its 
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own sake, “without much regard for economic consequences”, is productive power, as 
there are certain forms of productive activity “at virtually all ages” that “give satisfaction 
simply in the performance”.275 There are “innumerable hobbies” that can all be done 
“for the sheer pleasure of doing them”; Boulding suggests that there seems to be 
“something in the human genes that produces an enormous urge to produce artifacts 
of all kinds, whether physical, mental, or organizational” and “part of the motivation 
here is the sheer pleasure of production”.276 The “fundamental basis of productive 
power” is learning and this is something that begins “very early in evolution”; 
productive power, then, is “likely to increase substantially” when learning is “a pleasure 
in itself and is done for its own sake”.277 The object of productive power, then, is both 
“the thing that is made by the act of production—which may also be valued for its own 
sake” and “the pleasure taken in the productive activity itself”.278 It is also possible to 
value integrative power “for its own sake”; we often take pleasure in being 
acknowledged by others, as well “in our own self-image”.279 Economic power is “a 
combination of productive and exchange power” that is mostly expressed “in power 
over objects in the form of goods and services”, but even this type of power may be 
enjoyed “for its own sake”.280 Economic power has two objects: capital and income; 
capital deals with “stocks of useful and desirable objects or promises that the 
accountant measures in terms of net worth…”, while income deals with “the capacity 
to restore the stocks as they depreciate and are consumed, and also add to them”.281 
Capital and income are very closely related, as the more net worth we have, 
particularly if we include “the value of our bodies and minds”, then it is more likely that 
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we will have a larger income; income, in turn, depends “partly on our capacity to 
produce an increased amount of assets by activity in the form of work”.282 Exchange 
power “depends mainly on the exchangeable objects”, which are the goods 
“possessed by an individual in the form of assets, and on how these assets rate in the 
relative price structure in the market”; every exchange requires a ratio of exchange, 
which is the “ratio of the quantity of what is given to the quantity of what is received”.283 
Assets increase economic power in two ways: first, one adds “more to assets by 
production than are destroyed by consumption”; second, assets simply rise in relative 
value, which happens if assets held are wanted by others.284 Uncertainty and 
speculation are also factors in determining economic power. Though complicated, the 
object of one form of power may sometimes be “the ability to exercise other forms”; 
an example of this is when economic power is used to increase destructive power and, 
consequently, threat power, though threat power “tends to destroy itself unless it can 
achieve integrative power…legitimacy, respectability, and so on”.285 Boulding makes 
the case that integrative power “is the most fundamental and…dominant form of 
power” because it can “exist in the kin group, for instance, with a bare minimum of 
threat and economic power involved, whereas unless both threat and economic power 
can develop integrative power to go along with them, they are very fragile and apt to 
collapse”.286 However, when integrative power “expands beyond the kin group” the 
“interactions between integrative, threat, and economic power become extremely 
complex and very hard to identify”; common language, religion, culture and interests 
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“integration that is achieved through the hatred, fear, and threat of a common enemy”, 
can also be used to unite or convoke disparate elements of society for a common 
cause.288 Disintegrative power can lead to a “severe pathology of the integrative 
system” where a “negative identity”, which is an identity derived from what one rejects, 
rather than who one is, can lead to a “pathological situation of internal violence”.289 
Suffering and sacrifice play an important role in the “structure of integrative power”; 
these two acts can both create and destroy “integrative relationships”, whether in war, 
conflict, romantic or familial relationships, or in simple, everyday interactions.290 
Boulding points out, however, that what he calls the “sacrifice trap” can lead to the 
collapse of a system that demands too many sacrifices, particularly in war and in 
religion, where those that have sacrificed are at pains to admit that their sacrifice may 
have been in vain and, essentially, lose faith in the system that demanded said 
sacrifices to begin with.291 The object of power, particularly in instances where a 
system and its adherents have fallen into the “sacrifice trap”, can become “lost in the 
exercise of power itself”, which, in turn, can lead to power itself being lost.292 Even 
when the “object of power is clear and well justified”, it is not necessarily clear what 
the “appropriate means are”; the claim that “the end justifies the means” has been 
responsible for “some of the most inhumane acts of the human race and a great deal 
of human misery”. The question that must be asked, then, especially of those that wish 
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V. The Pathologies of Power  
 Power, like any other system, can fail: it can lead to disaster, destruction, 
rebellion, chaos, oppression, tyranny and the like. Boulding quotes Lord Acton as 
saying that ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely’, but he 
adds that “impotence corrupts and absolute impotence leads to death”; he also claims 
that it is not recognised that it is also influence that corrupts, “for influence is attempting 
to exercise power without ultimate responsibility”. Though the “pathologies of the 
power structure” are “subtle and complex”, they do, at least eventually, “give rise to 
institutions designed to modify or correct them”; the legal mechanisms put in place by 
the state, as well as nongovernmental entities, are meant to “check and correct the 
pathologies of power”.294 The press and the media, though they suffer from their own 
pathologies, also play a role in checking and calling the powerful to account. When 
power goes wrong, it is because the exercise of power is considered to do more harm 
than, “both in regard to the exerciser of power and for the subjects who may all too 
easily become victims”; the exercise of power, in any case, has “impacts and 
consequences far beyond” both who or what is exercising power and “the immediate 
subjects” of said exercise.295 This is because society, the “whole earth”, is an 
“interactive ecosystem”, which, as Boulding pointed out with his concept of the 
‘watershed principle’, means that what one person or entity does, however ‘small’ the 
action, affects or can affect what another may do, as well as affecting other events 
that are beyond human control completely.296 Power that is primarily illusory, and even 
power that is not illusory but is not exercised properly or in a timely manner, can lead 
to disaster, again, both for the exerciser and for those subjected to the exercise of said 
power. The “illusions of power” have many origins: flattery, pride, lack of opposition 
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and other factors can create a false sense of legitimacy and power in those that have 
important positions in both hierarchical and non-hierarchical systems. Another source 
is what Boulding calls the “dismal theorem of political science”, which is the idea that 
“the skills that lead to the rise to power and to promotion into powerful positions often 
make people unfit to exercise the power they have achieved”: nepotism, charisma, 
celebrity and other factors that have nothing to do with competence, but everything to 
do with popularity and electability, contribute to this phenomenon.297 Boulding also 
points out that a failure to recognise what he terms as the “unconscious dynamic 
processes” of the world, as well “the importance of random factors”, can create an 
“incompetence in the exercise of power”; good luck and fortuity can often be confused 
for skill and success, which can then lead to a false sense of competence.298 Loyalty 
and favouritism can lead to those in power surrounding themselves with those who 
will either simply be obsequious, betray them, give them terrible advice or just, 
effectively, not fit to serve in their position; again, the skills that help people become 
powerful are not necessarily those that help them exercise that power to the benefit of 
others. The desire for “for its own sake”, a pathological hatred of certain groups or 
society and a general perversion of social values, again, for the sake of power, can 
also lead to grave and catastrophic mistakes on the part of the ‘powerful’.299 Social 
behaviour can be driven, surprisingly easily, by the “need for an enemy”, but this 
antagonism typically “leads into pathological situations”.300 All of the different 
categories of power have their own “distinctive pathologies”; from destructive, threat, 
political and military power to economic and integrative power, all types of power are 
“subject to pathology”, though some pathologies are certainly more devastating and 
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perduring than others.301 Boulding argues that “the pathologies of conflict and the 
pathologies of power are very closely related”; for him, a conflict is a situation where 
two parties “perceive a change that is the power of somebody…as benefiting or 
increasing the welfare of one and…diminishing the welfare of the other”.302 Conflict, 
as Boulding also suggested about power, can be rooted in “illusions about the world, 
or…on illusory valuations that may change”; conflict, like power, is costly, whether 
monetarily or otherwise, and often not worth the while of either party.303 In fact, “one 
of the great objects of peace research” is finding ways to make conflict as ‘inexpensive’ 
as possible, particularly because there are always those, like mercenaries or weapons 
dealers/manufacturers, that seek to gain from it; there are also “unconscious” social 
forces that drive and shape conflict.304 The law, as an institution, benefits greatly from 
conflict, whether domestic, societal or international, and, in fact, deals primarily in 
dispute, which easily leads to ‘pathologies’; the military functions much in the same 
way and even peace-making/keeping efforts require some level of ‘force’, or at least a 
projection of it. Mechanisms of conflict resolution, as Boulding suggests and as 
mentioned earlier, tend to develop out of a desire to either reduce or eliminate the cost 
of conflict; loss of life and unsustainable defence spending are not typically preferred 
to general social welfare and prosperity, though this is not always the case. The 
argument here is that social systems, in a similar manner to biological systems, 
“develop resistances to the pathologies of power and conflict”, though they may never 
be entirely impervious to social ills. Language is very important to how we perceive 
the pathologies of power; the symbols and metaphors that we employ when we 
describe and try to identify different types of power are “very suggestive”: strong, weak, 
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hard, soft, etc.305 However, soft power is often “more powerful and successful” than 
power that might be labelled as ‘hard’ and ‘strong’ forms of power, like threat and 
military power, often weaken, as well as undermine any good intentions of, those that 
choose to employ them; thus, the way that we discuss power can “betray us and 
weaken us”, especially when we identify power solely with destructive and threat 
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The fourth dimension of power concerns the creation of the social ontology of social 
subjects. As social subjects, agents have certain predispositions, which make them 
more likely to structure and confirm-structure in a felicitous manner than others. Like 
the other dimensions of power, the fourth dimension is not inherently dominating or 
conducive to empowerment. Rather, it has elements of both, often as a duality.307 
 
Moving on from Boulding’s three faces of power, this chapter will briefly deal with, 
what Mark Haugaard refers to as, the fourth dimension of power. We will look at both 
how Haugaard theorises his four dimensions of power, as well as what this means for 
the concept, more generally, and what the social and political implications of this 
understanding are. As ‘the three dimensions of power’ have been discussed in 
previous chapters, the focus, here, will be primarily on the fourth dimension, though, 
for Haugaard, they are all parts of an integral whole.  
 
II. The Four Dimensions of Power 
All four dimensions of power are ideal types. They constitute lenses that render certain 
perspectives of reality visible. The designation of dimensions of power constitutes a way 
of understanding particular aspects of power, while momentarily methodologically 
bracketing the other dimensions.308 
 
Haugaard argues that there are four dimensions of power, each of which 
corresponds to different real and particular elements of both power and experience. 
Speaking in sociological terms, he relates the first dimension to agency, the second to 
structure, the third to system of thought and the last to social ontology.309 The first 
dimension of power focuses upon “the momentary exercise of power” and, as Dahl 
would have it, this exercise involves one actor making another actor “do something 
that they would not otherwise”; this first dimension is “agent-oriented and posits a direct 
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causal relationship between two or more social agents”, while “the external conditions 
of possibility are taken as given”.310 Haugaard claims, however, that all four dimensions 
of power are present in a majority of social interactions, “even if we choose to focus 
upon them one at a time”; he sees it as a language game, where the word ‘dimensions’ 
is used in the way that one might describe the different sides of a cube or “the four 
perspectives of the plans of a house”.311 Each dimension allows us a perspective that 
the others do not, but “full understanding comes from first separating and then 
combining all four aspects or dimensions”312; for Haugaard, agency, structure, system 
of thought and social ontology are all present, irrespective of what social interaction 
we are analysing and irrespective of what particular element of the interaction that we 
choose to focus on. Haugaard takes Dahl’s example of a traffic officer to describe both 
the first dimension of power and to elucidate Dahl’s understanding of the concept: 
…suppose a policeman is standing in the middle of an intersection at which most traffic 
ordinarily moves ahead; he orders all traffic to turn right or left; the traffic moves as he 
orders it to do. Then it accords with what I conceive to be the bedrock idea of power…313 
 
Now, as mentioned before, this is an example, according to Dahl, of a group of actors 
(here understood as “traffic”) being made to do something that they would not 
otherwise do, which is to be understood as the first dimension of power. Haugaard, as 
also mentioned before, believes that, in this interaction, it is in fact the case that all four 
dimensions of power are present and an analysis of all four provides us a 
comprehensive look at the power dynamics of the entire situation and even beyond. In 
this example, the police officer exercises power over the drivers, as they are made to 
drive right or left, instead of straight ahead, which corresponds to the first dimension of 
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make this individual a police officer, “with certain dispositional powers, which are 
reproduced every time there is compliance, and also to the notion that there would be 
“2-D structural conflict”, if a driver did not comply; the third dimension of power (3-D) 
relates to the “tacit social knowledge” that the drivers and the police officer share, as 
the drivers understand what the officer’s role is and they confer upon him the authority 
(and power) to give them commands related to traffic, a system that exists by law; the 
fourth dimension of power (4-D) relates to what Haugaard understands as the 
internalised “self-discipline” that is necessary “for drivers routinely to obey the highway 
code, which includes compliance with the demands of traffic police, even when the 
driver may not wish to do so”.314 Haugaard goes on to qualify this last point by claiming 
that “a driver with the temperament of a feudal knight would probably cut the police 
officer’s head off”.315 There are many problems with Dahl’s original conceptualisation 
of this exchange, but also with Haugaard’s elucidation of the same. What is important 
to note, first, is that Dahl claims that notions of command, coercion and obedience are 
the “bedrock” ideas of power; Dahl’s understanding of power is definitive, not simply 
suggestive nor meant to be considered as one aspect of a greater conception. We do 
not consider whether the traffic officer even wishes to be doing their job, or exercising 
their ‘power’, though this would likely be explained away by claiming that someone with 
greater authority than the officer is simply ordering them to do something that they, in 
fact, do not wish to be doing and so on (until we reach the highest possible authority, 
which, again, is very problematic). Haugaard’s understanding of the same event makes 
a point of using different elements of the situation to make claims about and explain 
the societal implications and realities of such an interaction. Something that is arguably 
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missing, at least explicitly and possibly unintentionally, is the fact that all of the ‘power’, 
per se, and especially the conferring of ‘authority’, is really coming, for the most part, 
from the drivers. The first claim is that the officer is making the drivers do something 
that they would not otherwise do, which is true, if you take the example and the claim 
quite literally; the traffic would normally proceed straight ahead, but is being redirected 
to the left or to the right. However, if you take it as fact that most drivers, or even just 
a few drivers, want nothing more than to follow the law and would even go out of their 
way to do so, then this claim seems mistaken, at best. Yes, the drivers are physically 
doing something that they would not normally do, but philosophically, or even 
ideologically, the drivers (or at least some drivers) are doing exactly what they always 
do, which is to follow and obey the law. This might be explained by the second claim, 
which, according to Haugaard, is that there are certain social structures that make the 
police officer who they are and certain powers belong to them and are conferred upon 
them, as a consequence of this responsibility; this responsibility and these powers (and 
this understanding) is reproduced every time someone complies with the officer’s 
commands; this reality, as real as it may be, goes beyond compliance and immediate 
social structures, however. The officer enforces the law, which they are neither allowed 
nor granted the authority to make nor interpret; a driver may choose not to comply with 
an officer’s orders and do so legally and an officer may also choose to exercise an 
authority that they do not have and said exercise may be illegal in its own right. ‘Power’, 
here, if we wish to call it that, is far more complex than the role of either actor and 
whether one chooses compliance or disobedience in any given social encounter that 
requires a choice to be made. This may, however, be explained by the third claim: 
Haugaard claims that there is “tacit social knowledge” that makes it so that the drivers 





said individual may make, with respect to traffic or other legal matters, may reasonably 
be complied with; Haugaard states that if “the driver think of the police office as having 
an absolute right to command, there is reification involved”.316 A driver may comply, in 
this instance, due solely to apathy or convenience, or a driver may choose to disobey 
because they know, for whatever reason, that this officer is wrong or that they might 
appeal to a higher authority that would overrule the officer’s decision. If a person not 
dressed as a police officer were directing traffic, in a similar manner, then the idea, 
here, is that this would be suspect and it would be reasonable to not comply with this 
person’s commands, but there could, of course, be a serious accident up ahead or, at 
the very least, a very good reason for drivers not to proceed in that direction. This point 
may, nevertheless, be explained by the fourth and final claim, which argues that drivers 
have an internalised “self-discipline” that is necessary for them to “routinely obey the 
highway code, which includes compliance with the demands of traffic police, even 
when the driver may not wish to do so”.317 This claim may be the most important of all, 
though Haugaard states that all of them are necessary, since it would seem to explain 
and rebut any counterclaims made above. Drivers have internalised the self-discipline 
that is required to follow traffic laws and this means listening to traffic officers, who let 
us know when temporary changes are, by necessity, made; this would suggest that 
the law itself is internalised, or, at the very least, the will to follow the law is internalised. 
This will is borne out of culturalisation, habit, fear or some sort of combination of these. 
It may seem odd to characterise a fear of penalty or death as ‘self-discipline’, but this 
fourth claim may boil down to precisely nothing more than that. Traffic cameras, traffic 
police, signs, obstacles and the like all exist to remind and shape the driver’s 








so on that are internalised by the driver and not necessarily some sort of ‘self-
discipline’, though this may also be the case, certainly. An unwavering respect for traffic 
laws is not an emergent characteristic, however, and follows from an understanding of 
law itself and a further understanding, and presumed fear, of illegality and its 
consequences. Furthermore, a driver may wish to obey traffic laws simply because it 
is safe for them to do so; they may have no true respect for the law, but a respect for 
their own life and their own property compels them to act in a certain way, nonetheless. 
Their ostensible ‘self-discipline’ may be nothing more than self-interest and 
convenience, which happens to serve them well. Drivers commit innumerable traffic 
offences when there are no officers and no cameras around and this is especially true 
when there are few to no drivers on the road, in the early morning hours. The point 
here, effectively, is that Dahl’s point omits critical elements and points of debate from 
the ‘power’ concept and that Haugaard’s points, while more complex and more 
elucidatory, do the same. A ‘simple’ situation, like a traffic stop, is actually far more 
complex than Dahl or Haugaard can explain, which, arguably, leaves ‘power’ in a 
conceptually nebulous place; a simple explanation does far too little work and a 
seemingly complex explanation does not do nearly enough work to explain every 
power dynamic at play in even the most minor of interactions. Moreover, there are a 












III. The Fourth Dimension of Power 
The being-in-the-world of social subjects is not given. Rather, it is constructed through 
the process of socialization. The being-in-the world of social subjects is inextricably tied 
to their practical consciousness, which creates second-nature expectations that create 
security in the social subject. However, when these fundamental ordering expectations 
are thwarted this causes a flooding through of emotions, including anxiety, shame and 
anger…318 
 
 Power, it is argued, does not exist in a vacuum; it is a social activity, process or 
relation(ship). For Haugaard, there are four dimensions of power, with the fourth 
concerning “the creation of the social ontology of social subjects”; this dimension 
considers individuals as “social subjects” and “agents’ who have “certain dispositions, 
which make them more likely to structure and confirm-structure in a felicitous manner 
than others”.319 He argues that a subject’s “being-in-the-world” is determined through 
a process of socialisation, as well as, presumably, both culturalisation and 
subjectivisation. This “being-in-the-world” of the subject is defined by their “practical 
consciousness”, which means that there are things, situations and ‘truths’ that the 
subject comes to expect, as “second-nature”, which, when they hold, produce a feeling 
of “security” in the subject. When this nature is disturbed, however, it causes a “flooding 
through of emotions, including anxiety, shame and anger”; this means, then, that order 
equates to security, while disorder, effectively, equates to a sort of helplessness and, 
more importantly, a sense of powerlessness. This “ontological security” is founded 
upon “the establishment of routine”, which, according to Haugaard (and Erik Erikson), 
“begins with the infant’s relationship with its primary carer”; an infant “experiences 
anxiety at letting go of the mother’s breast’, since they have no idea “if it will return”.320 
The infant’s first success in their subjectivisation, then, is “the establishment of 
confidence in the return of the breast, which empowers her to let go of the breast 
 







without undue anxiety”; Haugaard claims that it is this “confluence between inner 
certainty and outer predictability” that is “central to ontological security”.321 The 
subject’s ‘being-in-the-world’ is tied to the subject’s “capacity to link together 
expectation with external occurrence”, which is “interpretative” in nature; this is best 
expressed in the notion of object permanence: 
[an infant] develops practical knowledge that objects may be out of sight but do not 
vanish into thin air. The foundation of ontological security is an inner certainty 
concerning the continued existence of the world-out-there, both social and material.322 
 
Furthermore: 
Our existence relative to the world-out-there entails the continual monitoring and making 
present of reality. This is tied into our capacity to link memory with experience. Learning 
object permanence is both an act of interpretation and memory…This trust in the world-
out-there is the inner certainty fundamental to ontological security...323 
 
Haugaard adds that the “pre-linguistic child does not discursively construct a theory 
concerning the absence of presence of her mother’s breast, nor about object 
permanence”, but, rather, that this knowledge “is part of her taken-for-granted reality”; 
it is this “inner certainty” that is constitutive of a “default natural attitude”, which “defines 
the ontological predispositions: who we are”.324 This becomes “second-nature”, which 
is experienced as internal to the self and, thus, “as if it were…first nature”.325 Now, 
without entering into arguments over whether concepts are innate to the human mind 
and human experience, which Haugaard does, in fact, do in chapter 3, we should first 
look at whether or not ontological security is really founded upon the establishment of 
routine, which begins with the infant’s relationship to the breast. Irrespective of the fact 
that infant’s milk may come from a variety of sources, it would seem that what is being 
described by Haugaard, and Erikson, is an infant’s relationship to hunger and to a 
source of food, rather than to another ‘subject’. The infant’s anxiety stems from a 
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feeling of hunger that can only be sated by some form of nourishment, which the infant 
may associate with a breast or a bottle, but is certainly associated with some source 
of food. Food or, more generally, nourishment may be reified as some object or person, 
in a primitive sense, but the true source of the infant’s anxiety is hunger, which causes 
them discomfort and, in its most extreme form, ill health. An infant’s hunger and thirst, 
if it can be described as such, are both sated by their mother’s milk or by some other 
form of nourishment, e.g. infant formula or some style of it. The concept of thirst 
develops later, when solid foods are introduced into the diet and the water that the 
body needs must come, mainly, from another source. Furthermore, the concepts of 
object permanence and memory can be observed in many, if not most, non-human 
animals, which, arguably, objectively qualifies the infant at the same cognitive level as 
a non-human animal. The point, here, is that an infant is made human (is made 
subject), not necessarily because of their actions, but because of society’s relationship 
to infants, more generally. We can observe certain behaviours in children and we 
qualify them as ‘human’, specifically because they exist in a human society and are 
born from humans; we also anthropomorphise the behaviour of non-human animals 
because ‘nature’, per se, is observed in relation to humans and through human 
conceptualisation. The concept of ‘species’ is itself a human conceptualisation, which 
is meant to reflect and explain a natural phenomenon. In any case, we can leave this 
critique with the idea that the origins of an infant’s first anxieties are related to biological 
needs, as opposed to primarily ‘social’ needs; these biological needs become social 
concerns (are socialised), naturally, in a society, though this need not necessarily be 
the case. An infant, for example, who never has contact with another human (outside 
of the womb), would certainly cry, feel anxious and experience terror, if they were 





hunger is not experienced until birth, as all of the nutrients that a foetus needs are 






























Power and the Social 
 
I. Introduction 
 This chapter focuses on Sallie Westwood’s book, ‘Power and the Social’, which 
makes the claim that power is an immanent ‘force’ in social relations and that “there is 
no social without power”. Westwood, thus, analyses the way(s) in which different 
theorists, such as Hobbes, Machiavelli, Locke et al., conceptualise power “in relation 
to the construction of the social”. This analysis affords us a unique perspective on how 
power develops in relation to the adoption, promotion or development of different 
societal practices, norms, mores and structures. Westwood points out how different 
theories of power emerge(d) directly in relation and in correspondence with societal, 
scientific and political movements and developments of their time. A main point to be 
made, here, is whether or not there exist, or can exist, any forms of power or control 
that are strictly ‘asocial’, i.e. independent of a social relation or, at the very least, 
contingent solely upon the ‘self’.  
 
II. Power and the Social 
 This chapter focuses on Sallie Westwood’s book, ‘Power and the Social’, which 
makes the claim that power is an immanent ‘force’ in social relations and that “there is 
no social without power”. Westwood, thus, analyses the way(s) in which different 
theorists, such as Hobbes, Machiavelli, Locke et al., conceptualise power “in relation 
to the construction of the social”. This analysis affords us a unique perspective on how 
power develops in relation to the adoption, promotion or development of different 
societal practices, norms, mores and structures. Westwood points out how different 
theories of power emerge(d) directly in relation and in correspondence with societal, 
scientific and political movements and developments of their time. A main point to be 





that are strictly ‘asocial’, i.e. independent of a social relation or, at the very least, 
contingent solely upon the ‘self’.  
 
II. The Modernisation of Power 
This book begins with the proposition from the post-structuralist account that power is 
immanent—there is no social without power. However, in an attempt to pursue this in 
a sociological discourse, rather than a purely philosophical one, there are ways in which 
I hope to show it is possible to provide an account of power and the social that is 
substantively intelligible through the use of examples that demonstrate there is no 
social without power.327 
 
 As Sallie Westwood points out in the first chapter of her book Power and the 
Social, “debates on the nature of power in sociological discourses usually turn initially 
to the work of Hobbes…Locke…and Machiavelli…as precursors to the modern 
period”; contemporary theorists emphasise “one or other of these”: Clegg, for 
example, “uses the differences between Hobbes and Machiavelli to trace distinctively 
different accounts of power”, while Hindess “uses Hobbes and Locke in relation to a 
more Parsonian account of power as capacities”.328 Westwood argues that what is 
important about the different accounts of these three theorists is the way that they 
each theorise power “in relation to a construction of the social”; this, in fact, is precisely 
what makes them “precursors of modernity and sociological enquiry”. She claims that 
Hobbes, Locke and Machiavelli did not simply wish to define power, but to address 
“the issues raised by the exercise of powers, the relations between state and ‘people’, 
governance and…the moral questions bound to the exercise of power, responsibility 
and freedom”329; it was Hobbes and Locke, in particular, who struggled with “the 
relationship between subjectivities and the social…the distinctions between nature 
and passions, ‘man’ as social and part of a collectivity or social formation”.330 This is 
illustrated in Hobbes’ writings, where he “directed attention to the problem of order” 
 
327Westwood, Sallie. Power and the Social. New York: Routledge, 2002. 23 
328 Ibid, 6. 
329 Ibid, 6-7. 





and “suggested that all subjects exchange a degree of personal power for social 
stability in a social contract with the sovereign”; Macpherson claims that Hobbes’ views 
were very much a product of “the then developing capitalism of Europe” and “a theory 
of ‘possessive individualism’, well suited to the specific phase of capitalist 
development”.331 Hobbes, then, is seen as a social philosopher who was “trying to 
think through the upheavals, political, economic, social and religious, of his time”; he 
was, furthermore, a “radical…self-professed atheist, at a time when religious 
sentiments were not questioned, apart from which camp an individual belonged to”.332 
The social, as Hobbes understood it, was not identified “simply with the sovereign and 
the problem of order but also with the notion of civil society”333. Clegg suggests that 
the Hobbesian thesis, i.e. the idea that “barbarism rules without civil society”, “has 
strong moral overtones, but a mechanistic notion of power” and it is this notion that 
founds contemporary accounts of “nations, states and institutional frameworks”.334 
This idea motivated Durkheim, in the late 19th century, to suggest that the basis of the 
moral order and “the generation of consensus” could be found in the “division of labour 
in society”, rather than some sort of ‘social contract’.335 Clegg contrasts Hobbes’ 
theories with those of Machiavelli, who saw power as a series of “plays and strategies”; 
Machiavelli theorises, in The Prince, power as being, effectively, a “network of 
relations”.336 Power, then, is “not an absolute, nor is it vested in…[the] sovereign]”; it 
is “simply the effectiveness of strategies for generating a wider scope of action”; 
Machiavelli employs “military metaphors”, which suggests “a keen awareness of the 












precisely on whether or not they are effective in keeping those in power in power, 
rather than some social sense of morality and a mechanical understanding of the use 
of power.337 Hindess, on the other hand, does not see Machiavelli as a “theorist of 
power” and he focuses, instead, on Hobbes’ Leviathan and the work of John Locke, 
which allows him to account for the concepts of “freedom and responsibility” as 
originating in the “notion of consent” that Hobbes espouses and “the idea of a dispersal 
of powers as regulatory mechanisms in society”; Foucault, in fact, focuses on this very 
consensus.338 Westwood, however, criticises Hindess for not focusing more on how 
certain discourses of Hobbes, Machiavelli and Locke turned “’natural man’ into ‘social 
man’”, and it is these discourses that are important to the development “of a 
sociological space in which the social could be thought and theorised as distinctive”.339 
Westwood finds Hobbes’ conception of the person as most interesting; he argues that 
“instrumentalism in human affairs defines ‘rational’ actors” and, thus, the “strategist 
and the person are separated from nature by reason, and it is reason that is the 
invisible thread of the social”.340 Hobbes, as an atheist, theorised an entirely material 
world that “gave precedence to reason, though he did acknowledge “the power of 
love”; this materiality, nevertheless, “was also an embodied world in which corporeality 
was not separated from the social”.341 This world allowed Hobbes, then, to “discuss 
the strategic deal done between the subjects and the sovereign in which subjects 
exchanged freedoms for security, but also implicit…was the ever-present threat of 
violence as both an aspect of the human condition and the state of nature”.342 As 
Westwood points out, Hobbes, Machiavelli and Locke were crucial to “a conception of 
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the social”: Hobbes, “with his notion of a social contract, conceived a collectivity that 
could be thought beyond the individual”; Machiavelli, on the other hand, “with his 
ethnography of power, placed the individual in relation to others”; Locke, finally, 
“conceived a notion of laws, rights and responsibilities…that placed a premium on a 
conception of the social good”, which eventually became the “’felicific calculus’ of 
Benthamite social philosophy”.343 The self-proclaimed empiricism of these theorists, 
combined with their aforementioned concern for the social, was what eventually 
became the scientifically legitimate study of the social known, of course, as sociology; 
Hobbes, Machiavelli and Locke could only work and “differentiate forms of power” 
within the context of their own time, which included the spread of “merchant capitalism 
and the growing urbanisation of parts of Europe”.344 As, effectively, proto-sociologists, 
Hobbes, Machiavelli and Locke drew on what they saw as the realities of their time in 
conceptualise power and, as Westwood argues, power “has been bound to 
theorisations of the social” from “the earliest attempts to theorise” it.345 As reason 
became understood as “a way of being and knowing the world”, it became necessary, 
as Hawthorn understood, to supplement “the much vindicated faculty of reason by 
experience and experiment”; this understanding, combined with a need to supplement 
it, “provided the impetus for sociology and a conception of the social as intelligible 
through laws, measurement and empirical verification”.346 The  idea that the social was 
somehow “distinctive and intelligible” came from Enlightenment thinkers need to 
differentiate between the natural and the social; Montesquieu, in his The Spirit of the 
Laws, was concerned with how, “and through which mechanisms, the social was to 










human nature”.347 For Montesquieu, law was the “embodiment of reason”, but 
Hawthorn suggested that, at this time, “the rational was held to be natural and what 
was natural was held to be rational”, which, in turn, suggested both “a notion of natural 
justice and a universality to the law”.348 Montesquieu, nevertheless, recognised that 
law “interacted with specific cultures and customs”, which made it specific even in its 
universality; these legal “specificities” were born out of the “somehow innate 
characteristics or sensibilities of specific groups or nations”.349 He believed that the 
“esprit” in each nation should be honoured and that it was reason that brought stability 
and relevant laws to it; he did not conceive of any societal continuum because they 
were all different and “should remain so”.350 Furthermore, human nature, as concept, 
had to be bound to society “because individuals did not exist outside  of the nexus of 
relations of power within society, whatever the type”; the laws, though “contradictory 
and conservative”, “emphasised the immutability of ‘national’ characteristics and 
located politics with ethics and the fit between reason, ethics and cultural 
specificities”.351 Rousseau, as opposed to Montesquieu, romanticised the “state of 
nature” and adopted a “more evolutionary view of the development of societies through 
a conception of stages”; “natural man” is in an ideal situation, but the answer “to the 
ills of the world lay not in nature but in society”.352 It is only through society that one 
can enter “the moral universe”, which, though it allows one to understand the concepts 
of good and ‘right’, “also introduces notions and practices” that are “evil and 
reprehensible”; the goal, then, is to establish morality in people through a generation 












and the best laws.353 Rousseau’s solution to this was the introduction of a “social 
contract”, which was “a trade of liberty for the individual against the security of the 
general will”; it is these conditions that allow for the creation and preservation of “the 
moral individual”.354 Hawthorn suggests that Rousseau, rather than solve the problem 
of “the individual versus society”, instead simply re-frames “the definitions of individual 
and society in a  modern way”. Again, this account was very much a product of its 
time, as theorists had to contend with the French Revolution “and the growing sense 
that a social contract had to be sought between governors and governed in the 
interests of stability and order”.355 The concept of modernity, which was a product of 
the Enlightenment, prioritised science and rationalisation but also insisted that both 
concepts were “revolutionary”; this meant that the purpose of science was to scrutinise 
“social and political beliefs and forms of organisation” and to search for truth, which is 
what nature ultimately stands for.356 The way to unite the natural and the social, then, 
is to employ the tools of science, reason and empirical verifications in the search for 
truth; Rousseau conceives of this unity as “the general will”, “which is both society and 
those who compose society” and not “one section against another”. Touraine suggests 
that Rousseau’s rational society predates “the Durkheimian conception of the 
collective consciousness”; the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers saw this as “civil 
society” and, ultimately, even Kant argued for an ethics that was very much in the vein 
of Rousseau’s politics “in which the higher good is duty or a part in the social/universal 
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…meant the suppression of eternal principles, the elimination of all essences and of 
artificial entities such as the Ego and cultures in favour of a scientific understanding of 
biopsychological mechanisms and of the unwritten and impersonal rules that govern 
the exchange of commodities, words and women…[it] paved the way for the invasion 
of the classical order of modernity by the violence of power and the diversity of 
needs…358 
 
Tourraine did not ultimately believe in the success of the creation of a “rational 
society”, because he believed that social life, rather than being “transparent and 
governed by rational choices”, was “full of powers and conflicts”; modernity, 
nevertheless, is a liberating force, as understood by Berman, since it promises us 
“adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world…and, at the 
same time, threatens to destroy everything we have…we know…we are”.359 It is this 
“contradictory” and “paradoxical” legacy that now “fuels the preoccupations of our 
times and our futures”; Westwood herself focuses on issues central to these concerns: 
“the relationship between the social and powers, the individual and society” and “the 
relationship between the natural, the virtual and the social”.360  
 
II. The Legacy of Marx 
 Marx, as well as early and later sociologists, struggled with the issues raised in 
the previous section, but, like the Enlightenment philosophers, they had to contend 
with the developing movements of their time, e.g. modern capitalism, imperialism and 
nationalisms. Marx, as influenced by Hegel and “the political economists”, 
endeavoured to understand, on a scientific level, “the laws of motion of capitalism, 
including an understanding of the mechanisms of accumulation and…the role the 
commodity”; he was, nonetheless, a “philosopher, economist and inspiration to 
revolutionary movements” and these movements took from him “conceptions of power 
that led to revolutionary programmes”.361 While Marx did write a great deal on 
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economic power, he also understood the “power of ideologies and of collective 
subjects to act on the world”; he emphasised “the revolutionary nature of capitalism 
itself and the ability of the powerful, the bourgeoisie, to act on the world in their own 
interests with initiative and a power base to enable transformations”.362 Capitalism, 
while creating a form of systematic oppression, also “held within itself the revolutionary 
potential of the growing proletariat”; the system “contained its own critique and modes 
of organisation that turn critique into action in specific circumstances”.363 Marx 
understood the power of both coercion and of the state, and “the ways in which 
violence is part of ever nation-state, available to those in power through the military”; 
violence and coercion, however, are not the only operational forms of power, also at 
work are: “the necessities of life, the organisation of capitalist production, the power of 
poverty and the power of ideas and representations expressed in the language of 
ideologies”.364 Lefebvre argues that Marx’s “early period” produced a primarily, “but 
not exclusively”, political concept of modernity; yet, all of the nuances of Marx’s thesis 
were lost in the development of the authoritarian regimes “dedicated to statist versions 
of the socialist future”.365 Westwood argues that the history of the development of 
sociology is often framed as a debate with Marx, and this is because Marx expresses 
his concept of “the social” “within the frame of capitalist development in which social, 
economic and political elements are constantly articulated”, which, effectively, allowed 
for a “re-reading of Marx away from the economic determinism of earlier 
understandings”.366 These articulations between “the political, economic and 
ideological spheres”, instead, created “the space of the social in which collectivities 











most part, a result of the work of Antonio Gramsci.367 Gramsci argued that “the crude 
economism of the developing communist parties” was misguided, and that “the state 
and civil society” are, in fact, “separate but interacting” realms, with the civil realm also 
being “a space of political action”.368 The “ideological sphere” is equally as important 
as the civil realm in determining “the fate of political action and programmes”; Gramsci 
understood culture as a ‘lived practice’ and that “power blocs from the ruling classes 
could generate a consensus in society through the processes of ideological 
hegemony”.369 This consensus means that people are not simply coerced into 
believing something, but that “ideological spaces” are both “actively embraced and 
resisted by people in relation to a vast array of messages and signs mediated by the 
life circumstances of individuals”370, which means hat even those who recognise that 
they are being subjugated or manipulated in one way or another may choose to accept 
the situation for a variety of seemingly positive reasons. Gramsci’s work has inspired 
a move away from early Marxist understandings of ideologies, which focused on the 
concept of ‘false consciousness’ and the “all-embracing power of the media”, and 
towards a more “nuanced account of the role of the media in the seductions of 
capitalism”; these new theories introduce the concept of desire, as well as “the 
investments that subjects have in consumption”, as being “a crucial part of global 
modernities”.371 Gramsci’s theories have also allowed sociologists and political 
scientists to develop new understandings of the way that the state and civil society 
interact; contemporary studies on social movements have drawn on “the importance 
of civil society, the modes of representation of politics and the development of 
 









collective subjects”.372 Skocpol’s work, for example, analyses different “revolutionary 
moments” and how they relate to the role of the state; she sees the state not as “an 
analytical category or absence”, but as “an organisational structure responsible for 
policing, the military, and securing the conditions for economic development”.373 Her 
work, then, focuses on “the historical development and geo-political place of different 
states within global political and economic structures”, rather than simply placing the 
state “in relation to economic and political forms”, as “more thoroughly Marxist 
accounts” do; Westwood argues that this places Skocpol’s work more in line with 
Weber’s work in sociology than with Marx’s analysis.374 Weber developed an account 
“of the rationalisation and bureaucratisation of modern societies”, which was itself, 
essentially, a continuation of the concerns of “the Enlightenment project”; he focused 
on the prevailing “sense of disenchantment” that accompanied “the distinctive 
development of Western modernity” and he touched on everything “from religion to 
music”.375 As far as power was concerned, he distinguished “legal-rational power from 
traditional and charismatic forms of authority in relation to the presence or absence of 
the state”; these “forms of authority were separate from the issue of individual power”, 
which he understood as “the will to effect changes in another actor’s behaviour, 
context or view of the world”.376 Power, then, “was central to Weber’s understanding 
of the processes of rationalisation”; Beetham noted that Weber’s concern for 
bureaucracy was not so much about how well bureaucratic forms functioned, but 
rather how power is “exercised and developed” through them.377 Power, both 












capacity”; he recognised the importance of “economic factors”, but he understood 
these factors only in relation to “ideas and ideologies”, which he conceived of as social 
phenomena.378 Weber did not understood exploitation “in relation to class”, but, 
instead, “sought to understand class forms through the notion of status and market 
situation”; many of his conclusions, in fact, “have been incorporated into the main body 
of both empirical and theoretical sociology”.379 Weber’s sociology, unlike Durkheim’s, 
which sought the elaboration of “social facts” and the creation of  an object of study 
for sociology through said elaboration, was centred around “a theory of social action 
and the power of…understanding”; the social, then, was not “external to the subject, 
but the two are one and the same”.380 Weber’s subjects, nevertheless, were “rational 
actors”, which meant that the social had to be “constituted within the realm of reason 
and morality”; this clearly follows on from the tradition of “the French rationalists and 
Hobbes and Locke”.381 Weber, then, did not posit “social facts…collective 
consciousness…[nor the] re-building of solidaristic ties through a re-figured division of 
labour that would allow for a moral social space”; instead, Weber’s vision was based 
on 
the rise and rise of bureaucratic forms of power that stretched out as a vast network 
through society, generating forms of individuation and alienation not located, as they 
were for Marx, with capitalist production but with, what Foucault later termed, 
governmentality and the management of populations.382 
 
Furthermore, 
…these forms were a special form of power tied to rationalisation and bureaucratic 
procedures, and separated from charismatic power, which was secured through the 
person.383 
 
Simmel, on the other hand, embraced modernity and became, as Frisby suggested, 












of urbanisation, city life, the role of intellectuals and artists, and the importance of 
money”; he believed that the cultural and the social, “and the practices of everyday 
life”, were “bound into each other and not separated” as Weber separated science and 
culture, “locating the former with progress and the latter with a life of its own”.384 In 
fact, it was precisely this relatively autonomous cultural realm that interested Simmel 
the most; he did not believe in historical analysis, but rather the attempt to understand 
“the new mentalities of urban life” that brought together “the subjective and the social” 
in what he termed “the dissolution of fixed contents in the fluid element of the soul”.385 
Simmel tried to make sense of, “and elucidate”, the “transience of life in the cities and 
the shake out it implied for ties of kin and culture”; this ‘shake out’ was understood as 
the result of how commodification was forging “an increasing separation between the 
subjective and objective realms expressed through the power of money, so central to 
capitalist forms and relations”.386 Simmel believed that money, “as a medium of 
exchange”, “was separated from the social actors in the transactions”; commodities, 
at the same time, are “everywhere”, but the realm of commodities is “not encompassed 
only by the economic”.387 The realm of commodities is a realm of “social spaces, alive 
with social relations and pleasures, in contradiction to the stultifying production 
relations that had produced the commodities”; this understanding turned Simmel into 
“the sociologist of consumption and metropolitan life, and a forerunner of much that 
came to be understood as cultural studies and the cultural turn in sociology”.388 Simmel 
did not see a separation between the social and “the realm of the individual psyche or 
the economic”; he determined that “for modern living, the world of capitalism, 
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consumption and production was deep in the psyche and part of the times”.389 Simmel 
understood power as a very “nebulous notion”, as something “implicit in the economic 
relations of capitalism, in the capitalist labour process and in the power of 
consumption”; he understood “the seductions of capitalism and the ways in which 
power does not stand above or outside individuals” and that power “requires an active 
engagement”.390 This allowed Simmel, like Gramsci, to “articulate the ideological 
hegemonies bound to consumption as much as the imperatives of production 
relations”.391 Sociology in Britain did not develop in the same way as it did in 
Continental Europe; instead of the development of a “sociological imagination”, 
sociology in Britain developed by importing its founding fathers: Marx, Weber and 
Durkheim, and by following Charles Booth, “a social reformer”, “into a form of social 
research and a passion for class studies and class analysis”; these importations 
continue to this day because of, as Westwood points out, “the different status and role 
that intellectuals are accorded in France and Germany compared with the UK”.392 The 
development of “contemporary accounts of the social and the theorisation of power”, 
thus, has come via the work of Habermas, “the tradition of critical theory and the 
Althusserians”, the work of Ulrich Beck and Michel Foucault, the work of Touraine and, 
in the UK, the work of Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman, though they are both 
“deeply influenced by writers from beyond the UK”.393 Habermas describes himself as 
a Marxist, but his ‘Marxism’ is informed by Weber and the Frankfurt, which morphs it 
into a “critical theory that takes its departure from Simmel”; Habermas’ project is “to 











grounding of philosophy”.394 Though he remains a “political writer”, he sees the social 
and the political as being more distinct than a fundamental Marxist would; Outhwaite, 
in fact, refers to Habermas as a “Weberian Marxist”, one who agrees fundamentally 
with Weber while “maintaining a constructively critical relationship with Marxism”.395 
Habermas views “the modern project” as one that has yet to be complete, rather than 
one that should be supplanted by another worldview; Habermas’ theory of action “in 
relation to rationality” distinguishes between “instrumental and strategic action” and 
critiques the idea that emancipation comes from rationality.396 He does not believe that 
the account of the social sciences provided by scientism offers “the discourses 
necessary for a critical sociology”; because he is concerned with developing “an 
account of the public sphere”, then “issues of power and the ways in which power is 
transformed in modern societies” become crucial.397 Habermas looks at the ways that 
“the growth of specific regulatory discourses” affect “citizens in modern societies”, but 
he focuses more on “the role of law in democratic societies” and this results in his 
maintaining “the importance of the state” and “distinguishing between two types of 
power”: “the administrative power of the state” and, following on from Hannah Arendt, 
the “communicative power located with collective action”, which is often, in fact, 
“against the state”.398 Habermas criticises Foucault because he does not include 
“collectivites in struggle” in his analysis; he does, however, see communicative power 
in “less literal ways” in the “subject-less communication circuits of forums and 
associations”, particularly because it is only in this “anonymous form” that 
“communicatively fluid power” can bind “the administrative power of the state 
 









apparatus to the will of the citizens”.399 The concern here is how consent, in liberal 
democracy, is generated and sustained, as well as how civil society and the state are 
related and how said relationship “can be more emancipatory and participatory”; 
communicative action allows Habermas to partly theorise the relationship “between 
the subject and the social”, to overcome the “structure/action dichotomy” and to locate 
“the social with communicative acts within a frame that encompasses the rational, the 
political and the ethical”.400 Habermas’ work returns us to themes that were important 
for Hobbes, Locke and the Enlightenment philosophers: “issues of morality and state 
power” and “the role of civil society and citizen”; but he consistently radicalises “this 
vision” by introducing “Marxist categories and the role of collective subjects”.401 
Giddens, like Habermas, through his “theories of structuration” sought ways to 
“delineate the social” and to “overcome the division between structure and action”; this 
corresponds to Giddens’ conception of ‘modernity’ and his views on “power, authority, 
domination and violence”.402 Giddens holds that agency and power are directly 
related, since agency is defined by the capability to “make a difference”, which, in turn, 
is the capability to “exercise some sort of power”; all social relations involve power, 
particularly because power “defines the actor and agency”.403 Giddens understands, 
however, that power is multifarious and that can be found anywhere from the 
“transactional level wherein power is constituted as transformative capacity” to the 
“state and institutional level wherein domination is inscribed in institutions and the 
state”; in fact, the theory of structuration claims that power “is intrinsic to all 












since there is “no social space beyond authority”; the most that one can hope for is 
“the achievement of rationally defensible forms of authority”.405 Giddens also 
understands the role of violence and surveillance in maintaining the nation-state and 
global order; in fact, is is these “extremes of totalitarianism that deny the reflexivity of 
individuals”, which can be seen as “the marker of liberal democracy”.406 Giddens 
suggests that the way to oppose “the enormity of state power” to have “control over 
the means of violence” is a “life-world where actors have choices and possibilities to 
act on their own worlds and effect their biographies”; however, as critics have pointed 
out,  
the possibility of exercising choice and securing outcomes is still bound in capitalism to 
the refractions of class, gender and racism, which are also crucially bound to the issue 
of violence and the nation-state.407 
 
Giddens, as Westwood points out, reminds us of “the saliency of context and the 
ethnographies of power that permeate the social structure”; he, like Beck, is concerned 
with “process and the role of agency within the developing forms of late modernity”, 
though Beck focuses on the concepts of risk and safety as being “a major 
preoccupation for the middle classes in Western societies (and globally)”.408 The 
middle, and upper, classes, then, take advantage of their “cultural capital and 
competence” to ‘insure’ themselves “against the risk-laden world they inhabit”; those 
who have “obtained secure jobs, high levels of education and income” feel that they 
must “struggle constantly with securing [them]”.409 Individuals come to see the world 
as “risky and without safety”, which causes them to accept living under conditions like 
“endless surveillance” and to emphasise the management of all forms of risk; things 











there and the subject”, which de-centres the social and enfeebles “the lived experience 
of the social within the individual”.410 Beck, thus, recognises this and “the costs of all 







































Truth, Opinion and Power 
 
I. Introduction 
The chances of factual truth surviving the onslaught of power are very slim indeed; it is 
always in danger of being maneuvered out of the world not only for a time but, 
potentially, forever. Facts and events are infinitely more fragile things than axioms, 
discoveries, theories…Once they are lost, no rational effort will ever bring them back.412 
 
 
 This chapter deals with Hannah Arendt’s understanding of the concepts of 
truth, opinion and power, as put forth in her 1967 essay ‘Truth and Politics’. Arendt’s 
views on the antagonism between truth and power can serve as useful tools for 
making sense of current conceptions and usages of the same. Her comparisons of 
the discursive defence of a ‘fact’ and the discursive defence of an ‘opinion’ work well 
to describe how these two concepts are elucidated in modern political discourse, 
particularly in the fields of ‘punditry’ and what we might qualify as political journalism. 
Here, we will define each concept in turn, as Arendt understands them, and briefly 
sketch a picture of Arendt’s epistemological (and ontological) claims and position. 
Having done this, we can begin to analyse Arendt’s conception of political power 
contra truth as a precursor to the debates on ‘post-truth’, ‘alternative facts’, etc. that 
we see today. This understanding of power also serves to explain what we might call 
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II. Power over Truth 
Lies have always been regarded as necessary and justifiable tools not only of the 
politician’s or the demagogue’s but also of the statesman’s trade. Why is that so? And 
what does it mean for the nature and the dignity of the political realm, on one side, and 
for the nature and the dignity of truth and truthfulness, on the other? Is it of the very 
essence of truth to be impotent and of the very essence of power to be deceitful? And 
what kind of reality does truth possess if it is powerless in the public realm…413 
 
 Politics, insofar as it concerns campaigns, the electoral process, diplomacy, policy 
drafting, statecraft and the like, is notorious for, at the very least, a perceived culture of 
mendacity.  George Orwell, perhaps the most quoted (in English) novelist of this decade, 
wrote:  
Political language – and with variations this is true of all political parties, from 
Conservatives to Anarchists – is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder 
respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.414 
 
Robert M. Gates, former U.S. secretary of defence (2006-2011), once said, “[m]ost 
governments lie to each other…[t]hat’s the way business gets done”.415 This modus 
operandi, this way of ‘getting business done’, is precisely what Hannah Arendt is 
concerned with in her 1967 essay ‘Truth and Politics’. Arendt begins by claiming that 
no one “has ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each 
other, and no one…has ever counted truthfulness among the political virtues”.416 She 
goes on to trace the development of the relationship between truth and politics from 
Parmenides to the works of Plato and Herodotus, further on to the works of Hobbes, 
Leibniz, Lessing, Kant, Spinoza, James Madison and her contemporaries. Arendt, in 
this essay, takes for granted the precise meaning of ‘truth’ in order to find out “what 
injury political power is capable of inflicting upon truth” and in order to “look into these 
matters for political rather than philosophical reasons”.417 She does, however, 
distinguish between ‘rational truths’, which are “mathematical, scientific, and 
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philosophical truths”, and ‘factual truth’. A ‘rational truth’ might be an axiomatic 
expression or a physical law, while a ‘factual truth’ might be anything that we could 
describe as an actual occurrence or event. Arendt claims that merely making this 
distinction and cursorily analysing historical events and how important or not they 
seem to be (to historians and to the public) makes us aware of “how much more 
vulnerable” factual truths are “than all the kinds of rational truth taken together”.418 
She argues, furthermore, that facts and events, which are “the invariable outcome of 
men living and acting together”, “constitute the very texture of the political realm”419; 
in this sense, the ‘political realm’ is the real of the social, while the realm of reason 
exists beyond, though not independently of, the social. Political power, then, is out of 
its depth when it attempts to deal with ‘rational truths’, but is entirely in its element 
when it “falsifies or lies away facts”. Arendt even states that “[t]he chances of factual 
truth surviving the onslaught of power are very slim indeed”; furthermore: 
[factual truth] is always in danger of being maneuvered out of the world not only for a 
time but, potentially, forever. Facts and events are infinitely more fragile things than 
axioms, discoveries, theories…produced by the human mind; they occur in the field of 
the ever-changing affairs of men, in whose flux there is nothing more permanent than 
the admittedly relative permanence of the human mind’s structure. Once they are lost, 
no rational effort will ever bring them back.420 
 
The argument, then, is that a factual truth might be lost to time or to a concerted effort 
to suppress it or ‘revise’ it, while rational truths, even if they are lost, forgotten or 
attacked, may be rediscovered or reproduced at some point in the future. The same, 
of course, is true of factual truth, but the point would be that even the ‘rediscovery’ of 
a fact can be politically challenged and argued against. Truths themselves are 
dangerous because they claim a finality, a sort of limit point that either impedes or 









inconvenient may seem like anathema to a philosopher or an ethical scientist, but a 
politician or revolutionary can find that certain truths do not advance their cause or 
that those truths could cause their followers to question the legitimacy of their beliefs. 
The truth, then, becomes a deontological struggle between political convenience and 
fact per se. We can think of, for example, the Katyń massacres of April and May 1940, 
which were initially blamed on the Germany army (it was even claimed that they 
occurred in August 1941), but were later found to have been perpetrated by Soviet 
forces and the Soviet secret police; the truth was not officially revealed until 1992.421 
The facts of the matter were, of course, always true, but what was presented as true 
was always entirely dependent on the government in charge, at whatever respective 
time, in Poland. This one truth shaped Polish-Soviet relations for decades (up to the 
present) and even Poland’s relationship with the international community. Even the 
official revelation of these facts by the Russian government, and subsequent events, 
memorials and admissions, thereafter, could be seen as politically motivated or 
expedient. Other examples of this sort of suppression of the truth by the state are: 
the Khaibakh massacre of 1944, the Holodomor, the Armenian genocide, widespread 
sexual slavery in countries occupied by Japanese forces during WWII, the My Lai 
massacre of 1968, the 1986 disaster in Chernobyl, Abu Ghraib and U.S. extraordinary 
renditions and so many other similar events, some of which remain topics of 












III. Opinion over Fact 
For, seen from the viewpoint of the truthteller, the tendency to transform fact into 
opinion, to blur the dividing line between them, is no less perplexing than the truthteller’s 
older predicament, so vividly expressed in the cave allegory, in which the philosopher, 
upon his return from his solitary journey to the sky of everlasting ideas, tries to 
communicate his truth to the multitude, with the result that it disappears in the diversity 
of views, which to him are illusions, and is brought down to the uncertain level of 
opinion…422 
 
Though Arendt states very clearly that she is not dealing with the meaning of 
‘truth’ and, for the purposes of her essay, insists on being “content to take the word 
in the sense in which men commonly understand it”423, she, nevertheless, does 
ultimately make several claims about its meaning and value. Arendt argues that, in 
her time (1960s), there were more “diverse opinions on religious or philosophical 
matters” tolerated than at any other time, but that ‘factual truth’ had never before been 
met with “greater hostility” if it happened to “oppose a given group’s profit or 
pleasure”424; putting aside the argument that religious, philosophical and so-called 
‘rational truths’ are unquestionably ‘political’, even in the sense that Arendt takes 
them, Arendt claims that almost all truths that could be described as ‘factual’ have 
been subsumed into the political realm or, at the very least, are subject to political 
judgement and scrutiny. In terms of the relationship between politics and fact, she 
argues that the state, and even the community, treats inconvenient facts (facts that 
are “publicly known” and can be verified as facts) as if they were state secrets; 
discussing certain facts, then, becomes as dangerous as discussing classified 
information and information whose confidentiality is vital to the survival of the state 
apparatus. Arendt finds it a “curious phenomenon” that these inconvenient facts 
should prove “as dangerous as…preaching atheism or some other heresy proved in 
former times” and she finds it curious that this practice is also found “in countries that 
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are ruled tyrannically by an ideological government”; what she finds most disturbing, 
however, is that even “free countries” tolerate “unwelcome factual truths” by 
transforming them into opinions and that this is because certain factual truths 
“concern issues of immediate political relevance” and “there is more at stake here 
than the perhaps inevitable tension between two ways of life within the framework of 
a common and commonly recognized reality”.425 Furthermore, she states that what is 
at stake here “is this common factual reality itself” and that “this is indeed a political 
problem of the first order”; factual truth, “though it is so much less open to argument 
than philosophical truth, and so obviously within the grasp of everybody”, seems to 
be “countered not by lies and deliberate falsehoods but by opinion” when it is 
“exposed in the market place”.426 Factual truth, for Arendt, is “always related to other 
people”; it “concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved” and 
“exists only to the extent that it is spoke about, even if it occurs in the domain of 
privacy”.427 Factual truth, then, is “political by nature” and facts and opinions, “though 
they must be kept apart, are not antagonistic to each other…they belong to the same 
realm”.428 The social nature of human existence, of human being, creates a situation 
where everything that is, effectively, ‘human’ is subject to public scrutiny, 
interpretation and approval or rejection. This seems anathema, of course, to claims 
of universal truth or of an objective, even a priori, reality that would hold (and does 
hold) independently of human apperception or existence. The world is as it is, whether 
we like it or not, and there is nothing to be done; we cannot change what has come 
to pass and we cannot deny that there was always something before. Is this the case, 










various opinions and interpretations; subject to the meaning, relevance and value that 
we care to ascribe to it? Arendt states that, though there are certainly many real 
perplexities “inherent in the historical sciences”, they are certainly “no argument 
against the existence of factual matter, nor can they serve as a justification for blurring 
the dividing lines between fact, opinion, and interpretation, or as an excuse for the 
historian to manipulate the facts as he pleases”.429 She goes on: 
Even if we admit that every generation has the right to write its own history, we admit 
no more than that it has the right to rearrange facts in accordance with its own 
perspective; we don’t admit the right to touch the factual matter itself…We are 
concerned here with brutally elementary data…whose indestructibility has been take for 
granted even by the most extreme and most sophisticated believers in historicism.430 
 
Arendt argues that the only state of affairs that would grant a meaningful and 
perdurable change in what she calls “brutally elementary data” would be nothing less 
than “a power monopoly over the entire civilized world”; she claims, however, that 
such a world is “far from being inconceivable” and that “it is not difficult to imagine 
what the fate of factual truth would be if power interests, national or social, had the 
last say”.431 It is not inconceivable, then, to suspect that “it may be in the nature of 
the political realm to be at war with truth in all its forms” and to feel that “a commitment 
even to factual truth” may, in fact, be “an anti-political attitude”. If we were to accept 
this as the case, that politics qua power is, by its very nature, against all forms of 
truth, then we would have to accept that truth, whether in its ‘rational’ or ‘factual’ form, 
must exist outside of, or without, politics. The other, perhaps less radical, conclusion 
would be that rather than truth exist as the antithesis of politics, it functions more as 
a check, or a limit point, on the political; the truth, thus, would exist both at the 
periphery and outside of the political, delimiting its dominion and challenging, or 
corroborating, its claims. It is, however, this finality, this terminus, that threatens the 
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legitimacy and the authority of the political. A political project may pretend to great 
and just aims, but end up encountering a great deal of ethical dilemmas in its 
realisation; these dilemmas can sometimes be ignored, be recontextualised or 
reinterpreted or simply be accepted and perpetuated. An example of this might be 
the altruistic claims of the politico-economic project of industrialisation, with its 
promise of raising standards of living, ease of life, automating work, providing labour, 
purpose and income to communities and more, all while destroying the environment, 
exploiting workers and communities, actually lowering quality of life (pollution, waste, 
etc.) and influencing and manipulating the state to serve the ends of the industrialists. 
We see this evidenced very clearly in the water crisis of Flint, Michigan, where the 
public drinking water became so toxic that it poisoned thousands of children and 
citizens were told to either boil their water or purchase bottled water. Though the local 
government was to blame, since they switched the source of Flint’s drinking water to 
deal with a budget crisis and reduce costs, government officials initially denied claims 
that the water was not potable and even went so far as to give televised conferences 
where they supposedly drank the town’s water in order to prove that it was safe. 
Though independent sources and various organisations identified the problem from 
the beginning, the crisis has taken years and hundreds of millions of dollars to resolve 
and is, in fact, still ongoing.432 433 In this vital sense, situations such as these go 
beyond ‘abuses of power’; whether deliberate or not, these sorts of actions constitute 
crimes against citizens perpetrated by the state and the fact that the state typically 
finds it more convenient to lie or shift the blame onto another entity is proof that these 
are, truly, crimes. Budget crises, the selling off of vital infrastructure, the choice of 
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what sort of service to provide to citizens and customers and, most importantly, the 
laws and decisions made by the state, do not exist and are not entertained in a 
vacuum. Decisions concerning infrastructure and public services are biopolitical 
decisions; they can determine whether or not people, entire communities, live or die 
and what sort of quality of life they are subjected to. From the Flint water crisis to the 
Grenfell Tower disaster to Chernobyl and Fukushima, decisions made by the state 
can negatively impact hundreds of thousands of lives for decades and these impacts 
may or may lead to change or consequences. What all of these disasters have in 
common, other than their origins in government policy, behaviour and inaction, is that 
victims, witnesses, activists and concerned citizens were, at least initially, painted as 
liars or dismissed as sensationalists.434 435 436 
 
III. Truth as the Limit of Politics 
…factual truth is no more self-evident than opinion…opinion-holders find it relatively 
easy to discredit factual truth as just another opinion. Factual evidence…is established 
through testimony by eyewitnesses…by records, documents, and monuments, all of 
which can be suspected as forgeries. In the event of a dispute, only other witnesses but 
no third and higher instance can be invoked…there is nothing to prevent a majority of 
witnesses from being false witnesses…under certain circumstances the feeling of 
belonging to a majority may even encourage false testimony…to the extent that factual 
truth is exposed to the hostility of opinion-holders, it is at least a vulnerable as rational 
philosophical truth.437 
 
 Arendt claims that seen “from the viewpoint of politics, truth has a despotic 
character” that puts it in direct competition with tyrants and leaves it in a precarious 
position with “governments that rest on consent and abhor coercion”; facts are 
“beyond agreement and consent” and no discussion of them can change “their 
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establishment”.438 Opinions can be “argued with, rejected, or compromised upon”, but 
facts can only be countered with “plain lies”; factual truth, like all other forms of truth, 
“precludes debate”, but debate “constitutes the very essence of political life”.439 
Arendt states that the “modes of thought and communication that deal with truth”, 
when seen “from the political perspective”, are “necessarily domineering” in that they 
do not take into account “other people’s opinions, and taking these into account is the 
hallmark of all strictly political thinking”440; when one forms or argues in favour of an 
opinion, a plurality and myriad of information and perspectives works in one’s favour 
and allows one to approach a more persuasive and general argument. Fact, however, 
does not necessarily benefit from a variety of perspectives nor from vociferous 
advocacy in its favour; a fact simply is, or was, irrespective of whether anyone favours 
it or not. As Arendt says, “facts have no conclusive reason whatever for being what 
they are; they could always have been otherwise, and this annoying contingency is 
literally unlimited”; nothing, however, “could ever happen if reality did not kill, by 
definition, all the other potentialities originally inherent in any given situation”.441 
Arendt claims that the biggest problem with factual truth contra rational truth, or at 
least one of the biggest problems for those who labour towards knowledge of rational 
truth, is that philosophers, scientists, theologians and the like struggle to account for 
the inherent randomness of events, causality, probability, the future, free will and the 
like; in other words, so many things could happen until something actually does 
happen. One thing that Arendt fails to mention, at least in this essay, is the influence 
of value and ethical judgements on what we define as criminal or illegal. We can take, 
for example, the case of Roman Ostriakov, who was determined by Italy’s highest 
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court not to have committed a crime when he walked out of a supermarket with €4.70 
worth of food; the court determined that this act was not a crime because Ostriakov 
was in “desperate need of nourishment”.442 Ostriakov was, however, found guilty by 
two separate courts, before he was acquitted, and did spend some time in jail; the 
crime happened in 2011, he was convicted in 2015 and then exonerated in 2016.443 
The whole saga is, of course, reminiscent of one of the plots of Alexandre Dumas’s 
Les Misérables, in which one of the protagonists, Jean Valjean, is imprisoned for 19 
years for the crimes of having stolen bread for the family of his starving sister and 
then for attempting to escape from jail several times. Now, not taking Ostriakov’s 
ruling into consideration, most countries outlaw theft without exception and without 
consideration for how small the theft may have been; property rights being one of the 
cornerstones of a capitalist system, naturally. It could certainly be argued that 
Ostriakov’s case is the exception that proved the Italian rule, but the ‘problem’, here, 
is that this ruling makes any instance, past, present and future, of taking food when 
in “desperate need of nourishment” not an illegal act. Furthermore, in theory, this 
ruling transcends borders and could be cited in other cases across Europe and 
beyond. Beyond even that, this challenges the very definitions of ‘theft’, ‘property’ and 
‘need’ and it marks a change in policy towards the indigent and how a society should, 
and should not, treat those in need. The reason that this is so important to this 
discussion is that it is certainly a fact that Ostriakov took something that did not belong 
to him, which was described, at the time, as ‘theft’, and it is certainly a fact that this 
was illegal under Italian law, but his ruling, ultimately, made two of those things false. 
Ostriakov still took something that, at the time, did not belong to him, but we can no 
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longer (legally) consider the act as theft and we can no longer consider the act as 
having been illegal, though both of these things were true at the time. If we were to 
take facts in a dispassionate, deontologically-informed way, then we would be forced 
to interpret laws as written and we would be forced to punish the transgression of 
said laws as written, no more and no less. Ethical and moral truths should, at the very 
least, prevent us from doing this, however. Now, do we consider ethical and moral 
truths as belonging to the realm of ‘rational truths’, to the realm of ‘factual truths’ or to 
the political realm? This is not immediately clear; a case could be made for any of 
these being true and it has been a topic of contention for at least a couple of millenia, 
to say the least. It could be argued that we have an ethical duty to compassion and 
to meet the basic needs of everyone, but what would this duty rest upon: a deity, a 
higher purpose, a society? Human beings, qua homo sapiens, are a relatively young 
species, so we could only really argue that either certain ethical principles were in 
place even before our existence or these principles somehow evolved along with us, 
over the course of hundreds of thousands or years. It would seem absurd to 
anthropomorphically attribute ethics and morals to non-human animals, especially 
before the arrival of homo sapiens and particularly after our arrival, but a sort of 
natural(-ist) stance towards ethics would seem to do just that, i.e. an argument for the 
existence of natural rights, truths, laws, etc. In any case, the question of what 
information or ‘data’ counts as a fact and what does not, even at the most ‘elementary’ 
level, seems to be less clear than Arendt wants to make it; and this is precisely 
because we are social beings who are actively engaged in scientific discovery. If we 
are operating at the level of a statement like ‘that person picked something up’, then, 
yes, this could be taken an indisputable fact, but a statement like ‘that person stole 






IV. Conclusion: Technologies of Power 
 What does Arendt’s essay ultimately tell us, then, about power? Is truth now 
destined to be forever at the mercy of ‘the political’ and of popular opinion? Is it 
enough to say that all of ‘the good’ that happens within the ‘political realm’ forgives 
its base desires to fight for “pleasure…profit, partisanship, and…dominion”?444 
Today’s political discourse and landscape certainly argues for the claim that opinion, 
belief and emotion have completely trumped fact, truth and evidence in terms of being 
the driving factors behind much of government policy and public sentiment (both at 
the local, national and supranational level). Cicero, for example, says this of 
“eloquence” and of the role of discourse and of the orator: 
…what other power could have been strong enough either to gather scattered humanity 
into one place, or to lead it out of its brutish existence in the wilderness up to our present 
condition of civilization as men and as citizens, or, after the establishment of social 
communities, to give shape to laws, tribunals, and civic rights?445 
 
He goes on to claim that: 
the wise control of the complete orator is that which chiefly upholds not only his own 
dignity, but the safety of countless individuals and of the entire State. Go forward 
therefore, my young friends, in your present course, and bend your energies to that 
study which engages you, that so it may be in your power to become a glory to 
yourselves, a source of service to your friends, and profitable members of the 
Republic”.446 
 
In a very twisted way, this does, in fact, describe a great deal of modern political 
activity, particularly over the course of the past year: the pursuit of power, glory, profit 
and the enrichment of one’s friends.447 448 449 450 This is not, of course, what Cicero 
had in mind, though these sorts of activities, as well as corruption more generally, are 
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certainly discussed in his writings, speeches and dialogues. Arendt, like Cicero, is 
certainly arguing that there is a right and a wrong way to engage in politics; a right 
and a wrong way to conduct oneself politically. She claims that the “actual content of 
political life”, which might be lost in the assumption that “all public affairs” are “ruled 
by interest and power” is 
the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of 
acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word 
and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something 
entirely new.451 
 
We have already pointed that Arendt argues that it is not inconceivable that 
some sort of “power monopoly over the entire civilized world” could come about 
and that “it is not difficult to imagine what the fate of factual truth would be if 
power interests, national or social, had the last say in these matters”.452 Now, it 
could certainly be argued that something like this monopoly may be, at least, 
nascent in global society, particularly considering the ubiquity of social media, 
‘smart’ devices, internet culture and remote and digital labour. Direct and 
instantaneous access to ‘facts’ and information is a reality in today’s society, as 
is direct and instantaneous access to misinformation, lies, conspiracies, 
propaganda, doctored media and the like; and the proliferation of the first is 
certainly not commensurate with the second. Statista claims that, in early 2019, 
at least 50% of adults worldwide had witnessed fakes news on television453; 
they also determined that most U.S. consumers source their information about 
news and current affairs from television, social media and online newspapers, 
websites or apps.454 Datareportal claims that, worldwide, there are 5.27 billion 
unique mobile phone users, 4.72 billion internet users and 4.33 billion active 
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social media users, which means that over half of the world’s population is active 
on social media and at least 60% of the world’s population is connected to the 
internet.455 It is certainly true that Arthur C. Clarke, in addition to so many other 
science fiction writers and artists, predicted internet networks, internet culture 
and remote work456, as well as the personal computer and mobile devices457, 
but the true scale of how things have come to pass would likely have been 
laughed at even just a few decades ago. Certainly, in Hannah Arendt’s lifetime, 
and particularly at the time of writing ‘Truth and Politics’, such things were wholly 
within the realm of science fiction and fantasy. Now that all of these things are 
scientific realities, we can more easily imagine this “power monopoly over the 
entire civilized world” coming into being, if it is not, at least in part, already there. 
The general functions of social media, news outlets and internet advertising are 
perfect examples of what Arendt was discussing with regards the relationship 
between factual truth, rational truth and politics. This is particularly true because 
social media, other forms of media and the internet do not necessarily have an 
inherent goal nor do they have an inherent purpose, per se; at most, it could be 
argued that, particularly at their inception, the fundamental purpose of social 
media, news media and the internet is to communicate something to someone. 
In fact, the definition of ‘social media’ is given as such: “forms of media that allow 
people to communicate and share information using the internet or mobile 
phones”.458 Nowhere, other than the inherent limitations of the form, does it say 
how, when, why this communication takes place, but simply that that is the 
purpose of said technology. That social media and the internet have become so 
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omnipresent and have also become the preeminent tools for the dissemination 
of propaganda, misinformation and conspiracy, around the world, is taken more 
to be a reflection of our modern society, rather than as an indictment of these 
media. It is no accident that the first book to be printed after the invention 
Gutenberg’s printing press, circa 1439, was the bible and the second was the 
Book of Psalms. The use of technologies, particularly new technologies, will 
naturally reflect the interests, beliefs, practices, desires and hopes of the 
societies into which they are introduced. Their use will also reflect, as a matter 
of course, what the ruling classes, institutions of power and government need 
for the lower classes and citizens to know and obey. Access to new technologies 
will always be determined financially and in terms of social status or rank and 
the use of these technologies will always be informed by this access hierarchy. 
As new technologies and techniques become more affordable and more widely 
available, so too does our access to new perspectives, voices, opinion and the 
like increase. The wealthy and influential, however, will always have first access 
and greater control over their use, even if access is, effectively, universal. It 
could be argued, then, that power monopolies will rest in the hands of those with 
greatest access and control of technologies. According to Statista, the Android 
operating system, which is commercially sponsored by Google, controls around 
71% of the global mobile operating system market, while iOS, which was 
created and is developed by Apple, controls around 27%459; the top mobile 
phone vendors, worldwide, are Samsung, Apple, Xiaomi, OPPO, vivo and 









devices are truly monopolised and this is, of course, relevant in terms of how 
different forms of information, news, communications and the like are circulated. 
Governments (whether at the local, national or supranational level), news 
sources, all forms of media, individuals, artists and all manner of people must 
deal with one or more of these companies at least several times per day, if not 
the entire day, in order to do business, accomplish certain tasks, promote 
themselves, advertise and, in extreme cases, to simply function. If this is not a 












































When it comes to the concept of power, theoretical chaos still reigns. While the 
existence of the phenomenon itself cannot be doubted, the concept remains altogether 
ambiguous. For some, it means repression; for others, it is a constructive element in 
communication. Legal, political and sociological notions of power remain unreconciled. 
Power is sometimes associated with freedom, sometimes with coercion. For some 
power is based on common action, for others on struggle. Some draw a sharp line 
between power and violence. For others, violence is just a more extreme form of power. 
At one moment power is associated with the law, at another with arbitrariness.461 
 
 This chapter explains and engages with Byung-Chul Han’s work, What Is 
Power?, in which he attempts to formulate “a basic form of power from which we can, 
by modifying its inner structural elements, derive the different forms in which power 
may appear”.462 This “flexible concept of power” seeks to synthesise the different, and 
often conflicting, definitions and understandings of power, that we find throughout the 
social sciences. Han argues that fundamentally antithetical formulations of power are 
currently vying for theoretical legitimacy, in the realms of law, politics and sociology; 
these formulations conceive of power as everything from being rooted in repression, 
coercion, conflict, violence and/or order to, conversely, being representative of non-
violence, cooperation, arbitrariness, and/or freedom. Han argues that “[l]egal, political 
and sociological notions of power remain unreconciled”, which means that cross-
disciplinary analyses of power are sure to fall prey to the “theoretical chaos” that this 
produces. Furthermore, Han claims that it is precisely this fact that “we do not fully 
understand what [power] actually is” that gives power its ‘power’: the power of 
ambiguity and theoretical chaos. Han effectively eschews rationalisations of power 
that characterise it as a ‘three-dimensional’ concept, where each ‘dimension’ 
describes a different mode of power. Different theories of power, effectively, fall under 
the weight of their own logic(s), which contradict, confuse and weaken the very 
 






definitions that each dimension of power gives us to understand how relations work, 
in the first place. Han seeks to move beyond this to a more fundamental and 
explanatorily valuable conception of power. 
 
II. The Logic of Power 
Power is usually defined as a causal relation: the power of the ego is the cause which 
effects a particular behaviour in an alter against the latter’s will. It enables the ego to 
impose his or her decisions without having to show any consideration for the alter. Thus 
the ego’s power limits the alter’s freedom. The alter suffers the will of the ego as 
something alien. This common idea of power does not do justice to its complexity.463 
 
 Han argues that ‘common’ conceptions of power ignore the complexity of the 
various processes of power; in seeking to look for different characteristics of 
displays/relations of power and attempting to demarcate and define said 
characteristics in a nomic and negative fashion, power theorists, by nature of their 
very methodology, arrive at conceptual impasses. Again, these impasses are not only 
results of the paradigmatic methodologies of political science (and the social sciences, 
more generally), but they are also due to the delimiting, conceptualising and 
nomological objectives, at hand. In other words, the fact that, as Byung-Chul Han puts 
it, the “common idea of power does not do justice to its complexity” is due to the very 
nature of how political theorists might arrive at such a ‘common idea’.  
 
III. The Power of Coercion 
 Han challenges what has come to be known as the ‘first dimension of power’, 
introduced by Dahl in the mid-20th Century, which claims that A has power over B 
when A can coerce B into doing something that B would not otherwise do in absence 
of that coercion. Han claims that process of power “are not exhausted by attempts to 
break resistance or to compel obedience” and that power “does not have to take the 
 





form of coercion”.464 Furthermore, the fact that B is able to form a will “that opposes 
the holder of power actually bears witness to the weakness of that power”; how 
powerful a form of power is proportionate to how “silent…its efficacy” is.465 Finally, if 
power “needs to draw special attention to itself, it is already weakened”.466 Han’s 
critique of the first dimension of power, at best, qualifies as a very weak form of power, 
as it becomes rather clear that coercion cannot exist without the presence, or at least 
the threat or possibility of, resistance. Necessitating the existence of two wills that 
must contend with one another, irrespective of how onerous or undemanding that 
contention is, effectively makes coercion or control a very inefficient and demanding 
form of power and one that is very open to subversion and defiance. Han’s claims, 
nevertheless, are not necessarily true when it comes to instances or modes of 
coercion. It may very well be the case that A makes it very well known that B is being 
coerced, controlled and/or made to obey A’s will, but B is very happy, or at least 
content with, obedience to A. This may be due to what B perceives as a mutual, or 
symbiotic, advantage resulting from compliance; A may or may not be aware of B’s 
understanding of this advantage, but it would make no difference to A, as long as A’s 
objective is met. B, in this situation, may actually have the upper hand, as far as this 
arrangement goes, but whether or not this makes this form of power ‘weak’ or 
‘inefficient’ is not immediately apparent. The causal relation, i.e. the direction, 
placement or order of causal links, is not clear, when we take all of this into account. 
The biggest problem with the first dimension of power, which is implied in Han’s 
analysis,  is that it assumes a very strict and almost comical logic; a logic that does 
not take into account anything beyond the relationship between A and B, with respect 
 







to the making of one or more decisions, through coercion. This brings us, then, to 
Han’s critique of the ‘second dimension of power’. 
 
IV. Neutralising the Will 
Neither does power consist in ‘neutralizing the will’. The claim here is that the existing 
power imbalance impedes the formation of a will on the side of the subordinated party, for 
this party will in any case have to succumb to the will of the holder of power. Hence, the 
holder of power directs the subordinated party regarding the latter’s choices of action. But 
there are forms of power that exceed such a ‘neutralization of the will’.467 
 
 The ‘second dimension of power’, as theorised by Bachrach and Baratz in the 
early 60’s, concerns a move beyond the immediate ‘causal relation’ between A and B, 
to the social and political realities that make A ‘A’ and B ‘B’; in other words, we must 
first understand the societal and political factors that come into play when a decision 
is made and then we can understand, or at least properly analyse, who made a 
particular decision and why that particular decision was made. In order to gauge and 
understand how A coerces B, we must understand how A has come to be in a position 
of initiating this coercion and why B must obey A. We come to understand, then, that 
it is A who sets ‘the agenda’ in this ‘relationship’ and not only makes decisions, but is 
allowed to decide what decisions are worth making and vice versa. Han argues, 
however, that what is understand as this ‘second dimension of power’ is not power; 
there are “forms of power” that go beyond this agenda-setting dimension of power and, 
thus, come to make this power claim, effectively, superfluous. It is one thing to be able 
to decide what is important, what is up for discussion and what is worth the effort, so 
to speak, in terms of the social and political issues that define and comprise the 
quotidian life of a nation’s citizens, but it is another thing, entirely, to make said 
decisions feel or appear to have been made by those very same citizens. A hardly 
needs to coerce B to do C, if B believes that C was, in truth, their idea to begin with. A 
 





can give B no other choice but C and claim victory when B chooses C, but to deliver a 
plethora of options to B and still have B choose C because they truly want C is a far 
superior utilisation of power, as such. As Han explains it, it is “the sign of a superior 
power that those subjected to it explicitly want what the holder of power wants, that 
those subjected to power follow the will of its holder as if it were their own, or even 
anticipate that will”.468 Furthermore, the one “who is subjected to power may glorify 
what [they] would have, in any event, wanted to do, by declaring it to be in accordance 
with the will of the superior power, and executing it with…an emphatic affirmation of 
that power”; B’s action “takes on a different form in the medium of power because the 
action of [A] is affirmed or internalized by [B] as his or her own action”.469 This would 
clearly suggest that, for Han, power presents itself in degrees and hierarchies and that 
these different instantiations of power make many accepted understandings of power 
obsolete. Coercion is, without a doubt, a form of control, which should be understood 
as ‘powerful’; it does not, however, exhaust our understanding of how control and 
power might manifest themselves. Manipulation and subordination are also certainly 
useful methods of control, but their effectiveness and power pale in comparison to self-
motivation and affirmative conformity. For Han, then, power is a “phenomenon 
pertaining to form” and how “an action is motivated is crucial”; it is not “I have to 
anyhow’ but ‘I want to’ [that] expresses the presence of a superior power”.470 This 
cannot be described in causal terms, as “in this case power does not operate like a 
mechanical push that simply moves a body out of its original trajectory”; rather, “its 
effect is like that of a field in which the body moves out of its own accord”.471 Superior 
power might be explained, effectively, as a hijacking of the autonomy of one or more 
 








subjects by one or another subjects, for their own ends, but how necessary is this 
hijacking? How much effort is really required for power to move from within B towards 
the intended goal of A? As Han contends, power does not operate mechanically, but, 
rather, in a holistic and mediative fashion. We might say that Han’s initial conclusions 
have more in common with the ‘third dimension of power’, which we turn to, next. 
 
V. Organic Power 
The causal model is incapable of describing complex relations. Even organic life as 
such cannot be understood in terms of causal relations. As opposed to a lifeless and 
passive thing, an organism does not allow an external cause to have an effect on it 
without the organism contributing to it. Rather, it reacts independently to the cause. 
This capacity to give an independent response to an external trigger is characteristic of 
the organic. A lifeless thing, by contrast, does not respond.472 
 
 The ‘third dimension of power’, as proposed by Lukes, is described as power 
that is characterised by domination, where those who are dominated acquiesce in 
their own domination.473 Those who dominate may or not know that they are doing so, 
just as those who acquiesce in said domination may or may not know that they are 
doing so and how it is that they are doing so474; though it will not be taken up in greay 
detail, here, we may call this form of power ideological power. By examining and 
understanding several factors concerning different modes and methods of domination, 
we can come to understand why and to what purpose an individual acts and, because 
we understand the nature of domination, we do not give privileged status to any 
reasons or motivations that an actor may give, as it may be the case that an actor is 
not entirely aware of their motives and circumstance.475 Now, we can see more clearly 
how Han’s arguments play against the three dimensions of power. The first dimension, 
he argues, does not “do justice to the complexity of power”; coercion requires one to 
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enforce one’s will “against the will of the other”, which means that there is but a “very 
low degree of mediation between ego and alter, as these only relate 
antagonistically.476 Han claims that, in this case, the “ego is not received in the soul of 
the alter” and, thus, it is that form of power that does not “exercise its effects against 
the intended actions of the other but from within these” that “contains more 
meditation”; a superior power “forms the future of the other”, rather than blocking it.477 
It is here where we truly begin to see some similarities between Han’s thesis and 
Lukes’s third dimension of power. Han argues that a superior power does not proceed 
“against a particular action of the alter”, but, rather, “influences or works on the 
environment of the alter’s actions even before they take place, so that the alter 
voluntarily decides in favour of the ego’s will, even without the threat of any sanctions”; 
thus, with the use of violence, “the holder of power takes his place in the soul of the 
other”.478 What Han describes as ‘superior power’ seems to be far more benign than 
Lukes’s third dimension of power, but this is only because of the choice of terms 
employed. For Han, power does not end with B acquiescing in A’s domination of them 
nor in creating the conditions for acquiescence nor in understanding how different 
forms of domination manifest. Power, as Han understands it, is as unpredictable and 
mutable as thought and as organic as biology itself. He explains this by pointing out 
that “organic life as such cannot be understood in terms of causal relations”; unlike “a 
lifeless and passive thing, an organism does not allow an external cause to have an 
effect on it without the organism contributing to it…it reacts independently to the 
cause”.479 It is this capacity “to give an independent response to an external trigger 
[that] is characteristic of the organic”480; it is precisely because power deals with 
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biological organisms, rather than inorganic matter, for example, that the first two 
dimensions of power do not adequately account for human behaviour. Even the third 
is already put into question, at this stage. Han claims that the “specificity of life is that 
is cuts short the external cause, transforms it and lets it begin something new in itself”; 
life “may be dependent on food, but food is not the cause of life” and it is “life itself 
which has the power to turn what is external to it into a cause of specific organic 
purposes.”481 This means that these processes are not simply “repetitions of the 
external cause on the inside”, but, rather, “they are independent achievements, 
independent decisions of life”; an external cause, then, “is but one of many possible 
triggers that life itself turns into a cause…[an] external cause never achieves an effect 
without a contribution of decision of the inner”.482 Finally, we can observe “no 
immediate continuation of the outer into the inner, as in the case of the transmission 
of kinetic energy from one body to another”483; this means, both, that it is impossible 
to always be able to predict how anyone will react to a certain stimulus, situation or 
event and, also, that not all stimuli or ‘causes’ are necessarily external, as they may 
originate internally. Han argues, however, that causality “is even less suitable for a 
description of mental life” and that the complexity “of mental life determines the 
complexity of power processes which cannot be translated into linear relations 
between cause and effect”; it is precisely this complexity that distinguishes power, in 
its superior form, at least, “from violence, where a simple causality between force, or 
strength, and effect can be given” and it is this simplicity that “probably constitutes the 
advantage of physical violence”.484 Now, it is not immediately clear why violence would 










what is most striking, here, in relation to the three dimensions of power, is how active 
a process ‘power’ is and how reliant power is on the individual and/or the group. 
Power, as Han claimed, is a “phenomenon pertaining to form” and its forms seem to 
be so multifarious that it is not difficult to see how one ascribe the wrong 
characteristics, behaviours, explanations, motivations and ‘causes’ to the actions of 
another or even of oneself. Lukes may have been right to believe that one does not 
necessarily have privileged access to one’s own motives in action, but it does not 
follow, logically, that anyone else would be able to understand said motives, either. 
One must also reckon with reciprocity of power and asymmetrical power processes 
and dynamics; as Han states: the “complex processes of power cannot be adequately 
described with simple arithmetic” and a “slight countervailing power may inflict severe 
damage on a power of superior strength”.485 Perceived weakness can function as a 
strength, particularly if specific “political constellations” and “complex 
interdependencies” come into play486; logically, if A requires the cooperation of B, for 
whatever reason, then A has become dependent upon B and on their cooperation. 
This means that B must figure into the life A and must be taken into consideration, as 
it is up to B to choose whether or not to cooperate with A, unless A wants to be “into 
a difficult situation”; it can be said, then, that this dependence, naturally, can be 
exploited by B and used “as a source of power”.487 By “making skilful use of cultural 
norms”, then even “the very weakest can turn their powerlessness into power”488; what 
this means, then, is that power may be reciprocal, but not directly so. A potentially 
incalculable and unquantifiable number of factors come into play when considering 
different forms and processes of power that are completely alien, theoretically, to what 
 








we have come to understand as the ‘three dimensions of power’. This makes it, 
logically, confusing, as we seek to understand the rationale behind actions that are 
the result(s) of power dynamics, but can seemingly be explained in various different 
ways. The elucidations meant to be provided to us by the various dimensions of power 
ring hollow when they begin to conflict and invalidate each other; one action seems to 
be motivated by one thing under the paradigm of a certain power dimension, while 
being motivated by something else entirely, under another. This is what Han refers to 











































New Technologies of Power 
 
I. Introduction 
Today, we do not deem ourselves subjugated subjects, but rather projects: always 
refashioning and reinventing ourselves. A sense of freedom attends passing from the 
state of subject to that of project...this projection amounts to a form of compulsion and 
constraint...to a more efficient kind of subjectivation and subjugation. As a project 
deeming itself free of external and alien limitations, the I is now subjugating itself to 
internal limitations and self-constraints, which are taking the form of compulsive 
achievement and optimization.489 
 
Questions on power tend to focus on ‘power relations’ or the way that power 
manifests itself between individuals or in groups. Power typically involves an exchange 
or an ability of some sort; an ability to effect change, to engage in some activity or to 
influence some outcome. Our interactions with others, whether local or remote, shape 
our understanding of what we might consider ‘reality’, ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ and the like. 
Language itself does not come to us from our own imagination, but, rather, from our 
introduction into one or more groups that communicate in a way that they too inherited 
from those before them. What, however, of self-control? What of our relationship with 
our own self? Is self-scrutiny something that also comes from without or can the ego 
claim it for itself, as something that is not informed by interaction, but, rather, solely by 
introspection? This seems unlikely, as even our thoughts seem to be governed by the 
rules of our language, our general epistemology and ontology. Our monologues may 
or may not contain grammatically correct sentences and logical phrases, but they 
certainly contain concepts, visions and abstractions that, as nebulous as they may be, 
do, ultimately, relate something to us. Our language, concepts and senses allow us to 
know and experience not only what is around us, but within us, as well. We may just 
as well as well say that our psyche defines our ‘self’ and our individuality. Byung-Chul 
Han, in his work Psychopolitics, looks at how the psyche has become the terrain of 
 





neoliberalism; a terrain that has brought about the mutation of capitalism and the 
introduction of auto-exploitation. Han argues that it is neither biopolitics nor biopower 
that is the predominant ‘technology of power’ of our times, but, rather, ‘psychopolitics’. 
The psyche, essentially, allows for infinite possibilities of subjugation, control, 
manipulation, cooperation and the like. In the ultimate triumph of capitalism, 
neoliberalism, and psychopolitics, more specifically, have allowed for the development 
of ‘auto-exploitation’, where the improvement and enterprise of the self is the premier 
means and mode of production. Han’s analysis allows us to understand how 
fundamentally ‘asocial’ forms of power can be understood, conceptualised and 
developed. 
 
II. The Crisis of Freedom 
Neoliberalism represents a highly efficient, indeed an intelligent, system for exploiting 
freedom. Everything that belongs to practices and expressive forms of liberty – 
emotion, play and communication – comes to be exploited. It is inefficient to exploit 
people against their will. Allo-exploitation yields scant returns. Only when freedom is 
exploited are returns maximized.490 
 
Han, in a work that moves deftly between Marx, Foucault, Deleuze, Hegel, 
Bentham, Kant and others, argues that biopolitics, and biopower, in particular, is not 
the predominant ‘technology of power’ of our times. In a search for ever greater 
freedom, we have moved away from the subject and become projects, “always 
refashioning and reinventing ourselves”. The body is physical and limited; it must 
interact with, and is constrained by, that which is outside it. The mind, on the other 
hand, is, effectively, only bound by the imagination and by the creativity of concepts 
and thoughts. That is not to say that these cannot translate into something physical 
and ‘material’, but it is the immaterial realm that, seemingly, brings novelty forth. Han 
argues, nevertheless, that it is actually this assumed limitlessness that is, politically 
 





and socially, more deleterious that an assumed material ‘freedom’. Whereas the body, 
the ‘subject’, might subjugate itself to external limits, imposed upon it by the world or 
by others, this new mode of life, the ‘project’, subjugates itself “to internal limitations 
and self-constraints, which are taking the form of compulsive achievement and 
optimization”. The move from ‘subject’ to ‘project’ signals, for Han, a move from 
freedom to compulsion; he cites such “psychic maladies” as “depression and burnout” 
as examples of this. The only master that lords over the project is his or her own desire 
to achieve and optimise the ‘self’; the “achievement-subject...exploits itself without a 
master...it is an absolute slave”. Han refers to said “achievement-subject” as the 
“neoliberal subject” and this subject, “as the entrepreneur of its own self”, has “no 
capacity for relationships with others that might be free of purpose”.491 Han goes so far 
as to say that the neoliberal subject cannot even conceive of a “purpose-free 
friendship”; the “neoliberal regime”, thus, only “leads to utter isolation”, as opposed to 
happiness and “fruitful” relationships. Neoliberalism is conceived of, here, as a “highly 
efficient...intelligent...system for exploiting freedom”; what have traditionally been 
known as modes of free expression – “emotion, play and communication” – are now 
modes of exploitation. As Han states: it “is inefficient to exploit people against their will. 
Allo-exploitation yields scant return. Only when freedom is exploited are returns 
maximized”. Neoliberal has produced an evolved form of capitalism, thought it could 
also be said that it is the other way around and that it is capitalism that allows for the 
evolution of the structures into which it is placed. Han argues that neoliberal is a mutant 











III. The Neoliberal Regime 
The neoliberal regime transforms allo-exploitation into auto-exploitation; this process 
affects all ‘classes’. Such classless self-exploitation...something utterly unknown to 
Marx...renders impossible any social revolution based on the difference between the 
exploiters...and the exploited...Indeed, given the auto-exploiting achievement-subject’s 
isolation, no political We is even possible that could rise up and undertake collective 
action.492 
 
 It is capitalism that is destroying the working class, but not in the way that Marx 
theorised. Neoliberalism has turned everyone into “an auto-exploiting labourer in his 
or her own enterprise”, though no one is “master and slave in one”; class struggle, 
itself, is nothing more than an “inner struggle against oneself”. The ‘master’, here, is 
Capital, alone, as labour, struggle and exploitation take place on the terrain of the 
psyche. Contemporary ‘labour’ conditions “are defined by the solitude of an 
entrepreneur who is isolated and self-combating and practises auto-exploitation 
voluntarily”. Since production is ‘immaterial’, everyone already owns the means of 
production; there is no longer a proletariat nor a bourgeoisie, in the classic sense. Han 
claims that this accounts for stability of the neoliberal system; there exist no classes 
“that display mutual antagonism”. He points out that a ‘proletarian’ is someone “whose 
sole possessions are his or her children”, “self-production is”, here, “restricted to 
biological reproduction”. Now, however, everyone is under the illusion that they are 
“capable of unlimited self-production”, as “a project free to fashion him- or herself at 
will”. This annihilation, of sorts, of the proletariat (and of the bourgeoisie), leaves only 
capital as the sole ruler of all, “the Dictatorship of Capital”. This may be, for many 
Marxists, both too generalising and too cutting a view, as it would be easy to point out 
innumerable instances and examples of class-division and even warfare. Hardt and 
Negri claimed that the modern, or post-modern, “successor to the ‘proletariat’” is the 
‘Multitude’, which is based on Spinozist ethics and in globalist cooperation, but Han 
 





claims that it is erroneous to believe that said ‘Multitude’ will ever be able to overthrow 
‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri’s post-modern, global hegemony) and be able to create 
some new order.  Han would consider these debates or struggles as only superficially, 
or illusorily, about class, while the ‘real’ struggle is taking place elsewhere: within.  
 
IV. Neoliberal Shame 
...we no longer work in order to satisfy our own needs...we work for Capital. Capital 
generates needs of its own; mistakenly, we perceive these needs as if they belonged 
to us. Capital therefore represents a new kind of transcendence, which entails a new 
form of subjectivation. We are being expelled from the sphere of lived immanence – 
where life relates to life instead of subjugating itself to external ends.493 
 
 The neoliberal society revolves around ‘achievement’ and those who ‘fail’ 
believe that they are responsible for said failure and, ultimately, “feel shame instead 
of questioning society or the system”. This accounts, to some extent, for psychological 
pathologies like depression, suicidal thoughts, anxiety and the like. Shame is an 
incredibly powerful emotion/feeling/sentiment and there is extensive work on the 
subject, though there is not enough space to go into it, here. Nevertheless, Han claims 
that this is the foundation of the ‘particular intelligence’ that defines the neoliberal 
regime; the fact that “no resistance to the system can emerge in the first place”. Under 
‘Marxism’, those that are exploited “are still able to show solidarity and unite against 
those who exploit them”, but the neoliberal system is one of auto-exploitation and any 
antagonisms are aimed towards the self. This is more likely to give rise to 
psychological pathologies than to stir revolt. Capital has taken on the role of being the 
basis for a new transcendent order, an order that determines how politics should and 
does express itself and, consequently, how the neoliberal should and can express his 
or her own self. Han asks the question if it is really even the case that we want to be 
free; does guilt, shame and a lack of freedom not ‘liberate’ us in other ways? Freedom 
 





(from debt, shame and the like) would require a pure sort of action and, deontologically 
(perhaps), entail accountability and responsibility for whatever results from said ‘pure’ 
ability. Han suggests that it may be the case that we perpetually enter into debt so that 
we do not have to act, “so we won’t need to be free, or responsible”. Han points out 
that Walter Benjamin considered capitalism to be a religion, except that instead of 
providing the means for atonement, whether spiritual or otherwise, it only creates more 
guilt. Guilt and debt become the two pillars of the cult of capitalism and there is no way 
to relieve either of the two; capitalism, instead of providing the means to atone for guilt 
and to liquidate one’s debt, makes both universal.  
 
V. Digital Panoptica 
Secrets, foreignness and otherness represent impediments to unbounded 
communication. In the name of transparency, they are to be eliminated. 
Communication goes faster when it is smoothed out...when thresholds, walls and gaps 
are removed. This also means stripping people of interiority, which blocks and slows 
down communication...such emptying out of persons does not occur by violent 
means...it occurs as voluntary self-exposure.494 
 
 The role of the internet in every aspect of modern life is not to be ignored. Its 
ubiquity is indicative of a myriad of social, scientific, economic, biological and 
psychological paradigmatic shifts. Its introduction, at least into popular society, 
promised a world of “boundless liberty...unlimited freedom and mobility”. Today, 
however, it is a world of “total control and surveillance”, where social media function 
as sorts of “digital panoptica” that keep watch “over the social realm and [exploit] it 
mercilessly”. Han claims that freedom from the disciplinary panopticon, which, 
presumably, came via the internet, has only resulted into our throwing ourselves, 
headfirst, into a “new...even more efficient” panopticon. Bentham’s panopticon 
isolated, prevented, prescribed and functioned insidiously. Today’s panoptica exist as 
 





conspicuously as possible; its “occupants” “actively communicate with each other and 
willingly expose themselves”. Occupants “collaborate” and corroborate the panoptica’s 
“operations”, as it were; they work for “Digital Big Brother”, free of charge and hoping 
only for rewards. Data does not need to be taken or stolen; it is, rather, “offered out of 
an inner need”. Such is the efficiency of the digital panopticon. The concept of 
“freedom of information” plays a role, here, as it relates to transparency. Since 
information is now valuable in the same way as currency, its proliferation and 
valorisation are now fought for. Under “the immaterial mode of production that now 
prevails”, this proliferation leads to more “productivity, acceleration and growth”; this 
proliferation, however, is so accelerated that it results in a context-free dissemination 
of data: independent and arbitrary. This dissemination, free of reflection, deliberation 
and analysis, results in an unhinged “diversity” of views, opinions and references, 
though they are only superficially so. Information, thought and communication are 
exteriorised, totally, and this results from an absolute erasure of (informational) 
difference, introspection and interiorisation. The need for ‘transparency’, as such, 
promotes “total conformity”; this is the result of “total networking”: everyone 
accessible, at almost any time, with “everyone...watching over everyone else”. Though 
we are wary of agencies and secret services listening in on our conversations or using 
our own devices to watch and track us, it is moderation and curation in real-time that 
should concern us most. The ‘conversation’, in the most general sense of the term, is 
being guided and censored as it is happening; even those involved in the conservation 
participate in its censorship: they criticise, hector or praise whomever takes a side and 
has the nerve to speak up, though silence results in a complete erasure of one’s own 
identity and, in turn, self-worth. These are, certainly, extreme ways of understanding 





not seem to indicate that this characterisation is untrue. This ‘transparency’, the need 
for a totalisation of information, is affecting representative democracy. Politicians are 
scrutinised, thanks to these panoptica, in a thoroughly apolitical fashion. It is more 
important to try to scandalise a politician, or aspiring politician, than to judge them by 
the merit of their policies. What Han terms the “spectator democracy” is more 
concerned with “grievance and complaint” than with action and policy. What goes on 
behind the scenes in the capitols of the world is not so important as what goes on in 
the personal lives of those involved in these scenes; such is the politics of today. 
 
VI. Digital Psychopolitics 
Today, we are entering the age of digital psychopolitics. It means passing from passive 
surveillance to active steering...it is precipitating a further crisis of freedom...free will 
itself is at stake. Big Data is a highly efficient psychopolitical instrument that makes it 
possible to achieve comprehensive knowledge of the dynamics of social 
communication. This knowledge is knowledge for the sake of domination and 
control...it facilitates intervention in the psyche and enables influence to take place on 
a pre-reflexive level.495 
 
 ‘Transparency’, in the case of the digital realm, really only works one way. The 
data that its users voluntarily offer over to data companies for the use of their, 
seemingly, vital services is then utilised and seen by those that they do not know and 
for purposes that they, generally, ignore. Considering this, the very idea of privacy, or 
at least the desire for privacy, becomes “obsolete”; if “an essential component of 
freedom is informational self-determination”, then freedom is, effectively, a thing of the 
past.  Han argues that freedom, free action, more precisely, requires an “open” future. 
“Big Data”, however, has allowed self-determination to, much like privacy, pass into 
obsolescence by “making it possible to predict human behaviour”. As human 
behaviour becomes “calculable and controllable”, so, too, does the future; “digital 
psychopolitics transforms the negativity of freely made decisions into the positivity of 
 





factual states”. As data becomes even more valuable than currency, it results in the 
objectification of those that exist in the digital realm. “Persons are being positivized 
into things” and this means that they can be “quantified, measured and steered”; things 
can neither be free nor self-determined and, as a result, things are far more 
transparent than persons. Accordingly, “Big Data has announce the end of the person 
who possesses free will.” Han refers to technologies or techniques “of domination” as 
‘dispositives’ and he claims that every dispositive “brings forth characteristic 
devotional objects that are employed in order to subjugate”. The devotional object of 
“the Digital”, in this case, is the smartphone; the smartphone materialises and 
stabilises “devotion” to the digital regime; Han equates the smartphone to the rosary, 
as a “subjectivation-apparatus”, both are handheld ’devices’ and both “serve the 
purpose of self-monitoring and control”. The smartphone serves not only as an 
“effective surveillance apparatus”, but also as a “mobile confessional”, which actually 
goes back to Benjamin’s declaration of capitalism as a religion. Han declares that 
Facebook is “the church”, or the “global synagogue”, of “the Digital”, but the same 
could actually be said about all social media. Economic debt, ‘guilt’, has been 
extended to the digital realm, particularly with the digitalisation of money. We could go 
so far as to extend this church ‘analogy’ to the entirety of the Digital: social media may 
be used for some purposes, but banks, online retailers, online services, entertainment 
and the rest serve as further devotional centres. Just as Schmitt wrote of ‘political 
theology’, we might, here, declare that the psychopolitics of the Digital has ushered in 









VII. The Inefficiency of Disciplinary Power 
Disciplinary power is still commanded by negativity. Its mode of articulation is inhibitive, 
not permissive. Because it is negative, it does not describe the neoliberal 
regime...which beams forth in positivity. The neoliberal regime’s technology of power 
takes on subtle, supple and smart forms...it escapes all visibility...the subjugated 
subject is not even aware of its own subjugation. The whole context of 
domination...remains entirely hidden...the subject thinks itself free.496 
 
 Power does not express itself uniformly, according to Han. One expression of 
power, which goes back to political scientists of the mid-20th century, is manipulation 
and coercion. If one can force or convince another to do something that they do not 
wish to do, then this is a form of power; violence may enter into the equation, but not, 
of course, necessarily. That violence, however, need not be physical; it can manifest 
itself as a psychological or emotional type of violence. Han claims, however, that 
power, which “relies on violence”, is not “power of the highest order”. Power “of the 
highest order” is that power that “does not come into view at all” and “exists without 
question”, as the greater that power is, “the more quietly it works”...it “just happens 
[and] has no need to draw attention to itself”. Han distinguishes the different 
expressions of power from power itself; power, per se, is not “based on force” and 
does not need to “exclude, prohibit or censor”, nor is it against freedom. In fact, “power 
can...use freedom to its own ends”. The type of power that needs to employ methods 
like violence or coercion is a “negative” form of power; today, however, power has 
assumed a “permissive” form. Power, today, is ‘friendly’ and in its “permissivity...[it] is 
shedding its negativity and presenting itself as freedom”. If a machine requires more 
energy to operate than the work, or energy, that it creates, then it is highly inefficient; 
the same is true of disciplinary power. As Han puts it, it “expends a great deal of energy 
to force people into the straightjacket of commandments and prohibitions”. A more 
efficient sort of power would operate differently; it would make sure that “people 
 





subordinate themselves to power relations on their own”. This sort of power promotes 
activation, motivation and optimisation, as opposed to inhibition and repression; it 
neither forbids nor deprives, but pleases and fulfils: “instead of making people 
compliant, it seeks to make them dependent”. This sort of hedonistic expression of 
power is not alien to capitalism nor, even, to Marxism. Happiness, joy, pleasure, or 
analogue sentiments, are all promised, to one degree or another, by most socio-
politico-economic systems, particularly in the case of capitalism. The difference, here, 
is not only the means of the production, but new modes of life, more generally. The 
Digital presents something It is immediately accessible, yet wholly out of one’s grasp 
and, worse yet, infinite in its scope. The Digital can promise everything, while, in return, 
giving nothing. We saw the advent of this sort of limitless, infinite potential, that can 
simultaneously present itself as an immediate and accessible reality, though entirely 
illusory, when photography was introduced in the late 19th Century. Mythology, 
literature and the like existed far, far earlier, of course, but photography was meant to 
show us, quite physically, an element of reality, not to mention how it affected our 
perception of time. Cinema, of course, took everything that much further; and 
television brought the same, but even more immediately and with no physical 
displacement necessary. The illusion is real, in almost the strictest sense, but it is 
never ours, also in the strictest sense. One may possess a television, but never 
anything that it presents or offers. The spectacle is as hollow, or as empty, as the 










VIII. Smart Power 
Smart power reads and appraises our conscious and unconscious thoughts. It places 
its stock in voluntary self-organization and self-optimization. As such, it has no need to 
overcome resistance. Mastery of this sort requires no great expenditure of energy or 
violence. It simply happens. The capitalism of Like should come with a warning label: 
Protect me from what I want.497 
 
 ‘Smart’ devices represent a complete turn away from the analogue towards the 
digital. Though these days it simply means that a device can connect to the internet, 
a ‘smart’ device means, essentially, perpetual and limitless access to the world-at-
large, but, more importantly, to whatever ‘world’ we deem most important to us. Even 
though, in theory, we have access to anything and everything, we still choose to limit 
ourselves to what we find most comforting, agreeable, manageable or pleasant. We, 
voluntarily and of our accord, curate our ‘realities’ and determine or automate what we 
are exposed to. One could even argue that the concept of ‘censorship’ has become 
obsolete and that a more appropriate term would be ‘curation’. Of course, a journalist 
being silenced, incarcerated or murdered for revealing a state secret or some other 
sort of ‘sensitive’ information, or a non-fiction book being banned for questioning a 
practice that the author finds immoral, is certainly censorship, but what about the 
active choice to avoid, erase or protect oneself from such information? Internet access 
allows for access to all sorts of information concerning human rights abuses, state-
sponsored violence and innumerable injustices, but it is a choice whether or not one 
wishes to explore these facts or not. Access to such a vast, practically infinite, amount 
of information was hitherto unimaginable, but, it is, for a number of reasons, 
intentionally limited and curated to (try to) meet our emotional, psychological and 
economic means. This is representative of a power that does not “operate frontally”, 
but, rather, in a friendly and guiding way. Wills are bent to the benefit of this power; as 
Han explains: it “leads astray instead of erecting obstacles”. This is smart power; a 
 





power that promotes positivity and positive emotions, but only to, in turn, exploit them. 
Smart power promotes not only transparency, but friendship, confidence, participation 
and relation; it wants us to express all of our “opinions, needs, wishes and 
preferences” and everything about our lives. Smart power wants to be our best friend, 
our confidante and our partner, but is, of course, none of these. This type of power is 
“more powerful” than “purely repressive power”; it is not seen, at all, but it is felt. The 
crisis, here, rests in the fact that freedom, rather than being limited, is amplified and 
exploited: free choice, free will, even, “is eliminated to make way for a free 
selection...from among the items on offer”. For Han, the symbol, or signet, of smart 
power is the Like button; he claims that people “subjugate themselves to domination 
by consuming and communicating” and “click Like all the while”. Neoliberalism is, thus, 
the “capitalism of ‘Like’. This capitalism is “fundamentally different from nineteenth-
century capitalism, which operated by means of disciplinary constraints and 
prohibitions”. What is, perhaps, most interesting about neoliberalism, qua capitalism, 
is the idea of ‘currency’. Besides the fact that, yes, many different national currencies 
exist, there seem to be a myriad of currencies out there, some of which are more 
valuable, others less so, than national currencies. Data, Likes, views, hits, reactions 
and the like, have become, to a certain extent, more valuable than money. Certainly, 
money can be exchanged for any of these, and most of these originated out of 
monetary desire, but, in that sense, life today resembles a virtual game more than 
anything else. The conversation, perhaps, wanders too far out into politico-economic 
theory to be useful enough, here, but the concept of value is critical to the 
development, or ‘understanding’, of any form of power. In a virtual game, one spends 
‘real’ money in order to advance or to entertain the fantasies that said game promises. 





and even virtual currency, that allow one to become superior to other players. 
Neoliberalism seems to be doing the same, but in the Digital. In exchange for national 
currencies, participants, i.e. everyone, can become as ‘powerful’, or ‘influential’, as 
they can afford. This only holds, however, if we value data, Likes and views more than 
money, which, as Han would seem to argue, and has become quite clear, we do. 
 
IX. Panoptica 
A new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example: 
and that, to a degree equally without example, secured by whoever chooses to have it 
so, against abuse. – Such is the engine: such the work that may be done with it. How far 
the expectations thus held out have been fulfilled, the reader will decide.498 
 
 Jeremy Bentham describes, in his letter entitled ‘Panopticon, or, Inspection 
House, &C.’, an architectural development that will reform morals, preserve health, 
invigorate industry, diffuse instruction and lighten public “burthens”. This architectural 
development, “contrived” by his brother, which he refers to as the “Inspection House” 
or “Elaboratory”, could be, as he claimed, applied to any establishment that sought to 
keep “a number of persons...under inspection”. No matter what the purpose of the 
establishment, whether it was to punish, guard, reform, confine, employ, maintain, 
cure, instruct, train or educate, it would, Bentham claimed, function to a degree that 
had never before been seen. His brother’s design could be applied to prisons of all 
sorts, houses of correction, work-houses, factories, asylums, hospitals and schools, 
and it would function just as well in any of them. A place of inspection, of course, is 
more effective the more that it can actually inspect that which it needs to inspect. The 
issue, here, as Bentham saw it, was the unfortunate fact that a person cannot be 
inspected without limits. As he puts its: “ideal perfection...would require that that each 
person should actually be in that predicament, during every instant of time”. His 
 





solution was, then, to at least make it seem to the person being inspected that they 
were, in fact, being observed constantly and to make it so that that person would be 
unable to prove otherwise. The panopticon’s design, of course, would see that this 
became the case. The reason that it is useful to turn to Bentham’s original proposal 
for an “Inspection House”, is the fact that the digital realm would have been 
inconceivable, at that point in time. Oddly enough, the closest thing to it, at that time, 
would have been the panopticon. This is not just a simple case of technological 
knowledge, but also one of epistemology. Bentham could not conceive of, as he stated 
so himself, a reality where a person could be inspected without cessation. It had to be 
made to appear so and the person had to come to believe that it was so. In today’s 
world, not only do we believe, and know, that this is the case, but we are voluntarily 
complicit in it. As Han puts it, disciplinary society, a ‘panoptical society’, “consists of 
settings and institutions of confinement”; the “family, schools, prisons, barracks, 
hospitals and factories all represent disciplinary spaces that confine”. This is exactly 
as Bentham envisaged and as Han describes: the “disciplinary subject changes from 
milieu of confinement to the next...it moves within a closes system” and the 
“inhabitants of milieus of confinement can be ordered in space and time”. This is the 
result of the proliferation of panoptical architecture in society, which was Bentham’s 
vision, from the beginning. Deleuze, as Han explains, diagnosed “a general crisis 
affecting all milieus of confinement”: they “are no longer suited to post-industrial, 
immaterial and networked forms of production”. These forms of production do not 
tolerate limits or “borders” and they work to destroy or, at least, mutate them, with the 
purpose of exploitation, which can take many forms. Han describes the inhabitant of 
a disciplinary society as a mole, who is forced to move “through predetermined 





society is a snake, who “makes space by means of its own movement” and “does not 
move in closed spaces”; the mole “is a labourer”, but the snake “is an entrepreneur”. 
Neoliberal society has, according to Han, usurped disciplinary society, and the mole, 
a “subjugated subject”, has passed to become the snake, a “project”. This passage, 
however, does not imply that projects are any freer than subjects; it does not represent 
a move to “an entirely new way of life”. What has occurred is simply a “mutation” and 
“an intensification” of capitalism, which has not changed. In terms of productivity, the 
mole is restricted in its abilities by its very ‘nature’; the snake, however, moves and 
produces freely, almost limitlessly. Capitalism, according to Han, has switched from 
the former model to the latter. As Deleuze sees it, the disciplinary society, the society 
of the ‘mole’, is organised like a ‘body’: it is a “biopolitical regime”. Neoliberalism, 
however, organises itself as a ‘soul’: it is a psychopolitical regime and psychopolitics 
“is its form of government”. The “psychopolitical technology of domination” is 
represented by “motivation, projects, competition, optimization and initiative”; the 
snake is an embodiment of “the guilt and debts...that the neoliberal regime employs 
as instruments of domination”. Bentham could not envisage a digital society and even 
those who could, be they scientists, artists, authors, philosophers, etc., could not 
predict the, seemingly, sudden and epochal shift that digital technologies have 
introduced to human life, in nearly every aspect. The most important change, arguably, 
has occurred psychologically. It is not enough to say that we have become like the 
machines that are so ubiquitous in our lives, or even that we have become humanoids 
or sorts of androbots; digital technology has fundamentally changed the way that we 
speak, think, act and function. This is, no doubt, true of all technological developments, 





‘advancements’ of the last few decades have brought about a change that is not only 
still occurring, but was not predicted, at least in this fashion. 
 
X. Biopolitics 
Since the seventeenth century, Foucault claims, power has ceased to manifest itself 
as the godlike sovereign’s capacity to deal death and instead taken the form of 
discipline. The power of sovereignty is the might of the sword. It threatens with death 
and exploits the ‘privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it’...disciplinary power 
is not a power to deal death, but a power over life: its function is no longer to kill but to 
‘invest life through and through’...the ‘old power of death’ yields to the careful 
‘administration of bodies’ and ‘the calculated management of life’.499 
 
 The shift from sovereignty to discipline was not precipitous, but was, rather, the 
result of “changes in forms of production”, in particular, the shift from “agrarian to 
industrial production”. An industrial society requires its member to function in an 
‘industrial’ fashion; it requires that the body be disciplined, in order to “fit it machinic 
production”. Disciplinary power does not torture the body, but, rather, “yokes it into a 
system of norms”. The means of production serve to shape and develop the person 
as they deem necessary and, in an industrial society. “calculated coercion pervades 
each...limb and comes to be inscribed even in the automatism of habits...the body is 
calibrated to be a production unit”. Disciplines make the body useful and functional; 
industry requires machines and machines require operators, but these operators 
cannot be entirely human; they must develop into the machine. If one operates a 
machine for nine hours a day, what happens to one’s body and mind during those nine 
hours and in what sense, and for whom, is one being ‘productive’? It can be said that 
the most important science for the disciplinary society is ergonomics, as a primary 
concern of the disciplinarian subject is how he or she can most effectively and 
efficiently interact with some machine or series of machines. More will be said about 
this later, however, as neoliberal society has exactly the same concern. Disciplinary 
 





power is a normative type of power; it “subjects the subject to a set of rules...and 
eliminates deviations and anomalies”. This power concerns itself with exploitation from 
‘without’; it trains and drills one into obedience: it creates “the obedience-subject”. Han 
concedes that technologies of discipline do reach into “the mental sphere”, “beyond 
the physical real”, because obedience-subjects must be morally instructed and 
reassured; they must be convinced, to a certain extent, that their work is ‘right’ and/or 
‘good’. The nature of disciplinary technology, however, its primarily “orthopaedic” 
concern, does not allow it to “penetrate into the deeper layers of the soul...and take it 
over”. Bentham’s panopticon, Han claims, is “bound to the optical medium”; it only 
observes from without and has “no access to inner thoughts or needs”. Biopolitics 
devotes itself to the administration of ‘populations’, as said populations are considered 
“productive and reproductive” masses. It is the “governmental technology of 
disciplinary power” and seeks to regulate such things as “reproductive cycles, birth 
and death rates, levels of general health...and life expectancy”. Neoliberalism, on the 
other hand, is principally concerned with the psyche and not the body. Biopolitics is 
not granted “access to the psychic realm” and it cannot provide any material “for 
drawing up a psychogram of the population”. Han wants to distinguish between 
statistics, on the one hand, and Big Data, on the other; statistics being the tool that 
allows for the regulation of populations and Big Data being what allows us “to tap into 
or disclose the psyche”. Big Data gives us the means to establish “not just an individual 
but a collective psychogram” and, potentially, “even the psychogram of the 
unconscious itself”. Big Data may even allow us to “shine a light into the depths of the 
psyche and exploit the unconscious entirely”. Let us return, then, to the concept of 
ergonomics. Digital ergonomics would concern itself with how, specifically, we interact 





here, be an object of study. Swiping, clicking, scrolling, typing and the like would all 
be objects of digital ergonomic study. This would require a more nuanced approach 
and analysis in understanding how ‘individuals’ interact with new technologies. The 
problem here, however, is that neoliberalism, in Han’s view, de-individualises the 
person; in fact, it de-humanises the person and converts him or her into data. Digital 
ergonomics, however, does not disappear. The interaction between the neoliberalist 
project and neoliberalist technologies must never end; this is assured, in any case, by 
the dependency that said technologies develop in the project. These media become 
like sources of nourishment and, in many cases, their consumption is more important 
than the consumption of food. There is nothing particularly novel in this arrangement: 
Plato famously elevated concern for the soul over concern for the body, as did 
Descartes, Kant and innumerable other philosophers. The difference here is that 
media provides no real sustenance or nourishment for neither the soul nor the body. 
It is empty and pretentious and exists solely to exploit those who depend upon it, i.e. 
everyone. One might argue that a turn away from Big Data and the Digital may provide 
relief from this condition; it may be an answer and solution to the totalised and 
overwhelming exploitation of the soul and psyche that are the hallmarks of 
neoliberalism. This is proving more and more impossible, however, as the world is 
flooded, almost literally, with smartphones and internet access. If access to the internet 
is considered a ‘human right’, then there is no stopping its spread to all corners of the 
globe. Access to the Digital promises improvements in all aspects of our lives; it is 
simply just the way that world works, now. The problem, here, is that it is not just the 
internet providers that are fighting for everyone to access to the Digital, but the 
impoverished and those that fight on their behalf. Those that would only look to help 





problem, as Han would put it, is that no one is free; it is simply another neoliberalist 
illusion. 
 
XI. Body and Soul 
The body no longer represents a central force of production, as it formerly did in 
biopolitical, disciplinary society. Now, productivity is not to be enhanced by overcoming 
physical resistance so much as by optimizing psychic or mental processes. Physical 
discipline has given way to mental optimization. And neuro-enhancement differs from the 
disciplinary techniques of psychiatry fundamentally.500 
 
 The primary productive force behind neoliberalism is the psyche. This is the 
Archimedean discovery of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, as such, is “a further 
development...indeed, a mutated form” of capitalism and the course of contemporary 
capitalism is determined by “immaterial and non-physical forms of production”. This is 
evidenced in the fact that, though material objects are being produced, logically, at a 
rate never before seen in history, immaterial ‘objects’, like “information and programs”, 
are being produced at a much faster and more voluminous rate. Optimisation is now 
trumping discipline, regulation and habit; even when these things do present 
themselves, it is in the name of optimisation, particularly the mental kind. Han claims 
that the body is being “released from the immediate process of production and turning 
in to the object optimization, whether along aesthetic lines or in terms of health 
technology”. It is important to recognise that the factories do still exist and that farms, 
of course, are still maintained, but the point, here, is that even the labourer and the 
farmer are prey to neoliberal technologies. Han points out that “optimisation means 
more than aesthetic practice alone: sexiness and fitness represent new economic 
resources to be increase, marketed and exploited”. Again, there is nothing novel here, 
on the surface. Sex, health and the like have always been up for sale and marketed, 
even before marketing and advertising were considered, as they seem to be now, 
 





branches of sociology. Ancient civilisations were equally fascinated and concerned 
with the power of fertility, beauty and living ‘better’ lives, as the people shopping along 
Rodeo Drive in Los Angeles. The distinction, here, is that neoliberalism has 
transformed these conceptions not simply into commodities, but also needs. The more 
we are exposed to these ideas, which is, now, incessantly, the more we begin to see 
them not as things that can or should be attained, but, rather, as basic human needs. 
As Bernard Stiegler argues, biopower “has been replaced by ‘psychotechnological 
psychopower’” and neoliberal psychopolitics “employs digital technology on a massive 
scale”. Han argues, unlike Stiegler, that “truly digital technology” like social media, the 
internet and computer hard- and software “prove fundamentally different from the 
mass media of the past”; it is important to recognise, in this respect, the “panoptic 
structure of digital networks”. One important distinction between the media ‘of the past’ 
and the digital technology of today is what we might call cessation or shutdown. If we 
argue, like Stiegler, that television “represents the psychotechnical apparatus tout 
court”, then he would have to explain how this is so when a television can, quite simply, 
be turned off. Its programming certainly continues, but one can choose not to watch 
it. The same holds true of the cinema and of the theatre, not to mention the fact that 
these forms of media are being made less and less accessible due to price increases. 
Truly digital technology, as Han calls it, cannot be turned off. In fact, these 
technologies will not be turned off; they simply refuse. A social media post lives on 
well after anyone reads it and may not even be read for years before someone picks 
it up, again. The same holds true for literature, certainly, but the immediacy of social 
media communication distinguishes it severely from more deliberate and considered 
literary works. Stiegler points this out; he argues that the “programming industry” 





regression”. He juxtaposes these “psychotechnics” with the “technology of reading 
and writing”; literacy means “enlightenment”. He points out that Kant’s “thought of 
maturity as humanity’s sovereignty” was based on “the apparatus of reading and 
writing”. A social media post, in this case, is neither an ‘enlightened’, nor a ‘mature’, 
method of communication. This may be an unfair critique of the power and purpose of 
social media, in many instances, but, perhaps, not in a more general sense. The 
argument, here, is that social media democratises discourse, while print media and 
television, and even film and theatre, can also do that, to a certain extent, but the 
extent to which social does so makes it truly unparalleled. It would be nonsense, in 
any case, to argue that a social media post, however brief, that attempts to raise 
awareness about an injustice occurring somewhere in the world is less ‘enlightened’ 
or ‘mature’ than a novel about an adolescent wizard, for example. Nevertheless, the 
majority of social media posts or communications do not highlight government abuses 
or civil rights struggles; they frequently do not move beyond the self. Even if one does 
comment on social struggle of some sort, it is often to show how it concerns one’s 
own self and in the pursuit of Likes or some sort of personal attention. Neoliberalism 
has managed to universalise egotism and claim the self, particularly the inner self, as 
the one universal truth. Foucault, in the early 1980s, conceded that his work may have 
focused “too much on the technology of domination and power”, as he became “more 
interested in the interaction between oneself and others” and “in the technologies of 
individual domination, the history of how an individual acts upon himself” and “in the 
technology of the self”. Han argues that the “blind spot” in Foucault’s oeuvre is “the 
technology of power under the neoliberal regime”; Foucault did not recognise that “the 






perpetual self-optimization...as the exemplary neoliberal technology of the 
self...represents nothing so much as a highly efficient mode of domination and 
exploitation. As an ‘entrepreneur of himself’, the neoliberal achievement-subject engages 
in auto-exploitation willingly...even passionately. The self-as-a-work-of-art amounts to a 
beautiful but deceptive illusion that the neoliberal regime maintains in order to exhaust its 
resources entirely.501 
 
Neoliberal power does act “directly” on the individual; it makes the individual act. It 
makes sure that this action is directed towards the self and that power relations 
become “interiorized...and then interpreted as freedom”; self-optimisation “and 
submission, freedom and exploitation”, all of these become one. This “engineering of 
freedom of exploitation”, effected by neoliberalism with the aim of “self-exploitation”, 
is what Han claims that Foucault ignored. It is difficult, here, to claim whether or not 
these ideas “escaped” Foucault, or if it is simply the case that it is really digital 
technology that has allowed the neoliberal regime to develop as it has and, 
consequently, for us to develop an understanding of neoliberalism and psychopolitcs, 
such as Han has. It does seem to be clear, however, that the type of ‘power’ that Han 
is theorising, psychopolitical power, is not simply another form of ‘biopower’, nor of 
biopolitical power. The type of neoliberal power than Han outlines is so ubiquitous, 
insidious and all-consuming, that it allows for nothing else but what it provokes in the 
self, which it then exploits. 
 
XII. The Age of Exhaustion 
...the violence of positivity is just as destructive as the violence of negativity. Neoliberal 
psychopolitics, with the consciousness industry it promotes, is destroying the human soul, 
which is anything but a machine of positivity...The neoliberal subject is running aground 
on the imperative of self-optimization...on the compulsion always to achieve more and 
more. Healing, it turns out, means killing.502 
 
 Neoliberal psychopolitics does not, in a sense, conform to any mode of 
exploitation. It always seeks new modes and “refined forms of exploitation”. “Self-
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management workshops, motivational retreats and seminars on personality or mental 
training” claim that they will help one self-optimise and heighten efficiency, but these 
goals do not, in fact, serve the self, but, rather, the system. The object of 
psychopolitical exploitation is the whole of the human being: the entirety of his or her 
life. The “neoliberal imperative” to self-optimise only works to effect “perfect 
functioning within the system”; whatever might affect the system’s efficiency and 
performance, e.g. “inhibitions, points of weakness and mistakes”, is eliminated in the 
quest for self-perfection, but not, as it may seem, in the service of “the good life”. Han 
distinguishes between “the age of sovereignty”, the age of “active and industrial 
added-value” and, now, “the age of exhaustion”. The age of sovereignty “expressed 
itself as the right to seize and dispose at will”; the age of active and industrial added-
value, a product of the disciplinary society, expressed itself as the creation of new 
value that could be considered ‘real’; now, the age of exhaustion, a product of the 
neoliberal regime, expresses itself as the exploitation of the psyche and is defined by 
“psychic maladies such as depression and burnout”. Since self-optimisation is meant 
to “therapeutically” expunge whatever functional weaknesses or mental obstacles that 
one may be suffering from, for the sake of “efficiency performance”, and this is, 
effectively (and humanly), impossible, it is “leading to mental collapse”. It is 
“destructive”, particularly because it is “perpetual”; the system is optimising incessantly 
and so too must the self. The irony, here, is that the self, in the very quest of auto-
perfection, destroys itself; this is the act of “total self-exploitation”. Self-optimisation, 
as the neoliberal ideology, “displays religious...indeed, fanatical...traits”; its method of 
subjectivation is novel, though. It “resembles...Protestantism” in that self-optimisation 
works to constantly self-examine and self-monitor; the difference, here, is that sins 





enemy. A further irony is that negativity, in life, is actually a positive ontological force; 
as Han puts it, the “human soul owes its defining tautness and depth precisely to 
negativity”. He argues that pain, and its sensation, is “constitutive for experience” and 
that a life that is “wholly...positive emotions and the sensation of ‘flow’ is not human...”. 
Pain has not been eradicated, certainly, but the only pain that is allowed is the kind of 
pain that “can be exploited for the purposes of optimization”. Positivity, in the 
neoliberal, psychopolitical sense, is a negative ontological force; it is a violent and 
destructive force. The only ‘real’ product of the neoliberal regime, as Han would have 
it, is the destruction of the human soul. 
 
XIII. Creatures of Sentiment 
Consumer capitalism enlists emotion in order to generate more desires and needs. 
Emotional Design moulds emotions and shapes emotional patterns for the sake of 
maximizing consumption. All in all, today we do not consume things so much as emotions. 
The former cannot be consumed without end – but the latter can. Emotions assume 
dimensions beyond the scope of use value. In so doing, they open up a field of 
consumption that is new and knows no limit.503 
 
 Philosophy has always dealt with emotion, but not, typically, in a very positive 
way. From Seneca, to Descartes, to Plato, philosophers have not theorised the 
emotions positively, but, rather, as obstacles, impediments and nuisances that 
obstruct our path to pure and logical reasoning and its employment. Han claims that, 
today, emotion has overtaken reason as the defining human characteristic. He 
declares that suddenly, “the human being no longer counts as an animal 
rationale...[but as a] creature of sentiment” and that this “emotion ‘boom’ stems from 
an economic process, above all”. Furthermore, he criticises researchers apparent 
“conceptual confusion” and their inability to distinguish between “’emotion’, ‘feeling’ 
and ‘affect’. Han contends that this sudden interest in ‘emotion’ is not borne out of a 
genuine conceptual or scientific curiosity, but, rather, out of a desire, on the part of the 
 





neoliberal regime, to deploy “emotions as resources in order to bring out heightened 
productivity and achievement”. Rationality has a limit, which may express itself as 
‘logic’ or as ‘the objective world’ or something along these lines. Thus, rationality, as 
“the medium of disciplinary society”, clashes with the neoliberal project and is 
“experienced as a constraint...an inhibition”; neoliberalism, thus, is unable to tolerate 
it and has replace it with “emotionality”. This ‘release’ from rationality presents itself 
as a liberation of sorts, especially if we take it as fact that “being free means giving 
free rein to emotions”. “Emotional capitalism”, i.e. neoliberalism, succeeds in hailing 
emotion “as the expression of unbridled subjectivity”; this “unbridled subjectivity” is 
then ”mercilessly” exploited by neoliberal technologies of power. Rationality, on the 
one hand, concerns “objectivity, generality and steadiness”, while emotionality, on the 
other, is “subjective, situative and volatile”; the latter is, in a sense, reactionary, while 
the former is pre-emptive and calculated. Rationality moves toward stability and 
emotionality craves flux. Han argues that the neoliberal economy has pushed the 
emotionalisation “of the productive process forward”, in order to dismantle continuity 
and integrate instability as another way of enhancing productivity; “accelerated 
communication”, as facilitated by the Digital, “also promotes emotionalization”, but it 
is this acceleration, and the pressure that it produces, that “is leading to a dictatorship 
of emotion”. There is a tension, in emotionality, between generation and consumption; 
as Han puts it, consumer capitalism “enlists emotion in order to generate more desire 
and needs”, while emotional design “moulds emotions and shapes emotional patterns 
for the sake of maximizing consumption”. Today’s consumption revolves more around 
emotions than things; things, as such, are finite, while emotions can be “consumed 
without end”. Emotions are able to “assume dimensions beyond the scope of use 





no limit”. Furthermore, the shift to emotionality is the result of a “new, immaterial mode 
of production in which communicative interaction plays an ever-greater role”; this 
mode of production requires not only “cognitive competence, but also...emotional 
competence”. Employees are now judged not only on cognitive and manual skills, but 
also on their behaviour and their social skills; this new mode of production exploits 
“sociality, communication and even individual conduct”. “Corporate communication” is 
now optimised via the “raw material” that emotions provide; managerial strategies that 
once focused on “the principle of rational action”, now focus on “emotional 
management”, instead. Emotions can express themselves as either “performative” or 
as “inclinations”; they express themselves as the former when they “call forth certain 
actions”, but as the latter when they “represent the energetic...the sensory, or even 
sensuous...basis for actions”. Han considers that emotions are “steered by the limbic 
system, which is...where the drives are seated”; these “form the pre-reflexive, half-
conscious, physico-instinctual level of action that escapes full awareness”. It is on this 
level that neoliberal psychopolitics “seizes on emotion in order to influence actions...”. 
It is able to “cut and operate deep inside”, via the emotions; thus, emotion functions 
as the medium that allows for “psychopolitically steering the integral person...the 
person as a whole”. Neoliberalism, then, takes what is typically considered a ‘natural’, 
human phenomenon, emotion, and exploits it, to its own end. When it comes to 
consumption, impulse is often a key factor in the decision-making process, especially 
if the decision involves only very similar choices. Hume’s passions and sentiments 
were the basis for his ethics and even, to a certain extent, for his ontology and 
epistemology. Here, emotion is, effectively, completely devoid of any moral 
responsibility; neoliberalism takes emotion and reduces, or elevates (depending on 





something, but because they feel it and it is this sentiment that neoliberalism takes 
hold on and exploits to the point of saturation. Though the ‘logic’ behind this 
proliferation of emotionality and emotions, per se, is the generation of needs and 
desires and merciless exploitation of the same, what we really end up with is a 
situation where the more ‘valuable’ emotions become, the less that they actually mean 
anything. As Han pointed out, the turn to emotionality results from a turn away from 
rationality, which prevents anyone from being able to explain the ‘logic’ behind their 
emotions and allows them only to emote in an effectively meaning-less way.  
 
XIV. The Art of Living 
Neoliberal psychopolitics is a technology of domination that stabilizes and perpetuates 
the prevailing system by means of psychological programming and steering...the art of 
living, as the praxis of freedom, must proceed by way of de-psychologization. This serves 
to disarm psychopolitics, which is a means of effecting submission. When the subject is 
de-psychologized...de-voided...it opens onto a mode of existence that still has no name: 
an unwritten future.504 
 
 Is there any response or answer to the neoliberal condition or is it one that, 
thanks to the inexorable proliferation of our digital technologies, we can never escape? 
Han, following on from Nietzsche, references what is know as “the event”, which 
signals, in an “incalculable and abrupt” manner, the beginning of “an entirely new state 
of affairs”. An event introduces “an outside” and this introduction “breaks the subject 
open and wrests it from subjection”; events “represent breaks and 
discontinuities...they open up new spaces for action”. The glory of neoliberalism is its 
interminable quest for ever greater efficiency and performance, which it does always 
find or create. There is no break to psychopolitical power; it is incessant and 
everchanging. Han distinguishes between “experiencing” and “experience”, with the 
latter being “founded on discontinuity”; while existing as a subject “means being 
subjected...cast under, by a higher instance”, experience “means transformation...[it] 
 





tears the subject out from subjection...out of its downcast state”. Experience, for Han, 
“signifies the opposite of the neoliberal psychopolitics of experiencing or emotion, 
which only ensnares the subject deeper and deeper in the state of subjection and 
subjugation”. What might be understood as “the art of living”, following on from 
Foucault, is the practice of a ‘real’ sort of freedom, “bringing forth an entirely different 
mode of existence”. This requires, however, a “de-psychologization”; it is “the art of 
killing of psychology [and] of creating within oneself and with others unname 
individualities, beings, relations [and] qualities”. Neoliberal psychopolitics produces a 
sort of “psychological terror” that facilitates the subjugation of “subjectivation” and the 
“art of living” must be directly opposed to that. It is not terribly clear what “event” or 
how exactly this “art of living” can save us from psychopolitical power. Digital 
technologies and neoliberal capitalism seem too pervasive, too powerful and 
necessary, currently, to even imagine that things could one day be any different. 
Instead of social media becoming less popular or less ubiquitous, over time, it 
continues to change and find new ways of becoming ever more ‘social’ and integrated 
into quotidian life. Technology, more generally, is more present than ever; not only has 
it entered the home and all ‘traditionally’ private spaces, but it has also literally entered 
the body and the mind with the slow acceptance of bio-technologies. Resistance to 
power would only be able occur progressively and at the level of the individual; this 
resistance, however, would not only go unnoticed, but would also quickly grow 
irrelevant, as it would more likely be integrated into the neoliberal regime. Removing 
oneself “from the grid” is becoming an ever more popular choice among those who 
wish to free themselves from the stresses and social requirements of digital life. This 
‘choice’, too, has become a sort of faddish and only temporary ‘therapy’; it has quickly 





Homes, technologies, spaces and facilities that are all ‘off grid’ and free of digital 
technology are all up for sale and advertised, ironically, all over the internet. Even life 
‘off grid’ is generated digitally. There are certainly a variety of modes of resistance and 
resistance strategies against psychopolitcal power, which may or may incorporate 
some sort of ‘off grid’ logic, but it is not as simple as shunning technology altogether. 
Ignoring technology will not make it disappear; in fact, it will likely only make it appear 
more powerful as you experience the social and economic alienation that results from 
such a rupture. As the Digital becomes a source of ‘life’, as artificial and vacuous as it 
may be, its opposite is, in fact, a sort of ‘death’. The event, or events, that Han refers 
to would have to be so cataclysmic that they rid people of the ‘need’ for technology 
and did, truly, allow for the introduction of new modes of life. Again, this seems unlikely 
and an incredibly complicated problem, but it is perhaps possible, at some point in the 























The Power of Truth:  




 This chapter will look at the ways that the concepts of ‘science’ and ‘method’ 
have changed over the past century by focusing on the work of Karl Popper, Paul 
Feyerabend and Michel Foucault. It will show how the logical positivist movement, and 
those who criticised it, like Popper, attempted to ‘correct’ science and make it more 
precise and reflective of ‘reality’ and ‘the universal’. Feyerabend, on the other hand, 
criticised the very notion of logic, rationality and scientific discovery and advocated for 
an anarchic approach towards human knowledge and understanding. Foucault would 
argue that science itself is a mode of knowledge production; science gives us 
knowledge about the world because it delimits and defines: first, what is ‘true’ and 
what is ‘false’ in terms of our own experience and understanding of ‘reality’ and, 
second, what can even validly be considered as ‘reality’, ‘experience’, ‘knowledge’, 
‘understanding’, ‘science’ and the like. The dialogue/debates between these theorists 
serve as a way to explain why so many different conceptions of ‘truth’, ‘reality’ and 
‘knowledge’ seem equally valid depending on their contextualisation; if we understand 
epistemology as being a sort of self-contained system, rather than as a system that 
works to explain things outside of it, i.e. ‘natural phenomena’, then we see how it is 











II. The Power of Truth 
What one is seeing…is the emergence of a whole field of question…by which [a] new form 
of history is trying to develop its own theory: how is one to specify the different concepts 
that enable us to conceive of discontinuity…By what criteria is one to isolate the unities 
with which one is dealing: what is a science? What is an oeuvre? What is a theory? What 
is a concept? What is a text?505 
 
Applied science, by its very nature, does not concern itself very much with 
methodology, primarily because the proper method for practising science has been 
established for centuries. In the early 11th century, the physicist Al-Haytham pioneered 
what is now known as ‘the scientific method’, which is essentially a reliance on 
evidence that is experimental in origin, with said experiments being “systematic and 
repeatable”, as opposed to a reliance on theories in the abstract that cannot be tested 
and are not observable in nature.506 This ‘scientific method’, if valid and effective, 
would, then, “be routinely found in everyday contexts as well”, since we are constantly 
and routinely observing the world around us and reach conclusions based on these 
repeated observations.507 This is the nature of empiricism and empirical thought: first, 
that there is a world independent of our own existence and, secondly, that our only 
knowledge of it comes through experience. The relation between empiricism and 
science, then, is that science is a particularly successful practice of empiricism 
because it is “organized, systematic, and especially responsive to experience”.508 This 
essay will look at the ways that the concepts of science and method have changed 
over the past century by focusing on the work of Karl Popper, Paul Feyerabend and 
Michel Foucault. We will see how the logical positivist movement and those who 
criticised it, like Popper, attempted to ‘correct’ science and make it more precise and 
reflective of reality and the universal. Feyerabend, on the other hand, criticised the very 
notion of logic, rationality and scientific discovery and advocated for an anarchic 
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approach towards human knowledge and understanding, which he believed is 
reflected in the development of the scientific ‘facts’ that comprise the history of science. 
Foucault would argue that science itself is simply, though in a very complex fashion, a 
mode of knowledge production; science gives us knowledge about the world because 
it delimits and defines: first, what is true and what is false in terms of our experience 
and understanding of ‘reality’ and, second, what can even validly be considered as 
experience, reality, understanding, knowledge, science, etc. 
 
II. Epistemology of Science 
Foucault’s concepts break with the more traditional, naturalist view that 
knowledge, per se, is, in effect, our understanding of the external world; a world that 
would exist without us and a world that has laws, principles and truths that are also 
independent of our existence. His views contrast starkly with those of someone like 
Karl Popper who, as a ‘realist’, believed that “the aim of science is to find true, or 
increasingly truthlike, theories”; this is done, however, through falsification, which is, 
effectively, the exclusion of theories that have been proven to be “false”.509 
Feyerabend, on the other hand, understands ‘knowledge’ not as a “gradual approach 
to the truth”, nor as “a series of self-consistent theories that converges towards an ideal 
view”, but as an “ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives” where 
every theory “that is part of the collection” forces the other theories “into greater 
articulation” and all of them contribute, “via this process of competition” to “the 
development of our consciousness”.510 Furthermore, “nothing is ever settled, no view 
can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account”.511 This is a kind of knowledge “in 
which the history of a science becomes an inseparable part of the science itself”, which 
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means that “it is essential for its further development as well as for giving content to 
the theories it contains at any particular moment”.512 Anyone from “experts and laymen” 
to “professionals and dilettanti” to “truth-freaks and liars” are “invited to participate in 
the contest and to make their contribution to the enrichment of our culture”.513 
Scientists, then, are not, in fact, tasked with searching for “the truth”, but, rather, with 
making “the weaker case the stronger…and thereby [sustaining] the motion of the 
whole”.514 Feyerabend argues that ideas that today 
…form the very basis of science exist only because there were such things as prejudice, 
conceit, passion; because these things opposed reason; and because they were permitted 
to have their way. We have to conclude, then, that even within science reason cannot and 
should not be allowed to be comprehensive…that it must often be overruled, or eliminated, 
in favour of other agencies.515 
 
He contends that science is much more “’sloppy’ and ‘irrational’ than its methodological 
image” and that “the attempt to make science more ‘rational’ and more precise is bound 
to wipe it out”; methodology and even, perhaps, the ‘laws of reason’, are weak when 
contrasted with the apparent “’sloppiness’, ‘chaos’ or ‘opportunism’” of science, as it is 
these apparent ‘deficiencies’ that serve “a most important function in the development 
of those very theories which we today regard as essential parts of our knowledge of 
nature”.516 It is these deficiencies, or “deviations” and “errors”, as Feyerabend calls 
them, that exist as “preconditions of progress”; it is they that “permit knowledge to 
survive in the complex and difficult world which we inhabit” and “they permit us to 
remain free and happy agents”.517 He makes the aphoristic claims that “[w]ithout 













We can, though there are several theoretical similarities, juxtapose this with Popper’s 
1939 work The Logic of Scientific Discovery.  
 
III. The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
Popper distinguishes between what he calls the psychology of knowledge and 
the logic of knowledge: the former “deals with empirical facts”, while the latter deals 
only with “logical relations”.519 He claimed that the problem of induction, or, rather, the 
“belief in inductive logic”, is “largely due to a confusion of psychological problems with 
epistemological ones”, with ‘inductive logic’ being the move of an inference from 
‘singular statements’, e.g. “accounts of the results of observations or experiments”, to 
‘universal statements’, e.g. “hypotheses or theories”.520 The problem of induction, then, 
is the question of whether or not “inductive inferences are justified” and “under what 
conditions”; the problem can also be understood as the question of whether or not 
“universal statements which are based on experience, such as the hypotheses and 
theoretical systems of the empirical sciences”, are true or valid.521 Now, the reason 
Popper wants to distinguish psychology from epistemology is because he wants, 
ultimately, to distinguish between “the process of conceiving of an idea” and “the 
methods and results of examining it logically”.522 This develops, effectively, into the 
distinction between the logic of knowledge and the psychology of knowledge, with Popper 
claiming that 
…the task of the logic of knowledge—in contradistinction to the psychology of 
knowledge…consists solely in investigating the method employed in those systematic tests 
to which every idea must be subjected if it is to be seriously entertained.523 
 
For him, there can be no “logical method of having new ideas” nor a “logical 
reconstruction” of said process and every scientific discovery contains “an irrational 
 
519 Popper, Karl. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 7. 
520 Ibid, 3-4. 
521 Ibid, 4. 






element” or “a creative intuition”.524 In other words, a hypothesis, theory or prediction 
is not necessarily ‘illogical’ or ‘absurd’ a priori; it is only when said ‘intuition’ is tested 
under certain conditions and criteria. As he says: 
…[from] a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way…conclusions are 
drawn by means of logical deduction. These conclusions are then compared with one 
another and with other relevant statements, so as to find what logical relations…exist 
between them.525 
 
Induction logic brings us to the universal via the particular, whereas deductive logic 
leads us from the universal to the particular, or, rather, from a set of truths to another 
truth. However, even those conclusions that support ‘a new idea’ do so only 
temporarily, as “subsequent negative” conclusions may always subvert them and the 
same can happen to these subsequent conclusions.526 The only quasi-certainty that 
Popper allows for, which is hardly certainty, at all, is ‘corroboration’, which is the idea 
that a theory is ‘corroborated’ if it “withstands detailed and severe tests and is not 
superseded by another theory in the course of scientific progress”.527 An idea or theory 
becomes epistemically relevant when it is tested and supported, but it becomes 
knowledge when it is tested severely and fails to be supplanted by a ‘better’ theory, 
which is corroboration. Theories, then, can never be ‘verified’, because a truth that is 
ultimate or incontestable is not “empirically verifiable”; thus, Popper only considers a 
‘system’ as “empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience”.528 
He takes as his “criterion of demarcation”, or the criterion that allows statements to be 
admitted “to the domain of empirical science”, not the verifiability “of a system” but its 
falsifiability; as Popper states:  
…I shall not require of a scientific system that is shall be capable of being singled out, once 
and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it 
can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible 
for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.529 
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Popper has an understanding of the ‘subjective’ and the ‘objective’ that is “not unlike 
Kant’s”.530 He describes Kant’s use of the word ‘objective’ to mean that “scientific 
knowledge should be justifiable, independently of anybody’s whim”; a justification, then 
is ‘objective’ if it can, in principle, “be tested and understood by anybody”.531 Popper, 
though, does not believe that scientific theories can ever be “fully justifiable or 
verifiable”, but “they are nevertheless testable”; for Popper, then, the ‘objectivity’ of a 
scientific statement “lies in the fact that [it] can be inter-subjectively tested”.532 Inter-
subjective testing, however, is only one aspect of what Popper refers to as “inter-
subjective criticism” or “the idea of mutual rational control by critical discussion”.533 
Popper’s thesis can be summarised as such: 
 
…a subjective experience, or a feeling of conviction, can never justify a scientific statement, 
and…within science it can play no part except that of an object of an empirical (a 
psychological) inquiry. No matter how intense a feeling of conviction it may be, it can never 




…I may be utterly convinced of the truth of a statement; certain of the evidence of my 
perception; overwhelmed by the intensity of my experience: every doubt may seem to me 
absurd. But does this afford the slightest reason for science to accept my statement? The 
answer is, ‘No’; and any other answer would be incompatible with the idea of scientific 
objectivity”.534 
 
Thus, Popper concludes that if all statements that can be scientifically entertained must 
be ‘objective’, then all statements “which belong to an empirical basis of science” also 
have to be ‘objective’, or “inter-subjectively testable”; but this means, as Popper has 
argued, that any statements that are meant to be tested will deductively produce other 
testable statements.535 If even those statements that are meant to be taken as “basic 
statements’ must, perforce, be inter-subjectively testable, then “there can be no 
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ultimate statements in science”; all scientifically valid statements must be testable and 
they must all, in principle, be refutable “by falsifying some of the conclusions which can 
be deduced from them”. Popper summarises: 
…[systems] of theories are tested by deducing from them statements of a lesser level of 
universality. These statements in their turn, since they are to be inter-subjectively testable, 
must be testable in like manner—and so ad infinitum.536 
 
He does recognise, however, that “testability ad infinitum and the absence of ultimate 
statements which are not in need of tests” is problematic, as, for the sake of practicality, 
‘testing’ must be a temporally limited endeavour; he responds to this by arguing that 
not every statement has to have been tested “before it is accepted”, but “every such 
statement must be capable of being tested”.537 Popper believes that certainty, “the idol 
of certainty”, is the enemy of scientific advancement; hypotheses and new ideas should 
be as bold as possible and their testing as rigorous as can be.538 The purpose of 
science, then, is an advance towards “an infinite yet attainable aim”: the discovery of 
“new, deeper, and more general problems” and the subjection of “our ever tentative 
answers to ever renewed and ever more rigorous tests”. 
 
IV. Against Method 
 While several of the most important conclusions that Feyerabend made in his 
1975 work Against Method have already been discussed, we can now, after having 
briefly surveyed Popper’s deductive logic, go more in depth into Feyerabend’s critique, 
or rather invalidation, of the scientific method. Popper’s aim was to criticise the use of 
inductive logic in science and, instead, found it in deductive logic and falsifiability. 
Feyerabend’s aim, however, is to expose the anarchic nature of scientific discovery 
and dispel the myths of scientific naturalism and normativity. Feyerabend claims that 
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anarchism is “excellent medicince for epistemology, and for the philosophy of science”, 
as it is the case that 
…[a] complex medium containing surprising and unforeseen developments demands 
complex procedures and defies analysis on the basis of rules which have been set up in 
advance and without regard to the ever-changing conditions of history.539 
 
Feyerabend understands science as being, historically, a “complex” and “chaotic” 
enterprise, “full of mistakes”, and that the ideas that make it up are equally as 
“complex, chaotic” and “full of mistakes”, which are just as “entertaining” as “the 
minds who invented them”.540 The way that science is consumed, by those who 
learn of science but operate outside of it, is via a simplification of its history; 
making it “duller, simpler, more uniform, more ‘objective’ and more easily 
accessible to treatment by strict and unchangeable rules”.541 The objective of 
scientific education, accordingly, is to develop this original simplification through 
a further simplification of its participants, which is described by Feyerabend as 
such: 
…first, a domain of research is defined. The domain is separated from the rest of 
history…and given a ‘logic’ of its own. A thorough training in such a ‘logic’ then conditions 
those working in the domain; it makes their actions more uniform and it freezes large parts 




…[an] essential part of the training that makes such facts appear consists in the attempt to 
inhibit intuitions that might lead to a blurring of boundaries…[his] imagination is restrained, 
and even his language ceases to be his own. This is again reflected in the nature of 
scientific ‘facts’ which are experienced as being independent of opinion, belief, and cultural 
background.543 
 
Science as it is taught, then, for Feyerabend, is a sanitisation of its true and anarchistic 
nature, which is how the developments, conclusions and results that it produces and 
that ultimately affect the world actually come about. Feyerabend supports a science 
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that is both methodologically anarchist, “a pluralism of theories and metaphysical 
views”, and humanitarian; this means that science should not stifle human imagination 
and its potential impact on the world: “…[it] is possible to retain what one might call the 
freedom of artistic creation and to use it to the full…as a necessary means for 
discovering…perhaps even changing the features of the world we live in”.544 He seems 
to be opposing the institutionalisation of scientific discovery, which, in theory, could be 
done in an institution or by applying some sort of methodology to the process, but the 
way that this is actually done (in universities, laboratories, ‘in the field’, etc.) and the 
dogmatic adherence to the ‘facts’ that this practice produces is not in line with what 
Feyerabend views as the ultimate objective of science, which is to adapt itself “to the 
values of the people [it is] supposed to advise” and to support humanitarian aims and 
a multiplicity of minds.545 This is where the social and politically focused core of 
Feyerabend’s thesis becomes explicit; he even makes the point that a free society 
must insist on “the separation of science and society”, as it is the case that the 
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V. Foucault’s ‘Method’ 
I have read one book by Foucault (Madness and Society), and thought it was a marvellous 
case study of the different treatments madmen had received throughout the ages…These 
kinds of things I like. I did not like Foucault any longer when he became general and started 
to speak about the human condition…(Feyerabend, 280) 
 
Perhaps the reason why my work irritates people is precisely the fact that I’m not interested 
in constructing a new scheme or in validating one that already exists. Perhaps it’s because 
my objective isn’t to propose a global principle for analyzing society…My general theme 
isn’t society but the discourse of true and false…and it’s not just their formation that 
interests me, but the effects in the real to which they are linked. (Foucault, 237) 
 
 
For Foucault, the question of method or, rather, methodology is not necessarily 
a question of how best to define or understand a concept or object of study; it is not a 
question of the method that one should follow in one’s research or conceptual analysis, 
though it may sound oxymoronic to say that methodology is not about method. The 
idea of a methodology itself is interesting because choosing a method already says 
something about the work to be done; one may go so far as to say that it will, explicitly 
or implicitly, already hold the outcome of the work. In other words, a specific method 
can only produce a specific result, even if that result may seem like a discovery or 
revelation hitherto unknown. If we believe, like a naturalist or natural realist, that the 
reality that we inhabit is independent of us, then the only valid method, particularly in 
scientific research, is that one that leads us to truth or to an understanding of said 
reality that is verifiably understood as true; here, simply put, there are things that are 
true about the world and only that which helps us understand these truths is valid. 
Foucault, however, questions the very validity of said truth; what is more important: the 
truth that our research leads us to, or the method that led our research? This is why 
Popper and Feyerabend are so important to Foucault’s question(s) of method. For 
Popper, the problem is one of scientific validity and for Feyerabend, the problem is a 
lack of understanding of the anarchy of knowledge and the ways in which society 
creates artificial epistemic domains via science. Feyerabend, in correspondence with 





both for seeming “to go against the sanctity of the individual” and as “enemies of the 
individual (and, naturally, of Good Science)”.547 Popper, as mentioned in the previous 
section, argued that subjective conviction can never be taken as fact unless 
corroborated through rigorous and objective testing, which even then only raises the 
conviction to the status of a temporarily corroborated and scientifically valid statement 
that may be falsified at some point in the future. Foucault, in a way, challenges both of 
these perspectives, though he certainly, in many ways, shares certain affinities with 
Feyerabend. A concept like “Good Science”, as Feyerabend puts it, would mean 
nothing to Foucault, because first, if we take Popper’s view, then it is science itself that 
is the judge of whether or not certain statements, experiments, conclusions, theories 
and the like are scientifically acceptable, i.e. good, and second, if we take 
Feyerabend’s view, then it is the individual and, ultimately, society, understood as a 
group of independent and autonomous individuals, that is the arbiter of good science 
because it is they who develop and advance scientific thought, practice and discovery 
via an untethered and audacious imagination. However, in the first case, if science 
defines its own criteria for truth and objectivity, then it must be the case that it is not 
aiding us in our understanding of reality, but rather explicitly defining reality itself and 
what qualifies as such. In the second case, though Feyerabend does not ignore the 
power of the state over the individual nor over scientific enterprise, in general, it is not 
clear how any individual, or group of individuals, is able to ‘escape’ or function 
independently of the societal and administrative practices that work to dictate our 
understanding of what is true and what is false and, at a level above this, what can 
even be recognised as a practice, as reality. An individual, in Feyerabend’s world, 
would, presumably, function as an ‘acculturated’ individual, but one who is able to 
 





transcend this ‘reality’ and is able to apprehend a multitude of ‘realities’. It may be a 
case, here, of the process and the principle being more important than the definition, 
when it comes to understanding ‘Good Science’, but it is difficult to see how the process 



























The Abstraction of Truth: 




 This chapter will look at how Deleuze and Guattari understand the concepts of 
power, truth, individualisation and fascism and how these relate to language, 
representation, society, reality and epistemology. It will be argued that if Delueze and 
Guattari’s thesis is, at the very least, valid, then not only does ‘power’ become an 
obsolete concept, but it also becomes a dangerous and socially irresponsible one. 
Power, as Deleuze and Guattari understand it, is the foundation of the West’s 
structuring of order and truth, but brings with it a fascist mode of thought and action. 
In order to further this argument, in addition to analysing other works by Deleuze and 
Guattari, this essay will look at the work of John Fiske, specifically his book Media 
Matters, in order to understand how reality and representation function in modern 
society and how the act of ‘discourse’ challenges the emergent fascism of truth and 
reality. It will be argued that while ‘discourse’, an ‘anti-Oedipal’ life and new forms of 
politics are in no way guaranteed cures to the fascistic tendencies of life in ‘Western 
society’, they are certainly freer and more responsible ways of living that challenge the 













II. The Abstraction of Truth 
Words are not tools, but we give children language, pens, and notebooks as we give 
workers shovels and pickaxes. A rule of grammar is a power marker before it is a syntactical 
marker. The order does not refer to prior significations or to a prior organization of 
distinctive units. Quite the opposite. Information is only the strict minimum necessary for 
the emission, transmission, and observation of orders as commands…Language is not life; 
it gives life orders. Life does not speak; it listens and waits.548 
 
Michel Foucault, in his preface to Deleuze and Guattari’s book, Anti-Oedipus, 
seems to claim that the authors have intentionally made their work difficult to 
understand, to take seriously and to fully engage with because they are committed to 
their own theses.549 Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis, as Foucault understands it, is that 
concepts such as ‘power’, ‘truth’ and ‘individualisation’ are fascist concepts that serve 
to control and order those who subscribe to and employ them. For Foucault, Anti-
Oedipus set out to present, or at least begin to present, an “art of living counter to all 
forms of fascism, whether already present or impending”.550 He even goes as far as 
to summarise a few “essential principles” that he believes explain and outline the ‘anti-
Oedipal’, and anti-fascist, form of life that Deleuze and Guattari present in their work; 
the most important of which seems to be the renunciation of power.551 This essay will 
look at how Deleuze and Guattari understand the concepts of power, truth, 
individualisation and fascism and how these relate to language, representation, 
society, reality and epistemology. It will be argued that if Delueze and Guattari’s thesis 
is, at the very least, valid, then not only does ‘power’ become an obsolete concept, but 
it also becomes a dangerous and socially irresponsible one. Power, as Deleuze and 
Guattari understand it, is the foundation of the West’s structuring of order and truth, 
but brings with it a fascist mode of thought and action. To structure is to order and to 
delimit, and to order and delimit is to begin to negate and discard, which requires the 
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destruction, or banishment, of that which is deemed superfluous or unlimited. This 
means that order and truth are qualities or states that emerge from negation and 
exclusion, rather than from production and inclusion. As Foucault states in his 
summary of Anti-Oedipus, it is ‘the Negative’, i.e. laws, limits, etc., that “Western 
thought” has presented as “a form of power and an access to reality”.552 In order to 
further this argument, in addition to analysing other works by Deleuze and Guattari, 
this essay will look at the work of John Fiske, specifically his book Media Matters, in 
order to understand how reality and representation function in modern society and 
how the act of ‘discourse’ challenges the emergent fascism of truth and reality. It will 
be argued that while ‘discourse’ and an ‘anti-Oedipal’ life are in no way guaranteed 
cures to the fascistic tendencies of life in ‘Western society’, they are certainly freer and 
more responsible ways of living that challenge the very notion of a status quo and the 
acceptance of oppressive and/or repressive forms of life. 
 
II. Anti-Oedipus 
To be anti-oedipal is to be anti-ego as well as anti-homo, wilfully attacking all reductive 
psychoanalytic and political analyses that remain caught within the sphere of totality and 
unity, in order to free the multiplicity of desire from the deadly neurotic and Oedipal yoke.553 
 
Mark Seem, in his introduction to Anti-Oedipus, argues that Deleuze and Guattari 
invite us on a “journey through ego-loss”; they urge us to strip ourselves of “all 
anthropomorphic and anthropological armouring, all myth and tragedy, and all 
existentialism, in order to perceive what is nonhuman” in us, in our will, our forces, our 
transformations and our mutations.554 Seem claims that the sciences have 
“accustomed us to see the figure of Man behind every social event” and that such 
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“forms of knowledge project an image of reality, at the expense of reality itself”.555 
Furthermore: 
[t]hey talk figures and icons and signs, but fail to perceive forces and flows. They blind us 
to other realities, and especially the reality of power as it subjugates us. Their function is to 
tame, and the result is the fabrication of docile and obedient subjects.556 
 
As Seem understands it, ‘oedipalization’ is the “internalization of man by man”; it is the 
internalisation of suffering and an introduction of the state of depression to everyday 
life.557 Seem explains that depression and Oedipus are “agencies of the State”, of 
paranoia and power that are then delegated to the family; Oedipus is the figure of 
power, while neurosis is “the result of power on individuals” and “Oedipus is 
everywhere”.558 Oedipalism is the desire for control, for limits, for distance, for 
repression; it is the desire to have no desire, for fear of life devoid of loci, whether 
these are physical, psychological, social or familial. The home, the school, the 
workplace and institutions, in general, seek to Oedipalise and neuroticise their 
‘participants’, ‘inhabitants’, etc., and fascism is ubiquitous. What Deleuze and Guattari 
are investigating is how fascist beliefs “succeed in taking hold of a body” and “silencing 
the productive machines of the libido”; they are also investigating counter-fascism, i.e. 
how it is possible for the body to become free and manage to ward off “the effects of 
power”. Deleuze and Guattari conclude that neurosis is, in fact, the result of the 
“Oedipal imprints” taking, while psychosis is the state of being, more or less, immune 
to oedipalisation, “even and especially by psychoanalysis”.559 Revolution, then, 
involves studying the psychotic, in order to learn how to “shake off the Oedipal yoke 
and the effects of power” and how to “initiate a radical politics of desire freed from all 












to dissolve “the mystifications of power” as a part of the radical politics mentioned 
before.561 Schizoanalysis, a counter-psychoanalysis, is the act of ‘schizophrenising’, 
so as to “break the holds of power and institute research into a new collective 
subjectivity and a revolutionary healing of mankind”562; the creation, essentially, of a 
new self or, rather, many selves in one. It is only through a loss, or rejection, of the 
ego that a new politics, free of neurosis, can emerge; a politics that embraces both 
singularity and collectivity and “where collective expressions of desire are possible”.563 
This type of politics is unique in that it does not try to individualise “according to a 
totalitarian system of norms”, but rather attempts to subvert normalisation and 
individualisation via a “multiplicity of new, collective arrangements against power”; the 
goal of this politics is nothing short of a complete “transformation of human 
relationships”, an analysis and struggle on the part of “militant groups”, and “lone 
individuals”,  “against the effects of power that subjugate them”.564 Revolution is 
impossible if the “relations between people and groups” remain “relations of exclusion 
and segregation”; groups, then, “must multiply and connect” in novel ways that ‘free 
up’ “territorialities for the construction of new social arrangements”.565 Theory is only 
a preface to action, the foundation; it should be thought of as “a toolbox, producing 
tools that work”.566 The primary objective of schizoanalysis is to “destroy the 
oedipalized and neuroticized individual dependencies though the forging of a 
collective subjectivity, a nonfascist subject—anti-Oedipus”; anti-Oedipus is a group or 
an individual who “no longer functions in terms of beliefs” and seeks to redeem 













collectively, breaking from power through madness, which takes “the form of a 
disconnection”; anti-Oedipus, however, only learns from madness in order to “move 
beyond it, beyond disconnections and deterritorializations, to ever new 
connections”.568 The first victims of this ‘anti-Oedipal’ politics, this “politics of desire”, 
are “loneliness and depression”; this is a result of the ‘anti-oedipal strategy’, which is, 
essentially, a person’s connecting themselves to “the machines of the universe”, being 
in tune with their own desires and becoming “anchored”.569 Thus, when a person no 
longer concerns themselves with “the fitness of things”, with the behaviour of others, 
with justice and injustice or what is “right or wrong”, then the life within them “will 
manifest itself in growth” and “growth is an endless, eternal process”; it is this process, 
the process of “desiring-production, that is “everything” and that Deleuze and Guattari 
are analysing.570 They believe that if a society represses desire, then it is because 
“every position of desire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into question the 
established order of a society”; every desiring-machine is explosive and the mere 
assembly of a desiring-machine requires the demolishment of “entire social 
sectors”.571 Desiring-machines, desire, in general, “is always a combination of various 
elements and forces of all types”, which is why not only revolutionaries, but anyone 
“who know[s] how to be truly objective”, must be taken into account in the production 
process.572 As Deleuze and Guattari state: 
…[r]evolutionaries, artists, and seers are content to be objective, merely objective: they 
know that desire clasps life in its powerfully productive embrace, and reproduces it in a way 
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III. The ‘Origins’ of Anti-Oedipus 
 Mark Seem argues that Anti-Oedipus is, effectively, a sort of sequel to 
Nietzsche’s The AntiChrist, because it calls for the destruction of the church that is 
‘psychoanalysis’, which is “a form of treatment based on a set of beliefs that only the 
very faithful could adhere to”.574 These “very faithful” individuals are those “who 
believes in a security that amounts to being lost in the herd and defined in terms of 
common and external goals” and such a security would be anathema to Nietzsche, 
who believed in the philosophy of will and the will to power: a ‘will’ that neither aspires, 
seeks nor desires, nor does it desire power itself, but simply creates and gives.575 The 
neurotic, the ‘patient’ of psychoanalysis, seeks a life free of pain and trouble: “a 
tranquilized and conflict-free existence”.576 This need for security, this “herd instinct”, 
comes from “a desire to have someone else legislate life”; a desire that in Europe has 
expressed itself, politically, as fascism.577 Anti-Oedipus takes up questions that 
Wilhelm Reich, and Spinoza578, had asked before: namely, how is it that people can 
desire and tolerate their own oppression and then wish to perpetuate and extend that 
same oppression to others? Reich, for example, describes the “average intellectual”, 
of the 1930s, who does not wish to be ‘politically active’, as someone who “is motivated 
by immediate economic interests and fear for his existence, dependent as it is on 
public opinion”; it is this “fear” that encourages this person to sacrifice “knowledge and 
conviction to a grotesque degree”.579 Though Reich focuses on the “sexual conflicts” 
that individuals engage in, he explains that the inhibition of “rational thinking and the 
development of social responsibility, and the apprehension and defensiveness that 
said sexual conflicts bring about, allows one to be able to turn to the “fascist program” 
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as a ‘solution’ and surrender to it; this surrender to the fascist program “provides a 
momentary release from…chronic inner tension” and it can “unconsciously give a new 
form to [the] conflict and thereby seemingly solve it”.580 Reich claims that “[e]very living 
being will spontaneously attempt to discover and to eliminate the cause of a 
catastrophe which has overcome it; it will not repeat actions which have brought about 
the very catastrophe” and that this “lies in the nature of overcoming misfortune by 
experience”; politicians, on the other hand, do not have these “natural reactions”.581 
Reich explains that the practise of “sound science” involves operating under certain 
theories as long as one can “operate well” within them; it is only when said theories 
have “proven inadequate or erroneous” that it is necessary to “find the errors in them” 
and develop “new concepts on the basis of new facts”.582 This “natural procedure”, 
however, is “alien to politicians”; Reich claims that democratic politicians fail to “go 
back to the starting points of the democratic principles”, “to correct them according to 
radical changes that have taken place in social living” and “to make them practically 
fruitful”.583 He states: 
…[n]o matter how many new facts are added to the old, no matter how many errors have 
become obvious, the old theories continue to exist in the form of slogans and new facts are 
obfuscated in an illusory way.584 
 
It is this inability to learn and to incorporate experience that Reich believes 
“disillusioned millions of people in Europe and thus made fascist dictatorship 
possible”.585 He argues that the “basic elements of peace and human collaboration” 
are already given, “tangibly”, in “natural human work relationships” and that is from 
these very relationships that things such as peace, cooperation and harmony must 
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develop; it is not necessary to introduce anything further.586 Reich compares the 
treatment of a sick organism to the treatment of a sick, social organism: rather than 
introduce a new type of health to the diseased organism, a physician “plays” the 
healthy elements present in the organism against the “disease process”.587 If one 
approaches the sick social organism, “from the standpoint of social scene”, rather than 
from the standpoint of the politician, then one realises that it is only possible to 
“organically develop actually existing freedoms” and to “eliminate the obstacles” that 
are not allowing them to develop; it is not possible to “graft legally guaranteed 
freedoms” onto a sick social organism.588 Deleuze and Guattari claim that those 
regimes, or States, that claim never to have suffered under fascism, e.g. the United 
States and the United Kingdom, are reluctant to deal with the question of fascism, more 
generally; fascism becomes the problem of others and it becomes a “phenomenon that 
took place elsewhere”, a problem “for others to deal with”.589 We all carry “fascisizing 
elements” deep within us and even revolutionary groups that question these elements, 
to at least some degree, can fall prey to a: 
…rarely analyzed but overriding group ‘superego’ that leads them to state…that the other 
is evil (the Fascist! the Capitalist! the Communist!), and hence that they themselves are 
good. This conclusion is reached as an afterthought and a justification, a supremely self-
righteous rationalization for a politics that can only “squint” at life…590 
 
The people that make up these groups are like the ‘man of ressentiment’ that Nietzsche 
contended with; a man who loves “everything covert” and takes this as “his world, his 
security, his refreshment”, who “understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how 
to wait” and “how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble”.591 This person need 
to believe in some sort of “neutral, independent “subject””, which is “the ego”, because 
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they are motivated “by an instinct of self-affirmation and self-preservation that cares 
little about preserving or affirming life”, an “instinct “in which every lie is sanctified””; 
this is the world of what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as “the silent majority”.592 This 
problem, the “problem of the subject” and the “behind-the-scene reactive and 
reactionary” person, is one of the main problems, if not the main problem, that Deleuze 
and Guattari take as a starting point in developing their schizoanalytic approach. 
 
IV. Schizoanalysis 
Destroy, destroy. The task of schizoanalysis goes by way of destruction—a whole scouring 
of the unconscious, a complete curettage. Destory Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the 
pupper of the superego, guilt, the law, castration. It is not a matter of pious destructions, 
such as those performed by psychoanalysis under the benevolent neutral eye of the 
analyst. For these are Hegel-style destructions, ways of conserving.593 
 
The schizoanalytic approach that Deleuze and Guattari develop is one that is 
simultaneously “diagnostic” and curative, though what it attempts to cure us of “is the 
cure itself”.594 Psychoanalysis “measures everything against neurosis and castration”, 
while schizoanalysis begins with the schizophrenic and their “breakdowns 
and…breakthroughs”; this approach works against the Oedipal, “oedipalized 
territorialities”, such as the family, the church, the school, the nation, the political, and, 
especially, the “territoriality of the individual”.595 What Anti-Oedipus seeks, then, are 
the “flows of desire” that are “deterritorialized” and that have not been “reduced to the 
Oedipal codes and the neuroticized territorialities”; it seeks the “desiring-machines” 
that escape said codes “as lines of escape leading elsewhere”.596 These desiring-
machines, if they are, in fact, meant to be the opposite of oedipalisation, oedipalised 
territorialities and individual territoriality, must, then, be found in that which 
psychoanalysis is trying to ‘cure’. A desiring-machine must, unlike that which has been 
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territorialised, be unrestrained, limitless, positive and grounded in freedom, rather than 
in repression. Deleuze and Guattari’s strategy is to develop a “materialistically and 
experientially based analysis” of those behaviours and ways of life that psychiatry 
labels as ‘schizophrenic’; they investigate the “process of life flows as they oscillate 
from one extreme to other”: from “paranoia to schizophrenia…fascism to revolution” 
and “from breakdowns to breakthroughs”, on a scale from 0, “the body without organs”, 
to the nth power, “the schizophrenic process of desire”.597 Seem views Deleuze and 
Guattari’s relationship, as the undertakers of this investigation and analysis, as one a 
philosopher (Deleuze) being in communion with a militant (Guattari); what this means 
is that the strategy that they employ combines different modes of knowledge: the 
intuitive, the practical and the reflective, which each correspond to a different 
‘machine’: the ‘artistic’, the ‘revolutionary’ and the ‘analytical’.598 These modes of 
knowledge become, in a sense and in bits and pieces, a single machine “whose target 
is the ego and the fascist in each of us”; they develop, through this strategy, a “politics 
of experience”, which extends thought and action to their respective extremes: 
madness and revolution. This experience is not a human one, but, rather, an 
experience is what is not human in us, our “desires and forces”, and this politics of 
desire is “directed against all that is egoic—and heroic” is us.599 As Seem points out, 
the number of authors and concepts that Deleuze and Guattari refer and allude to is 
vast, but these references and allusions are “never done in an academic fashion aimed 
at persuading the reader”; as schizoanalysis is a process, or process driven, these 
references serve as points and signs, rather than directives, that show us the way to 
our objective.600 It would, seemingly, appear contradictory for Deleuze and Guattari to 
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claim that there is only way, one path or one method to loss of the ego, our ultimate 
objective, which is why they offer, as Seem also points out, “a multiplicity of solutions 
and a variety of directions for a new style of politics”; their strategic schozanalysis, a 
“political analysis of desire”, irrespective of how exactly it plays out, remains the tool 
that they have chosen to help humanity revolt.601 Schizophrenia, as a process, which 
is precisely what allows for the aforementioned ‘multiplicity of solutions and…variety of 
directions’, remains, again irrespective of how exactly the process goes, both our “point 
of departure” and our “point of destination”.602 
 
V. A Life Against Fascism 
How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be 
a revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our 
pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behavior? 
The Christian moralists sought out the traces of the flesh lodged deep within the soul. 
Deleuze and Guattari, for their part, pursue the slightest traces of fascism in the body.603 
 
Foucault summarises Anti-Oedipus with incredible pithiness and very succinctly; 
this summary/analysis serves as a preface to the text, but it works as a brief opus, in 
its right. He argues that the book should not be seen as a work of theory, nor as a work 
of philosophy, but, rather, as a work of art, “in the sense that is conveyed by the term 
“erotic art””; it is an “analysis of the relationship of desire to reality and to the capitalist 
“machines”.604 Anti-Oedipus asks: “[how] does one introduce desire into thought, into 
discourse, into action” and “[how] can and must desire deploy its forces within the 
political domain and grow more intense in the process of overturning the established 
order”?605 The book confronts, as a consequence of the questions that it asks, three 
adversaries: first, “political ascetics…sad militants…terrorists of theory” (who are part 
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of the same ‘group’); second, the “poor technicians of desire…” and, finally, fascism.606 
The first adversary concerns “those who would preserve the pure order of politics and 
political discourse”, the “[b]ureaucrats of the revolution and civil servants of Truth”; the 
second concerns the “psychoanalysts and semiologists of every sign and symptom”, 
those who would “subjugate the multiplicity of desire to the twofold law of structure and 
lack”; and the third concerns “not only historical fascism”, but the fascism “in all of us, 
in our heads and in our everyday behavior”: the fascism “that causes us to love power” 
and “to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us”.607 The last adversary, 
fascism, serves, in a sense, as the ‘tactical’ focal point of the ‘anti-Oedipal’ strategy; 
the strategy itself, however, can be referred to, as Foucault does, as “the art of living 
counter to all forms of fascism”, i.e. the “non-fascist life”.608 Foucault states that this 
‘art’ works alongside several “essential principles” that, if we keep kind them in mind, 
serve to guide us in, around and through the ‘non-fascist life’.609 These seven principles 
are, roughly, as follows: 1) free political action from all unitary and totalizing paranoia; 
2) develop action, thought and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction; 
3) withdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative…prefer what is positive 
and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities…; 4) do not think that one 
has to be sad in order to be militant…it is the connection of desire to reality (and not 
its retreat into the forms of representation) that possesses revolutionary force; 5) do 
not use thought to ground political practice in Truth and do not use political action to 
discredit, as mere speculation, a line of thought; 6) do not demand of politics that it 
restore the “rights” of the individual…the individual is the product of power…what is 
needed is to “de-individualize” by means of multiplication and displacement; 7) do not 
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become enamored of power.610 Foucault argues that Deleuze and Guattari translate 
their renunciation of power to their work and this accounts for the “games and snares 
scattered throughout the book”; he points out, however, that these ‘games and snares’ 
are not meant to manipulate or trick the reader into acquiescence, but, rather, that they 
are part of a humour and playfulness that are necessary elements of the ultimate 
project of Anti-Oedipus: “the tracking down of all varieties of fascism, from the 
enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that constitute the 
tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives”.611 While the text itself may be considered 
‘difficult’, it is merely a lexical representation of the anti-Oedipal process, which is, by 
its very nature, difficult and tedious, but necessary. A few questions that might be 
raised here, however, are whether or not the idea that one has come to fully understand 
the ‘anti-Oedipal strategy’, which could breed complacency and a form of inaction or, 
on the other hand, arrogance and certainty, can also give rise to a sort of fascist 
sentiment; this is, in effect, the question of the role of the intellectual qua activist, or 
vice versa, which is primarily what the seven principles that Foucault outlines address. 
The logic (if one can call it that) behind the ‘playfulness’ of the text is that certainty, 
knowledge, judgment, etc. constitute forms of power, which feed one’s need for identity 
and awareness and can lead to fascist thought and action. Nevertheless, does the 
proscriptive nature of the anti-Oedipal strategy, i.e. reject power, ‘de-individualise’, do 
not retreat into pessimism or nihilism, etc., not create a new intellectual/practical nexus 
and domain that one who does not follow the ‘rules’ would be denied? There do seem 
to be ‘rules’ to the strategy, though the process, essentially, seems to require an 
anarchic mode of life, which could, even then, easily lead one into fascism. This does 
not mean that the entire project should be rejected in favour of something less ‘difficult’, 
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but, rather, that questioning what it means to be ‘anti-fascist’ or ‘anti-power’, and 























































The Empty Place of Power:  




 This chapter focuses, primarily, on Torben Bech Dyrberg’s work, ‘The Circular 
Structure of Power’, and his ‘non-derivative’ conception of power. Dyrber’s theory 
argues that power is, essentially, a phenomenological process that can only be 
understood by challenging and developing our understanding of the concepts of 
subjectivity and social identification. Rather than take for granted that power is 
legitimated by an external, or a priori, authority or legitimating force, power should be 
seen as a purely socio-political process that is manifested in the process/activity of 
subjectification and the interaction of subjects. While none of these processes stand 
on their own, none of them can be said to have been derived from another, as all of 
these processes are concurrent and, in a sense, symbiotic. The purpose behind 
rejecting a derivate conception of power is to reject the idea that power is a causal 
and, effectively, tyrannical force that is utilised primarily to control, manipulate and 
create exploitative relations. Dyrberg’s account of power clarifies the motives and 
foundation of a myriad of social phenomenon that are typically branched under the 
concept of ‘power’ and ‘control’, but cannot, themselves, be explained adequately by 














II. The Empty Place of Power 
…Dyrberg rightly reminds us that power is an inescapable feature of human interaction, 
that it is ubiquitous, and that no identities can be formed independently of its effects. This 
is not to say that notions like democracy, the common good or public interest should be 
abandoned. They must instead be rethought in terms of what psychoanalysis helps us to 
envisage as an ‘impossible good’...612 
 
Power and control, in many disciplines, are typically thought of as conceptually 
symbiotic concepts, at least in terms of definition. Control might be considered as 
‘power over’ or as a ‘power to’ or as a sort of order or absence of chaos. Power might 
be thought of as ‘ability to’, ‘capacity’ or ‘control over’ or as an exercise of right or 
freedom. These concepts can be thought of in relation to the self, to others, to objects 
or even in relation to other concepts: power or control over one’s self; over others or 
other things; or even as a power or control over other ideas or concepts, i.e. their 
definitions or ontological status. Self-control, coercion, manipulation, exploitation, 
regulation and similar concepts demonstrate the power/control symbiosis in a 
relatively simple way. Wherever we find power, control follows and vice versa. Are 
there, however, situations or examples where one might be found without the other? 
Is mere stasis a sort of power without control; is a meditative state a sort of control 
that ignores power? Certain theories of power associate the concept with domination, 
control, coercion and the like, but can power exist without the need to dominate, 
control or coerce? If we adopt the view that power is only coercive and manipulative, 
i.e. ‘power/control over’, then how do we explain acts of self-control or self-regulation? 
It is strange to think that one is manipulating oneself when one decides to exercise 
more or to adopt a ‘healthier’ diet, though that may be the case. Having ‘power’ over 
oneself, when referring to self-control or discipline, is also a strange notion, as the 
whole concept of ‘agency’ seems to derive from the fact that one is capable of acting 
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and of deciding what actions to take, generally. To have power over the self, in this 
case, seems redundant or conceptually gratuitous. What does ‘power’, as a theory, 
have to say about self-control and discipline, then? Again, it seems superfluous to 
think of having to tell our ‘selves’ what to do or think, as this process of ‘self-reflection’ 
or ‘self-control’ seems to be a part of the very act of thinking or conversing with one’s 
‘self’, but there is certainly something more there than mere thought or conversation. 
It could be argued that this very process, i.e. the process of self-control/self-discipline, 
is both the ontological and epistemological foundation of the subject, of subjectivity 
itself. To say that power, in the political, and even social, sense, depends on force, 
influence, economy, manipulation and the like, does little to explain the relationship 
between one’s thoughts, one’s behaviour and one’s subjective understanding. The 
problem of subjectivity and the problem of agency can be understood as the problem 
of power; in other words, understanding one concept can lead to an understanding of 
the others, but the process threatens to become recursive. Dyrberg, in his work The 
Circular Structure of Power, attempts to theorise what he calls a “non-derivative 
conception of power”, which argues, essentially, that power is characterised by a 
circular logic, as opposed to a derivative one, and that there exists no “form of external 
authority…from which power might be descend or be legitimated”613; power, then, 
must be understood in situ, which, in this case, means socially. Furthermore, this 
social understanding cannot derive its legitimacy or authority externally, but, rather, “it 
has to structure itself”, which means that this legitimation can only be found in human 
interaction itself. This, in turn, means that it is the social, i.e. human interaction, that 
allows for power and legitimacy to present themselves politically, but it is this very 
same politics that allows for the social to structure itself; hence the ‘circular logic’. The 
 





social lacks, in a sense, objectivity, as it cannot be decided a priori, or prior to the 
political (and vice versa); however, the social does present itself, concretely, in 
subjective identities, as it is the establishing of identities that results from the 
establishment of ‘structures of power and authority’. These identities are not ‘fixed’ 
and must be formed, though this process is never an entirely complete one. Power, 
thus, “has no a priori status” and, as Dyrberg concludes, “the most effective way to 
understand power is to approach it in terms of processes of identification, in the most 
politically undecidable sense of the term”.614 This means that Dyrberg’s theory, as he 
himself puts it: 
…approaches the issue of power by directly addressing metaphysically loaded terms, 
like the subject and identity…there is no other way to understand power itself, or to 
consider the radical consequences that arise from this comprehensive approach, than 
to plunge…into the metaphysical terrain of what power as ability means.615 
 
This means, then, that questions of self-knowledge and the relationship that one has 
with one’s own mind, thoughts and speech are paramount to understanding power, 
psycho-social interaction and even metaphysics, as well as philosophy more 
generally, itself. The question is whether or not venturing into, as Dyrberg calls it, this 
‘metaphysical terrain’ creates further problems that extend too far into philosophical 
genealogy to be truly useful; in other words, Dyrberg’s approaches could potentially 
lead us astray from our ultimate goal, which is an understanding of power and control 
in the context of human interaction. If it is the case, however, that “power adheres to 
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II. The Irreducibility of Power 
 Power, for Dyrberg, is “an irreducible relation or process”, which means that “it 
cannot be derived from any form of social objectivity, such as free will or structural 
determination”; power “adheres to nothing but itself” and is derived from nothing but 
itself.617 This relation or process does not localise around or above society as an 
objective, external arbiter of sorts, but is expressed, rather, as the process of 
subjectivity. Dyrberg argues that though there is really no consensus on how to define 
power, it could be said that “all notions of power entail ‘ability’”; he takes it further, 
however, and argues that since power “must be contextualized in some way in relation 
to the issue of the subject”, then ability should be considered as “a (if not the) defining 
characteristic of subjectivity”.618 The subject, then “has power”, but it is this very idea, 
of possessing or not possessing ‘power’, that raises several issues, “not the least of 
which deals with the question: how do we theorize…the very conditions within which 
ability is made possible, particularly when the concept of agency…is being 
challenged?”619 Attempting to understand power this way forces a confrontation with 
“the metaphysically loaded conceptions of the subject whose ability is…taken for 
granted, in the sense that it precedes the ‘possession’ or ‘dispossession’ of power”.620 
This reveals the essence of Dyrberg’s thesis: questions as to “who has power, how 
they acquired it, how much and under what circumstances” are not prioritised in 
attempting to understand the concept of ‘ability’; understanding how ability is 
“constituted”, on the other hand, is “the proper subject matter for a theory of power 
that does not ground power in something outside itself”.621 Dyrberg’s non-derivative 
conceptualisation of power must, then, “be cast in terms of the constitution of identity”; 
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nevertheless, for Dyrberg, to say that a subject ‘has power’, and to theorise “the very 
conditions of possibility” that give rise to this possession, demands a “certain flirtation 
with a kind of transcendental logic”.622 These conditions are not meant to be 
understood as conditions that are expecting fulfilment or realisation in order to 
manifest themselves, nor should they be understood as the conditions for power: 
rather, it is these conditions, “and the transcendentalism to which they point”, that need 
to be understood “against, or in terms of, the copula: ability is power”.623 An analysis 
of these ‘conditions’ and of said transcendentalism will not lead to an understanding 
of power per se; it is not something to be discovered. Power does not exist as power, 
but it does “make a difference”; in fact, “it is difference” and, according to Dyrberg, it 
is “that which cannot be conceptualized proper”.624 We cannot find nor create, 
objectively, a subject who can then become equipped with power or ‘ability’; a subject 
does not exist independently of ability, for this is the very identity of the subject. The 
subject’s identity, “as well as social and political constructs in general, cannot be taken 
for granted or reduced to the structural positionality of the subject”; a subject’s identity 
“must be studied in terms of an immanent process…in the becoming of identity”.625 
Power is to be conceived of via the process of identification, in the deepest sense of 
the term, and only in this way can we produce its non-derivative understanding. As 
Dyrberg explains: 
…in so far as power derives from something else, say, agency of structure, or a 
combination…the moment of the becoming of identity cannot but presuppose what, in 
fact, needs scrutiny. The conceptualization of power cannot…presuppose the 
objectivity of the social (that the structuring of the social is grounded in, say, 













To seek power outside of the identification process is, in a sense, to already 
fundamentally dismiss it and enter a conceptualisation that almost actively attempts 
to deindividualise ‘the social’; in other words, subjectivity, as a process, is the 
fundamental characteristic of power, if it is not power itself. The utility of such an 
understanding goes beyond simply attempting to understand the power process and 
extends further, into conceptualisation itself.  
 
III. The Ability to Conceptualise 
 Dyrberg does not argue for a “general form of power”, nor for an “infinite set of 
particular types of power”. For Dyrberg, power can exist only “in terms of a ‘forgetting 
of its origins’…a forgetting of itself as ‘pure’ ability”; this is intended to focus on the 
idea that “the nature of ability as the becoming of identity” is, “analytically speaking”, 
“…prior to its particular form and content”.627 He claims that only by accepting his non-
derivative concept of power can we “begin to account for the variety of relations of 
political struggle, and…for the political itself in a non-reductionist way”; as long as 
power “is based in social objectivity, such as agency or structure; and politics is 
conceived merely as a supplement to…an economic or social logic, then power and 
politics are deprived of their means of expression”.628 The “specific nature” of power 
and politics “cannot be accounted for”, so long as they are considered “reducible to 
other logics”.629 In reckoning with the nature of identity and subjectivity itself, it is 
necessary to reckon with the level of explanatory power of politics and power, as 
concepts, and with their own ontological status. It is the ‘becoming of’ of these 
concepts that allows them to express themselves fully and, more importantly, usefully. 
This theorisation forces politics to account for itself at the conceptual level, just as the 
 







subject must account for its own ontology. If power is in all of these concepts, if power 
is all of these concepts, as processes and abilities, then everything becomes, in a 
sense, active and pliable, though political transformation may require significant 
struggle. Dyrberg states that he is not attempting to find a novel ‘defintion’ of power, 
but, rather, to reckon with “the most important underlying problems” that plague its 
conceptualisation and “to consider the consequences of these for political theory”.630 
The key question, here, is what “power as ability entails”, rather than a prioritisation of 
the questions of who has power, how do they obtain it, where is it and why. Such 
questions, according to Dyrberg, “operate on the basis of ready-made assumptions as 
to the basis and nature of power as well as its characteristics”631; Dyrberg considers 
his approach a “’higher order’ conception of power”, since it concerns itself with “how 
power as ability is constituted”.632 Here, we arrive at the essence of Dyrberg’s 
methodology: the transition “from the higher-order to the lower-order level”633 of power 
analysis, which gives rise to several methodological questions. Power analysis 
typically moves from the lower-order to the higher-orderl, in a sort of abductive fashion, 
which leaves the analyst with a series of mistakenly generalised conclusions about 
the nature of power and power relations that may be, at best, merely true 
‘observations’, rather than ‘truths’. As Dyrberg states: 
…power is usually analysed as a causal mechanism, rooted in either agency or 
structure; it both generates and prevents conflicts and consensus; and its vehicle 
typically comprises interests striving to dominate others. When we set out to investigate 
what power is, we are always guided by specific research interests and…in the 
Gadamerian sense…’prejudgements’…634 
 
Dyrberg argues that what are often taken as universalised particular meanings and 











level” and this “hegemonic enterprise in inherently reductionist”; this approach can be 
seen “as a mirror image of the prevailing assumption that power in general, and 
political power in particular, connotes repression in one way or another”.635 It could 
even be said, then, that the method of analysis has a very conspicuous effect on one’s 
ultimate conceptualisation of power. This may seem an uncontroversial statement, but 
praxis often takes priority over method in certain disciplines and approaches and that 
seems to be exactly what Dyrberg is arguing against; promoting, instead, a direct leap 
into higher-order and metaphysical inquiry. With power analysis, he claims that a 
“higher-order level of analysing power looks at the ongoing processes of the 
constitution of identity into which particular strategies insert themselves in order to 
give these processes form and content”; these lower-order level strategies, however, 
“can never fill in, or fully domesticate, ability as such”.636 A “constitutive or irreducible 
gap” exists between these two levels, “between part and whole”; if this is not 
acknowledged, Dyrberg claims, then “the conception of power becomes inevitably 
reductionist because the part is hegemonizing the whole, and its opposite, the whole 
is reduced to the part”.637 He states that his aim is “to figure out what can be said 
about power at the higher-order level”, which makes it his task to see “how the higher-
order structure of power conditions, and can be traced in, the lower-order structures”; 
he is concerned solely with “how [the two levels] are built into each other, and what 
this means for the constitution of identity”.638 Dyrberg analyses the “higher-order 
structure of power” as “an immanent condition for the lower-order structuring of power” 
and this means that, since the higher-order level of power deals with power “as such” 
and the lower-order level deals with “the particular forms and contents of power”, then 
 








the lower level must be contingent upon the higher level.639 The lower level must, then, 
conform to the higher and uphold this structure of power as “the ability to make a 
difference”; power must be non-derivative and we neither “can nor should…make any 
assumptions as to what power as such is” and it must remain “an empty place”.640 In 
other words, power “is and must remain an unspecified and open-ended process of 
identification in which identity is becoming what it is”; it is this “empty place” that, in 
the process of triggering effects at the lower level, becomes what Dyrberg terms “an 
‘absence incorporated’”.641 It is, effectively what ability must come up against as it 
structures itself, meaning that it guides the process of subjectivity by triggering it, in 
the first place. This approach serves to ‘democratise’ power, in that it does not impose 
the universal onto the particular, but, here, the universal is never attained, as power 
is never a ‘finished’ concept. As Dyrberg states: 
The empty place of power, the site of ability as such, is always ‘present’ as an 
ontological condition and possibility, which is why power cannot ever be exhaustively 
explained or definitively mastered by any political institution.642 
 
IV. Authority and Society 
Political authority can…be seen as a power which has managed to universalize itself 
spatially and temporally. A political authority can legitimize itself by, for example, 
inventing a mythical origin – as in social contract theory where authority is deduced 
from the proposition of autonomous and rational individuals. (125) 
 
It could be argued, given Dyrberg’s claims, that political authority is political power 
taken beyond itself; beyond the limits of power. However, limits themselves are both 
an effect and cause of power, which means that moving ‘beyond’ said limits would be 
natural to such an understanding of power. This move is the ‘universalisation’ of 
power; a totality that is expressed “spatially and temporally”. Political struggles, 
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identities of “forms of life”. When limits clash, then an expansion occurs; this 
expansion occurs across many terrains, whether they be biological, social or physical. 
Authority wishes to account for these terrains, though they can neither be accounted 
for, predicted nor easily ‘mapped out’, at least in a ‘totalising’, or ‘universalising’, 
sense. Dyrberg describes authority as “universalized power”, as a “cluster of power 
relations which has occupied the place of the political” and has become “the vehicle 
and symbol for the social structuring of social relations”. The difference between ‘the 
political’ and ‘the authoritative’, then, is that to the extent that the political is protean in 
its expression and both a cause and effect of new social realities, the authoritative 
gives claim to all of this. In other words, authority is all expressions of the political and 
it is finished. This means that anything that ‘appears’ novel can be explained, because 
it is a result of something prior and is merely a reconfiguration of ‘facts’. The universal, 
in the ‘naturalist’ sense, admits novelty only if it can be integrated with previously 
admitted novelties and incorporated into a totalised incorporation of reality. As Dyrberg 
puts it: 
Political authority is…a power strategy which, by virtue of particularizing all other power 
strategies, attains a ‘universal’ status. Political authority attains this status because it 
is the overdetermined expression of power: the point of condensation where the 
particularity of power turns into its opposite by embodying universality. 
 
Every ‘thing’, in the individual sense, is determined and, in fact, ‘overdetermined’, by 
the whole; in the context of the social, a way of life is ‘determined’ because it is 
legitimate in the eyes of a social authority, i.e. the state, the church, etc., but ‘ways of 
life’ are overdetermined in the sense that all possible ways of life are already 
delineated (as vague as that delineation may be) by the rules of said authority. An 
authority must account for what is, but also for what is not or for what is not yet. The 
‘social’, then, is not something that is ‘up for debate’; it cannot be contested, nor, like 





through various methods of discovery and epistemologies, can come to be known by 
us. Authority, however, is the result of a number of struggles, be they ideological, 
political or social. If it is a question of locating the origin of society in a social authority, 
say the state, then how is it possible to distinguish between the two if, for example, 
one claims that a precondition for the state is a social order? Even the very constitution 
of an authority is a struggle; a struggle which is concurrent with the struggles that it is 
meant to totalise. Dyrberg criticises political authority for claiming to be a power 
strategy that is above all other power strategies; its task is to establish “some form of 
order”, which, in the end, becomes an ordering and delimitation of power itself. He 
claims that power “is immanent in social relations not as their hidden and enigmatic 
substance…but as their limits” and he understands these limits as “points of 
recurrence and stumbling blocks that throw subjects into games of signification and 
identification”. Power, then, comes before the subject, or could even be said to be “the 
political constitution of identity” itself. In other words, in contradistinction to authority, 
power is, effectively, without limit, but must be given limits in order to be rendered 
intelligible. Objectivity, for example, is a subjectively understood concept, or ‘reality’, 
but is meant to understood as something that does or would exist independently of 
any subjectivity. Objectivity, like order, authority and the like, is meant to exist beyond 
and before its own constitutional elements, but such an explanation quickly threatens 













The Metaphysics of Power:  
Power Beyond Biopolitics 
 
I. Introduction 
 This chapter will explore the inception and the evolution of the concept of 
‘biopolitics’. This will be done, mainly, by focusing on the work of Thomas Lemke, 
whose book ‘Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction’ pretends to be the first introduction 
to the subject. Lemke argues that biopolitics, ultimately, aims “at the administration and 
regulation of life processes on the level of populations” and that it “focuses on living 
beings rather than on legal subjects” or, rather, that “it deals with legal subjects that 
are at the same time living beings”. Lemke, then, follows a “relational and historical 
notion” of biopolitics, rather than a “naturalist and politicist” understanding, which was 
first proposed by Foucault. This means that biopolitics represents the emergence of a 
“specific political knowledge” and of novel disciplines such as: “statistics, demography, 
epidemiology, and biology”.  This essay will run through Lemke’s understanding of 
Foucault’s work, to Agamben and Hardt and Negri’s development of Foucault’s 
biopolitics, to an analysis of the ‘mode of politics’ that distinguishes biopolitics from 
‘classical’ forms of ‘politics’ and an understanding of what the ‘substance of life’ means 
in a biopolitical world. Lemke then addresses the notion that biopolitics cannot be 
separated from the economisation of life, which incorporates the concepts of an 
“economy of humans”, proposed by Goldscheid, “vital politics”, promoted by German 
liberals after WWII, and “the theory of human capital”, which was proposed by the 
Chicago School. Finally, Lemke takes all the developments that followed Foucault’s 
biopolitics and integrates them into an “analytics of biopolitics” and he shows how this 







II. The Metaphysics of Power 
An analytics of biopolitics should investigate the network of relations among power 
processes, knowledge practices, and modes of subjectivation. Accordingly, it is 
possible to distinguish three dimensions of this research perspective…643 
 
For Thomas Lemke, defining ‘biopolitics’ is not a “value-free activity that follows 
a universal logic of research”; meaning that even establishing a definition for the term 
would only be one step in understanding it. He admits that the term clearly, and 
literally, “denotes a politics that deals with life”, but that even this understanding brings 
with it a series of problems: among them, how to define ‘life’, ‘politics’ and ‘biological 
life’; as well as what politics should and should not deal with or contain. What, then, is 
biopolitics? Lemke argues that biopolitics involves a “network of relations among 
power processes, knowledge practices, and modes of subjectivation”; this means that 
biopolitics deals with three ‘dimensions’: first, a “systematic knowledge of “life” and of 
“living beings”; second, an understanding of how “strategies of power mobilize 
knowledge of life and how processes of power generate and disseminate forms of 
knowledge”; and, finally, “forms of subjectivation”, which deals with “the manner in 
which subjects are brought to work on themselves, guided by scientific, medical, 
moral, religious, and other authorities and on the basis of socially accepted 
arrangements of bodies and sexes”.644 Why is this important, however? Why the need 
to distinguish biopolitics from politics ‘proper’?  
 
II. Biopolitics 
Lemke argues that over the centuries, not only has “the importance of “life” for 
politics” increased, but, also, the “definition of politics has thereby been 
transformed”.645 Biopolitics allows for a rapport between “domains that are usually 
separated by administrative, disciplinary, and cognitive boundaries”. As Lemke states: 
 
643 Lemke, Thomas. Biopolitics. 119 
644 Ibid, 119-120. 





…categorical divisions between the natural and the social sciences, body and mind, 
nature and culture lead to a blind alley in biopolitical issues. The interactions between 
life and politics cannot be dealt with using social-scientific methods and research 
models alone. The analysis of biopolitical problems necessitates a transdisciplinary 
dialogue among different cultures of knowledge, modes of analysis, and explanatory 
competences.646 
 
It is also not enough to deal with biopolitical questions in an ‘isolated’ manner; in other 
words, one cannot adequately analyse the “medical, political, social, and scientific 
aspects” of biopolitical questions independently. Biopolitics needs, though it is a 
‘challenge’, to be presented as “part of a greater context”: a context that “contains 
numerous divisions in the form of empirical facts that could be explained historically 
and perhaps overcome or at least shifted in the future”.647 Biopolitics must also be, 
fundamentally, a ‘critical’ enterprise; it must show that ‘biopolitical phenomena’ are 
“grounded in social practice and political decision-making”, as opposed to resulting 
from “anthropologically rooted drives, evolutionary law, or universal political 
constraints”; said phenomena are not assigned to a “necessary logic”, but, rather, “are 
subject to specific and contingent rationalities” and they “incorporate institutional 
preferences and normative choices”.648 An “analytics of biopolitics” must then “reveal 
and make tangible” the myriad “restrictions…contingencies…demands and 
constraints, that impinge upon it”.649 Critique, here, must be understood as a 
“productive and transformative, rather than negative or destructive” process; there is 
no promise of “an ultimate and objective representation of reality” that is “based on 
universal claims of scientific knowledge”, but, instead, it “critically assesses its own 
claims and exposes its own particularity, partiality, and selectivity”.650 This analytics is 
not founded on “authoritative knowledge”, but, rather, has an “ethicopolitical 











sense of an ultimate, final truth, but must be empirically adaptable. Biopolitical critique 
cannot result in the prioritisation of “some general normative preferences”, instead of 
offering critical empirical analysis; meaning that it cannot end, simply, in newer, either 
more general or more specific, ‘ultimate’ conclusions (not matter how ‘radical’ these 
may be), if these conclusions are not themselves self-critical in nature and adaptable. 
Lemke argues against the “institutional and discursive dominance of bioethics”, as 
said dominance has limited the scope of political and social debate and discussion, 
as it is “mainly conducted in ethical terms and as an argument about values”. 
Bioethics, in a sense, seems to naturalise the relationship between biology and politics 
and to draw ethical and ethico-normative conclusions from said relationship. 
Biopolitics attempts to present us with the “epistemological and technological 
foundation of life processes and their integration into power strategies and processes 
of subjectivation”, as opposed to bioethics, which deals in “abstract choices” and “no 
examination of who possesses (and to what degree) the material and intellectual 
resources...to use specific technological or medical options”. Bioethics, in a sense, 
can be seen as a biopolitical ‘problem’; it is obscuring the ‘empirical elements’ of 
certain debates in order to ‘frame them’ in a different light and both result and process 
are specifically biopolitical contentions. Bioethics does not take into account the socio-
politico-economic constraints and variables that affect a person’s ability to actually 
make ‘bioethical’ decisions or to “take advantage of the options that, in principle, are 










 III. An Analytics of Biopolitics 
Bioethics focuses on the question, what is to be done? It reduces problem to 
alternatives that can be treated and decided...An analytics of biopolitics opens up new 
horizons for questioning and opportunities for thinking, and it transgresses established 
disciplinary and political borders.651 
 
 Bioethics is methodologically opposed to biopolitics, as Lemke understands it. 
It is reductionist, dialectical and specific. Biopolitics, on the other hand, deals in the 
production of problems, in “questions that have no yet been asked” and in answers 
that can, and must, be questioned. It highlights “all those historical and systematic 
correlations that regularly remain outside the bioethical framework and its pro-contra 
debates”. While bioethics is a prescriptive discipline, biopolitics is a creative one; one 
that, through problematisation, “links a diagnostics of the contemporary with an 
orientation to the future”. At the same, biopolitics operates subversively, destabilising 
“apparently natural or self-evident modes of practice and thought”. It invites us, as 
Lemke puts it, to “live differently”. Thus, it is a fundamentally “speculative and 
experimental” enterprise: “it does not affirm what is but anticipates what could be 
different”. Biopolitics, then, favours, and even produces, uncertainty, experimentation, 
speculation and imagination. It respects, equally, both theory and praxis, while 
expressing, and demanding, an inherent irreverence towards both. The beauty of an 
analytics of biopolitics, then, is that it invites all disciplines (biology, sociology, political 
science and philosophy, in particular) to question, speculate, experiment, innovate and 
change, fundamentally. This Protean innovation should lead, ideally, to a more 
accurate science or discourse; not ‘accurate’ in a strict scientific sense, but accurate 
in a biographical, phenomenological way. An example of such a shift could be a move 
towards a new type of biology, or biography, that integrates rigorous biotechnological 
and medical research with biographical and phenomenological experience. An 
 





analytics of biopolitics has, effectively, no limit to its scope; modern biotechnology and 
medicine has put even our living in thraldom to death, disease and time into question. 
When even the very limits of life are thrown into question, the only question one can 
ask if: where do we go from here? 
 
IV. Nature, Reinvented 
Foucault’s concept of biopolitics remains bound to the notion of an integral body. His 
analyses of disciplinary technologies which are directed at the body, in order to form 
and fragment it, are based on the idea of a closed and delimited body. By contrast, 
biotechnology and biomedicine allow for the body’s dismantling and recombination to 
an extent that Foucault did not anticipate.652 
 
 Lemke highlights several authors who have questioned the limits of Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of biopolitics. These theorists question not only the limits of biology, 
politics and biopolitics, but also the limits of our conceptualisations of nature, life, 
death, ontology and epistemology.  Several scientific theorists have suggested 
that, with regard to biotechnologies, genetic mapping and engineering and the like, 
biotechnology and biomedicine, as a whole, represent a paradigmatic shift from 
“traditional forms of bioscientific and medical intervention” to a novel, and 
reprogramming, form of bioscience. This bioscience seeks to “reprogram” biological 
processes, as opposed to “merely” modifying them. This “political epistemology of life” 
is not concerned with a “control of external nature”, but, rather, “the transformation of 
inner nature”; biology, then, is “no longer...a science of discovery that registers and 
documents life processes but rather...a science of transformation that creates life and 
actively changes living organisms”. This is not merely an epistemological concern; 
such a conception of biology has ontological and metaphysical ramifications, as well. 
A naturalist view of biology would argue that there are objective, intellectually-
independent truths and realities that we must discover and learn to recognise; 
 





normatively, there are even general principles, rules and laws that we can observe or 
come to know, via certain epistemological methods. This ‘new’ biology, however, 
argues that we are not the subjects of nature, nor, more radically, of any sort of 
external, anthropologically independent reality, but, instead, that we are capable of 
creating new ‘natures’, new ‘realities’ and, most importantly, new ‘biologies’. This new 
conception of biology raises all sorts of political, social and philosophical questions 
and concerns, but, primarily, it problematises humanity, more generally. 
 
V. Thanatopolitics 
...”human material” transcends the living person. The person who dies today is not 
really dead...Death can be part of a productive circuit and used to improve and extend 
life. The death of one person may guarantee the life and survival of another.653 
 
 New biotechnologies and biomedicines, as mentioned in the section above, 
have created “a new relationship between life and death”. Death is not necessarily the 
end of the life of a human organism; this person “lives on, at least potentially”, as parts 
of them may continue to exist within others. “Cell...organs, blood, bone marrow” and 
the like, can all be transplanted to someone else’s body and either improve that 
person’s quality of life or spare them from death, entirely. The “organic materials of 
life”, as Lemke puts it, are not “subordinate to the same biological rhythms as the body 
is”: said materials “can be stored as information in biobanks or cultivated in stem cell 
lines”. The elements, or ‘materials’, of life have become completely separated from 
what has traditionally, or naturalistically, been described as ‘life’, in the biological 
sense. Death is no longer as ‘simple’ as it once was; it has become “flexible and 
compartmentalized”: developments such as the introduction of “brain death”, “the 
development of reanimation technologies” and “the splitting of death into different 
regions of the body and moments in time” have allowed for “transplantation medicine” 
 





to flourish. The concept of human life is defined and conceptualised from beginning to 
end more so by “medical-administrative authorities” than by “state sovereignty”, now. 
Thanatopolitics, the politics of death, is now “an integral part of biopolitics”, but in “an 
entirely new sense”. The medical-administrative evolution and development of death 
is certainly revolutionary and has, in fact, allowed for new biotechnological and 
biomedical innovations that would have seemed like science-fiction not too long ago, 
but this should not distract from the power that so-called ‘state sovereignty’ has over 
the lives, and deaths, of billions of people, on a global scale. Biology is changing the 
way that we look and life and death in a sanitary, controlled and scientific sense, but 
modern warfare has changed the way that we look at the living and the dead in a very 
raw, visceral, emotional, yet, for the most part, entirely ‘digital’ sense. Modern warfare 
has turned the average citizen into an enemy combatant and the enemy combatant 
into a pixelated, virtual opponent, ready to be exterminated at the push of a button or 
the click of a mouse. The state need not necessarily define, originate nor terminate 
life, in order to decide on those very same matters. Modern policing, too, has impacted 
the state’s relationship with life and death. The decision-making power of law 
enforcement has become such that an officer is allowed to judge whether an individual 
or group is a threat to either said officer or the public-at-large, based on very little to 
no evidence. This decision-making power, both in terms of law enforcement and 
modern warfare, though not quite as revolutionary as new forms of biology, does, 
certainly, represent a paradigmatic shift in the state’s relationship with its constitutive 
elements, i.e. citizens (and, now, corporations). Humans, as much as we may be able 
to modify them emotionally, psychologically/intellectually or genetically before or after 
death, have become, in the eyes of the military-industrial complex and the police state, 





This is, in a much different and, perhaps, more immediate sense, thanatopolitics: the 
power to decide who lives and who dies, or who should live or die, is a very 
complicated form of power that still remains in the hands of very few. The courts, the 
boardrooms and different law-making bodies all make these decisions, though they 
may not be expressed in thanapolitical terms. Decisions concerning abortion laws, 
healthcare, social security, wages, social housing and benefits, public transport and 
the like are all thanatopolitical decisions, though they may not ‘immediately’ seem to 
be. This is not even necessarily akin to, as Lemke interprets it, Agamben’s biopolitics, 
which is “above all “thanatopolitics”: “death as the establishment and materialization 
of a boundary...”. Thanatopolitics, here, is, to a certain extent, death as a promise, as 
a threat and as a bargaining chip. The questions that the state asks, whether indirectly 
or otherwise, are: do you want to die (as a threat); how do you want to die; and would 
you like to do for something? The first question relates both to the state as benefactor, 
as giver of life, and to the state as executioner, as dealer of death. It relates to social 
benefits, welfare and security and the idea that the state is merciful and responsible 
for its citizens well-being. The purpose of the state is to serve all of its citizens. As 
executioner, however, the state deals in order, justice and rule; this, too, nevertheless, 
is for the well-being of its citizens, so that they will be safe, learn to keep others safe 
and to keep the promised harmony of the state, i.e. the state itself, safe. The second 
question relates to the inevitability of death and to the acceptance of death as a 
guaranteed end, but, on the other hand, a limited amount of control over this inevitable 
and inexorable conclusion, whether that control be ‘real’ or illusory. This corresponds 
to different institutions, careers, ways of life and the like that the state promotes and 
supports, either in principle or financially, which promise a better standard of living/life 





decisions concerning whether or not one wishes to live or die, if we consider death as 
the limit to all of our choices, and life as said limit’s rival and antagonist (as that which 
will delay it), then quality of life, standard of living and other social metrics are 
paramount to the state’s thanatopolitical agenda. The third question, then, 
corresponds to the purpose that the state can give, or take away from, life, which can 
even come via death. This purpose is offered, again, by institutions and careers that 
the state promotes or supports, again, either in principle or financially, which promise 
to give a meaning and purpose to human life that it would not otherwise have (e.g. the 
military, legislator, judge, law enforcement, the church, etc.). These institutions utilise 
death, and life, to their advantage, by either weaponising it or glorifying and exalting 
it. The military is, in fact, the best example of this, as it takes both the threat of death 
(war) and the promise of new life (peace), weaponises these ideas, and then ties them, 
generally, to religious or philosophical doctrine. This ‘purpose’, or ‘higher purpose’, 
that is given to life is then defended to the death. The state, then, offers death as a 
threat, as a weapon, as a promise, as leverage and as a purpose.  
 
VI. Anthropopolitics 
 Lemke outlines another critique that has been levied against Foucault’s 
biopolitics: it is “exclusively oriented to human individuals and populations”. Such an 
orientation does not allow for the inclusion of “ecological problems” and “the 
environmental discourse” into discussion concerning the “(re)production of the human 
species”. Paul Rutherford, who raises this point, suggests expanding the “semantic 
field” to “allow the concept of biopolitics to stand for the administration and control of 
the conditions of life”; meaning that anything relevant to human life, and its success or 
failure, would have to be incorporated into the biopolitical discourse. Another problem, 





that qualify as “social actors”; only their actions can be considered as relevant to the 
discourse. Gesa Lindemann’s response to this is the suggestion of a “reflexive 
anthropology” , which asks “who is empirically included within the circle of social 
persons” and, more importantly, who or what can have agency. Bruno Latour 
suggests, similarly, a “symmetrical anthropology”, which “conceives of both human 
and nonhuman entities as capable of action” and, consequently, as participants in 
biopolitical discourse. Latour and Lindemann’s “theoretical contributions”, as well as 
others, move biopolitics towards an “anthropopolitics”: a “new field of research 
that...investigates which entities, under what conditions, can become members of 
society and which cannot”. These reconceptualisations of biopolitics serve to give us 
a wider array of tools and questions that we can utilise to confront dilemmas such as 
how to approach our relationship with the environment and with other animals and 
how to survive, as a species (if we want to call it that), in the face of changing 
conditions that threaten said survival. Anthropopolitics also serves, to a certain extent, 
the needs and concerns of non-human animals and organisms, which are, for the most 
part, widely absent from most forms of mainstream political discourse. Green parties 
and policies that concern environmental conservation and the like are certainly steps 
in this general direction, but granting a sort of anthropological status to non-human 
entities is a much more radical and, arguably, a far more effective move towards 
dealing with wanton environmental and ecological destruction and change. 
Anthropopolitics is an example of the radical and critical nature of biopolitics itself: 
instead of questioning how animals should be treated vis-à-vis human cohabitation 
and coexistence, biopolitics debates whether or not nonhuman animals should be 
granted the same legal and ethical considerations as humans and, furthermore, 






In the future this new genetics will cease to be a metaphor for modern society and will 
become instead a circulation network of identity terms and restriction loci around which 
and through which a truly new type of autoproduction will emerge, which I call 
“biosociality”. If sociobiology is culture considered on the basis of a metaphor of nature, 
then in biosociality, nature will be modeled on culture understood as practice.654 
 
 Paul Rabinow’s concept of biosociality pretends to be “an extension of 
Foucault’s biopolitical problematic”. It theorises that a “new articulation” of the 
concepts of “body and population”, as Foucault understood them, has emerged “from 
the Human Genome Project” and all of the “biotechnological innovations” that have 
been derived from it. A “new disciplinary order” has emerged; one that has overcome 
“the strict division between nature and culture” and has introduced “a new 
understanding of social relationships through biological categories”. The question is 
how, given all of the knowledge that genetic research has ‘given’ us, we are going to 
continue to refer to and understand our own selves in light of this new information. 
Rabinow argues that given this genetic knowledge, “new individual and collective 
identities” shall articulate themselves. As “genetic information spreads” and becomes 
popular, “people will describe themselves and others in bioscientific and genetic 
terminology” and “biomedical vocabulary” will become integrated into popular 
language. In other words, people will begin to describe themselves as genetically 
predisposed to this or that or as genetically at risk for something, instead of through 
the use of more popular medical terms, as said knowledge increases and becomes 
more renown. This is reminiscent of Quine’s argument that epistemology, as a 
naturalised science, would, one day, allow people to describe things such as moods 
and behaviours in terms of the chemical processes taking place in the brain and the 
body, instead of terms of emotion or feeling, which is not as empirically relevant.655 
 
654 Ibid, 97. 






656Rabinow’s thesis, however, goes “even further”; he argues that these biotechnical 
innovations and new “scientific classification systems” create: 
...the material conditions for new forms of socialization, representational models, and 
identity politics, whereby knowledge about specific bodily properties and genetic 
characteristics decisively determine the relationship of the individual to her- or himself 
and to others...657 
 
Rabinow argues that “the experience of illness forms the basis of a field of diverse 
social activities”; the “groups of people” that experience illness, as well as “their 
families”, work “with medical experts”, as opposed to working for them. These groups 
advance studies and research “targeted at their needs”, as well as building “networks 
of communication” that influence both medical community and the public-at-large. In 
other words, pathological knowledge creates “new forms of community and collective 
identity”. Furthermore, this knowledge, or, rather, the popularisation of this knowledge, 
“results in a demand for rights based on biological anomalies and in hitherto unknown 
forms of political activism”; these have discussed as creating a new sort of “biological” 
or “genetic citizenship”. The result is the articulation of a “systematic connection 
between biomedical knowledge, concepts of identity and selfhood, and modes of 
political articulation”. The individual and collective identities that are formed around 
advancements in pathological knowledge “represent new collective subjects that 
remove the borders between laypeople and experts” and “between active researchers 
and the passive beneficiaries of technological progress”. Biosociality is, effectively, a 
ver concentrated version of the biopolitical project, as it fuses epistemology, 
subjectivation and political action into, essentially, a new mode of life. Identity based 
around pathology or abnormality of some sort is not a novel concept, but what is novel 
is the way that, in biosociality, it is the person, and people, suffering, who, to a certain 
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extent, is allowed to express and define their own experience. This may seem, at first, 
a bit of a naïve conclusion, since it will always be those experts who have a 
background and expertise in biotechnologies, biomedicine, biogenetics and the like, 
who will have the most authoritative say on how genetic matters are dealt with and, 
for certain reasons, it would be difficult to argue against this naturally being the case. 
However, biosociality has also introduced new forms of political activism that are 
organised “around shared political attributes”, three of which are discussed by Lemke. 
The first form is lobbying, which works to “increase public interest” and “to attract state 
funding for research projects” that serve the cause of the lobbyists. The second form 
is a struggle “again material or ideological restrictions to gain access to medical 
technologies and bioscientific knowledge”, while the third is the participation of “self-
help groups and patient organizations” in “ethics committees and parliamentary 
deliberations, as well as the drafting of guidelines for the regulation of technological 
procedures”. These groups fight the restrictive nature of copyright, intellectual property 
and patents “in the domain of biomedical and genetic research”. The less restrictive 
access to this knowledge is, of course, the more accessible medicines and treatments, 
as well as public sensitisation, becomes. If said knowledge is in the hands of a few 
biogenetic or biomedical companies, then it is more than likely that these companies 
will seek to profit off of this information, as opposed to making it available to anyone, 
irrespective of their economic means. Lemke states that very few studies have been 
done concerning this “biopolitics from below”, but it is clear that knowledge and 
information, and their swift proliferation via social media and other forms of media, can 
quickly mobilise certain individuals and groups, particularly those that have something 
vital, and personal, at stake. Lemke also notes, however, that these struggles are not 





the protection “of a particular genetic profile...shared only by a few”. This, as Lemke 
puts it, “complicates the political articulation of rights”, as “the accent is placed more 
on genetic difference than on a common biological identity”. Again, political 
movements, actions and struggles based in genetic difference or representation are 
nothing novel, but have, historically, led to war, genocide and transgenerational 
conflict. Here, the difference is that they are based around pathological identity and 
biological anomaly, as opposed to some genetically discriminatory ideology. This may 
be a fear that some have, however, concerning struggles that are based around 
genetically determined identities, as policy changes could very well lead to new, 
genetically-motivated lobbying for causes that are either not widely supported, morally 
questionable, discriminatory or a combination of all of these.  
 
VIII. Ethopolitics 
If discipline individualizes and normalizes, and biopower collectivizes and socializes, 
ethopolitics concerns itself with the self-techniques by which human beings should 
judge themselves and act upon themselves to make themselves better than they 
are....658 
 
 Nikolas Rose, like Rabinow, believes that advances in biotechnology and 
biogenetics, as well as “genetic knowledge”, more generally, have dissolved “the 
traditional boundary between biology and society” and that “recourse to a pre- or 
extrapolitical nature is blocked”, which means that “biology cannot be separated from 
political and moral questions”. Rose calls this synthesis, “ethopolitics”. Rose wants to 
distinguish today’s genetics from the genetics of the past, as the “biopolitical frame of 
reference, as well as biopolitical forms of regulation”, are now different. The human 
genetics of today is directed “at the genetic makeup of the individual” and not “at the 
body of the population”, which distinguishes it from the eugenic projects of the past 
century. Genetic intervention, today, is less concerned with “the health of the public at 
 





large” and more concerned with how to “improve the health of individuals and...help 
them avoid illness”; instead of the extreme and repressive methods of the past, we not 
see a “variety of strategies that...identify, treat, manage...administer those individuals, 
groups, or localities where risk is seen to be high”. These strategies, however, do not, 
ultimately, only focus on “specific, limited subpopulations”, but, rather, all “members of 
society are affected to the extent that everyone is predisposed to genetic risk”. The 
idea of ‘health’ becomes relative and time-specific, as the “risk discourse” is 
broadened to include those are healthy, at the time, and to submit them “to the same 
medical monitoring as the sick in order to anticipate and...prevent future illnesses”; 
Rose understands this expansion as the “democratization of biopolitics”. Medical 
decision-making, now, is characterised, to a certain extent, by “autonomy and self-
determination”, as socialised “forms of regulation” have been dismantled and 
“neoliberal programs and policies” have been established, which has resulted in 
individuals taking medically preventative measures into their own hands. Since the 
nature of the body appears to have changed, due to novel means of bioscientific 
intervention, people now view it as more important than ever in determining “individual 
identity and self-perception”; the body is now “malleable, correctable, and improvable”, 
irrespective of how much ‘health’ an individual enjoys at any given time, as this could 
change at any moment. Gone are “the boundaries between the normal and the 
pathological...between healing and enhancement” and a new “set of ethical and 
political questions is emerging” that has the taken the place of the biopolitics of the 
before. The human body, then, the individual as a collection of organic material and 
possessor of thoughts and behaviours, is fully modifiable and ethopolitics is 
characterised by a “vital constructivism” that questions the concept of an “original, 





the past; ethopolitics is “vital politics”. There are two ways, in a general sense, that 
such a politics can go: on the positive side,  the antinaturalism and antiessentialism of 
ethopolitics allows individuals the possibility to “creatively make the best of 
transformative possibilities”, through “deep ethical reflection that includes concerns 
about biological constitution, as well as concepts of identity and how one wishes to 
live”. Biology was, before, only fact and it is, now, possibility; it has gone from being 
an “immutable” field to a politics that is concerned with “creating individual and 
collective potentials”. On the negative side, these new possibilities and potential 
threaten to create new opportunities for exploitation, capital gain and control. These 
new life processes can, and will be, commercialised, which “puts research in thrall to 
the profit motive, and to the development of new forms of social inequality and 
exploitation”. In addition to this, ethopolitics brings about “new institutional 
expectations and social norms” that create the need for a sort of “genetic 
responsibility”; said responsibility is taken on by those who deem themselves fit to do 
so and believe that they can best ‘solve’ ethopolitical dilemmas and existential 
questions. “Physicians, bioethicists, genetic counselors, scientists, and 
representatives of pharmaceutical enterprises and biotech companies” work to 
popularise “scientific knowledge, disseminate value judgments, and guide moral 
reflection”. A person’s striving towards “health and wellness”, then, becomes “closely 
allied with political, scientific, medical, and economic interests”. Ethopolitics threatens 
to allow life itself to fall into the hands of experts, both pseudo and qualified, instead 
of allowing for the dissemination and flourishing of genetic knowledge and research, 
on a global, yet individual, scale. Lemke points out two criticisms that have been levied 
against Rose’s conceptualisation of ethopolitics. The first is that Rose is wrong in 





constructivism of ethopolitics. Lene Koch argues that “processes of exclusion and 
selection” in “genetic and reproductive technologies” do not belong to the past, but, 
rather, that only the “forms of intervention and modes of justification” have changed; 
the “fundamental objective” of these biotechnological and biogenetic developments 
remains the same: “guiding and controlling reproductive decisions”. The second 
criticism is that it is not clear “to what extent biopolitics merges with ethopolitics”. Bruce 
Braun argues that ethopolitics is only possible under certain socio-economic 
conditions, conditions that are not available to “millions around the world who must 
fight every day to survive”. However, even in those states and societies where 
ethopolitics would be meant to flourish, there is, still, a “central dimension of 
contemporary biopolitical practices” that is missing. Ethopolitics does not account for, 
what Braun calls, “biosecurity”; biosecurity “aims to guide biological life and its 
developmental cycles and contingencies”. Braun argues that Rose’s idea of “an 
isolated and stable molecular body” that “provides the foundation for ethical decisions 
and practices of the self” cannot, in fact, exist solely based on these decisions and 
practices, as it can be “counteracted through other perceptions of the body”. A body 
does not exist in isolation; it “interacts with other human and nonhuman bodies and is 
permanently threatened by the risk of disease”. If biological security is not, in a sense, 
accounted for, then no ethopolitical decisions can take place or, at the very least, they 
















A Pure Critique of Power 
 
I. Introduction 
...government refers to a form of power that operates indirectly, by way of actions 
performed by subjects who are ‘led’ by means of the truth...Foucault defines critique 
as a social practice that seeks to escape being led and ‘dominant truths’...His thesis is 
that the generalization and spread of arts of government from the sixteenth century on 
cannot be separated from a correlative moment, which simultaneously limits them and 
poses the condition for their unfolding.. For this reason, the genealogy of governmental 
technology is also a genealogy of critique...659 
 
Michel Foucault is, without question, one of the foremost theorists of power of 
the last century, thought this is not without controversy. As Lemke claims, in Foucault’s 
Analysis of Modern Governmentality, Foucault’s work has a polarising effect in that 
some view it as successful, or, at the very least, while others view it as so problematic 
and fundamentally lacking in theoretical explanatory power that it creates more 
problems than it solves. Lemke argues, in a sense, that both views are actually correct, 
but that the latter view should not actually be considered a ‘fault’. For Lemke, Foucault 
is following a tradition that puts critique above all else in the process of investigation 
and research. Those who defend Foucault’s work claim that his “analysis of power 
continues and promotes projects of social criticism by dismantling hierarchies and 
processes of political domination”; Foucault’s works “afford insight into how power 
works” and they are examples of “’theory as a toolkit’”. He contributed to “critical (self-
) reflection on intellectual labour by stressing the political significance of how 
knowledge is produced, structured and disseminated”. Those who criticise his work 
claim that his work on power “raises an array of epistemo-logical and normative 
questions that it cannot answer satisfactorily”. Not only is Foucault’s “theoretical 
agenda” not suited “to developing a critique of modern power mechanisms”, it actually 
“suspends the possibility...in a substantive fashion”. Foucault’s conception of power is 
so comprehensive that it becomes impossible to even “imagine a society free from its 
 





workings”; it combines two notions: the idea that power is “the condition for the 
existence of society” and that power is “a matter of social asymmetry”. There is an 
“unresolved tension” between what Foucault intends to do, which is to critique, and 
his “neutral conceptualization of power”; this tension produces “paradoxes, 
contradiction and aporias” that do not allow for Foucault “to deliver on the critical 
claims he advances”. Lemke points out three reasons why these paradoxes, 
contradictions and aporias are not actually ‘problems’, in his view, but, rather, part of 
the work itself. First, it is unlikely that Foucault would not notice these ‘deficiencies’ in 
his own work, so, assuming, that he was aware of them and yet refused to change his 
positions, we must, then, ask why this was the case; “what did he want to achieve”? 
Secondly, to point out theoretical inconsistencies or to criticise the lack of self-
reflection in Foucault’s work is, essentially, counterproductive; radical, critical theory 
would not necessarily seek or pretend to conclude with strict, normative and rationally 
coherent frameworks to justify its findings or conclusions. His critics seek normative 
and logical justifications for his claims, yet Foucault himself would not claim to have 
them, and he did so quite explicitly. Such critique, as Lemke points out, “follows a 
rationalistic strategy focused on insufficient theoretical reflection and intellectual 
misprision”. Third, Lemke argues that critics do not arrive at a conclusive or clear 
assessment of Foucault’s politics; while some see him as a conservative, others view 
him as a nihilist, anarchist, Marxist or as a proponent of any number of political 
positions. This proves that there is no generally accepted reading of Foucault’s works, 
at least in political terms, which proves, furthermore, that there exist contradictions 
within the very criticisms levelled against Foucault. If the very critique that cries out for 
logical and theoretical consistency in Foucault’s writing is not itself consistent in its 





fundamentally wrong with the entire critical enterprise. Lemke, as a result of these 
three observations, shifts the critique back against Foucault’s critics and claims to find 
“a host of misunderstandings, misreadings and prejudices”. One of the main problems 
that Lemke finds is that a majority of these critics are operating within “a conception 
of power from which Foucault explicitly sought to distance himself”; their conception 
of power is negative and “focused on constraint, repression, domination” and the like. 
Not only did Foucault wish to “demonstrate the political and historical limitations” of 
this power model, but he also worked with a fundamentally positive conception of 
power. Lemke himself discovers faults and contradictions in his criticism of Foucault’s 
critics: Lemke, at first, wanted to prove that Foucault’s work was not, inherently, 
contradictory and that what he concluded was, in fact true; this, however, is 
fundamentally at odds with Foucault’s own methodology. Lemke ‘discovers’ that the 
contradictions in Foucault’s work are not proof of its deficiency, but, rather, they are 
what make the work theoretically significant and they “define its ‘problematic’”. Many 
critics claim, as Lemke points out, that the reason that Foucault abandoned his work 
on power, to later focus on subjectivation and ethics, was that it was too riddled with 
problems and, ultimately, led to a theoretical “dead end”. Lemke believes that the 
opposite is, in fact, the case: Foucault “turned to processes of subjectivation as the 
result, and due consequence, of his interest in practices of power”. He did not abandon 
any position, so much as he corrected and continued his earlier studies; in fact, “this 
theoretical move bears on the conception of power, above all”. Foucault recognised 
that his own model of “power as strategy”, which he “analysed in terms of struggle, 
war and conquest”, led to a number of problems that this theoretical framework could 
not adequately deal with. Lemke identifies two of these problems: “the relationship 





a critique of the effects of power processes of subjects”, while, at the same time, 
claiming that subjects are “the products of these mechanisms” and that bodies “are 
shaped and ordered” as a result of the ways “in which confining, disciplinary 
institutions produce them”. If power produces subjects, then, it is difficult to understand 
how “’domination’, ‘constraint’ and ‘subjugation’” are still relevant to products of power. 
Foucault holds that the subject is autonomous, but, rather, heteronomous and “subject 
to anonymous strategies of power”; Lemke points out, then, that it is unclear what 
resistance looks like, or whether it even exists, at all. The second problem, that of 
state power, questions how the state can continue to exist given Foucault’s 
development of a “’microphysics of power’” that focuses on “site-specific practices and 
particular institutions”. As Lemke states, “it is not enough to focus on micropolitical 
phenomena and understand the state as a result of social relations of power alone”; 
a “strategic model of power” should, somehow, be able to explain how the state 
supports its own power structures and expresses forms of social domination. These 
problems prove that Foucault had “struck the outer point of what” his “’analytics of 
power’” would allow and that a “change of conceptual framework” had become 
necessary. More analytical tools became necessary in order to examine 
“subjectivation processes as they relate to forms of social domination”, i.e. “’how self-
control is integrated into the practice of controlling others’”. This corresponds to 
Foucault’s shift towards government and governmentality, towards the act itself of 
governance.  
 
II. The Problematic of Government 
As opposed to rule, struggle, law and the like, Foucault “explored power 
relations in terms of ‘conduct’”. He did not simply abandon his genealogy of power 





analytical dimension was meant to resolve the problems created, in the framework of 
an analytics of power, by the relationship between subjectivity and power and the 
nature of state power. The “problematic of government” serves to avoid “the traditional 
separation between micro and macro levels of analysis” by viewing, for example, the 
“’political government’ as practised by the state” as simply “one form of government 
among others”. This new problematic also serves to more fully explain the relationship 
“between governing others...and modes of self-government”, which allows for “a more 
thorough examination of processes of subjectivation”. Lemke claims that the concept 
of government is key to understanding Foucault’s work “as a whole”; the concept 
serves as a “’hinge’ between different aspects of the overall project: it connects 
“strategic power relations and conditions of domination” and allows for Foucault to 
distinguish “between domination and power”; it also connects “power and subjectivity” 
and allows us to see “how techniques of domination connect with ‘technologies of the 
self’”. Lemke remarks on how it is “remarkable how little attention this corrective to the 
analysis of power has received”, but this serves to explain a great deal of the 
misunderstandings and misreadings that Lemke attributes to many of Foucault’s 
critics. Foucault, in his lifetime, was only able to focus on one side of the problematic 
of government, “forms of self-relation”, and was not able to elaborate the concept “in 
the narrower, political sense”. The problematic of government “lends concrete form 
and substance to the categories or critique and resistance in Foucault’s work”; it allows 
for an analysis of the relationship between “power, truth and subjectivity”. His thesis 
argues that power intends to “’lead’ individuals in agreement and cooperation” with a 
truth that this very same power produces. Government is a “specific way of exercising 





as it produces and utilises truth. Government does require “subordination and 
obedience on the part of individuals”, but, rather, it “demands acts of truth”.  
 
III. The Politics of Truth 
The question, then, becomes: how do people govern “(themselves and others) 
by the production of truth”? Foucault would argue that the “political problem” is not so 
much “the untruth of social relations”, which might present itself as oppression, 
prevarication, force, exploitation and the like on the part of others, but, instead, the 
“truth” of social relations: social relations are rational and positive, in any guise, 
seemingly. Critique “that argues by means of contrast and affirms what is right against 
the backdrop of social conditions that are false” fails because of its pretence to truth, 
when what it claims to be false is already truth. Foucault, then, concerns himself with 
a “politics of truth”, as opposed to an “economy of untruth”. This should not be taken 
to assume that Foucault held that truth was ‘relative’, nor that he believed that truth 
was ‘individual’ or ‘voluntary’; Foucault was concerned with cultivating a “’limit-
attitude’” that distanced itself “both from the absolutism of single truth and from efforts 
simply to dissolve it”. The problem with this stance, if it really is a problem, at all, is 
that, because Foucault refuses to play “the ‘game’ of universality and...must occupy a 
position outside of ‘the true’”, then he is open to attack by those who do, in fact, play 
this game; precisely because Foucault’s work “concerns historically variable forms of 
distinguishing between true and false” is it open to the same analysis. It takes, as its 
stance, a critique of the production of true and false distinctions, rather than electing 
one or the other. Foucault’s answer to government was precisely this: critique. 
Critique, not only as act or process, but as “’attitude’ or ‘ethos’”. Critique is defined as 
“both a struggle for truth and a refusal of modes of leadership and conduct”, as 





rationality”. Critique, then, is not “based on knowledge, which it then legitimates”; 
Foucault’s critique is neither ‘legitimate’ nor founded upon anything. It does not make 
itself legitimate “by appealing to law, rights or truth”, but, rather, it self-generates and 
does not censor itself. Foucault problematises critique and formulates questions “that 
others think they have already answered”; Foucault’s contradictions, then, make us 
face “what is not ‘self-evident about the ‘truths’ that supposedly provide the basis for 
performing critique in the first place”. Again, the ‘problem’ with Foucault’s critique is 
that it is not really possible to come to it seeking a solution, an answer or a guide. 
Foucault’s writings can, at most, provide theoretical tools that allow us to ask 
appropriate questions and to frame those questions critically. The problematic of 
critique creates problems, rather than solves them, because to do otherwise is to seek 
government, reason, rule, order and the like, which only come via imposition and truth 
before the fact. Truth can never be attained or known in the way that we typically 
conceive of knowledge; truth requires an epistemology and a consensus that is 
relative to the time: truths are only truths if they are recognised as such. Critique, in 
the way that Foucault understands it, is, in fact, difficult; when one is engaged in this 
form of critique, this ‘critical attitude’, it is not something that, in the logical sense, 
ends. It can be silenced or interrupted, in the case of death, censorship, imprisonment 
and the like, but it can always be taken up again or by others. As Lemke explains: 
Challenging the notion of a logical link between theory and practice, for the sake of 
sketching a form of critique that does not rely on abstract necessity so much as the 
freedom of a practical bearing—however paradoxical it may seem—represents one of 














IV. The Genealogy of Critique 
 
 Lemke explains that government is a form of power that does operate directly; 
it operates “by way of actions performed by subjects who are ‘led’ by means of the 
truth”. Critique, then, as defined by Foucault, is “a social practice that seeks to escape 
being led”, as well as “’dominant truths’”. Critique, however, is not a reactionary or 
antagonistic practice; it is an element “within” practices of government. Government is 
a form of power that “structures the field of subjects’ possible actions through the 
production of truth” and it must, at all time, deal the question of “’true government’”, 
which is the question of “its principles, scope and aims”. Critique, then, is “the act of 
voluntary insubordination” as it relates to “the problem of ‘true government’”: just as 
government must constantly confront its own aims, so too must the subject confront 
the aims of government and confront his or her own aims. We know that many 
philosophers of science, mathematicians and physicians, throughout history, have 
praised parsimony, elegance, purity and the like, as theoretical virtues and as the 
hallmarks of good science. This may, however, be the source of so many of the 
debates, misunderstandings, paradoxes and dilemmas that have plagued science, 
mathematics, physics and biology. The need, the desire, to contain so much within a 
few statements, sentences or proofs. Science has come to admit that even laws are 
finite and subject to change, but, in praxis, laws tend to be regarded as absolute 
notions.  
 
V. The Critical Attitude 
 What does it mean to problematise the truth, to problematise truth or to 
problematise anything? Problematisation, Lemke explains, “is a specific form of 





necessary constraints”. Problematisation does not result, nor begin, in knowledge; it, 
instead, questions the very status of knowledge. Critique, ontologically speaking, 
cannot be considered as “a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of 
knowledge that is accumulating: it has to be conceived as an attitude”. Not every 
attitude is a critical one, however, as critique means “analysing the epistemologico-
political limits of our historical existence—and thereby indicating how they may be 
surpassed”; critique neither affirms nor negates “the standing order”, as its 
problematisations “aim at a deeper, more basic level—the common ground of both 
these ‘solutions’”. Criticism, according to Foucault, consists of an analysis and 
reflection upon “limits”; it is not a rejection, but, rather, an attitude: a “limit-attitude”. It 
is not necessary to base critique “on scientific knowledge”; in fact, “doing so harbours 
a host of dangers and problems”. To seek legitimation within scientific knowledge 
leads to subjugation to “an imperative of knowledge”; an imperative that not only 
censors, but also “rejects whatever does not fulfil established criteria as ‘unfounded’ 
and ‘unjustified’”. This sort of critique is limited in its commitment to “truths”, as it “seeks 
to affirm, against domination and exploitation, a larger truth”, which is also “tied up in 
manifold power relations”. Change and resistance are admitted, in this form of critique, 
as far they “respect human ‘nature’ and the social ‘laws’. Individuals, then, are 
compelled to admit constraints “in order to ‘explain’ universal patterns and laws and 
‘prove’ that resistance must assume a certain form in order to qualify as ‘resistance’ 
at all”. Critique, of the kind described above, is not only self-defeating and 
counterproductive, it also becomes a recursive exercise: as one submits to said 
‘imperative of knowledge’, one will soon wish to free oneself of said submission and 
this critique will continue to occur, without end. Lemke claims that Foucault rejects the 





knowledge”, by defining critique, instead, “as an ethos”; an ethos that does not need 
to find legitimacy in “normative criteria”. It is, in fact, this “normative criteria” that 
critique seeks to throw into question; critique is questioning the very notion of ‘truth’ 
itself, so attaching itself “to a ‘true’ identity” is precisely it is working against. Critique 
is not so much scientific as it is ethical, as it shows us that “we are responsible for the 
‘truths’ that we think, say and perform—and that no theoretical justification can relieve 
us of such responsibility”. Critique as ethos shows us not what we must follow nor 
what constraints we must submit to, but, rather, “possible liberties and starting points 
for resistance”. Lemke points out that the separation between knowledge and critique 
does not mean theory should be abandoned nor that it is not useful. Theory can 
perform the important task of checking “claims to universality” and revealing “elements 
of arbitrariness and contingency within them”; theory, then, that “reflects on its own, 
historical conditions”, functions as a sort of “counter-science” that allows us to change 
social practices “by liberating us from the sovereignty of knowledge and its 
constraints”. Theory does not even justify nor necessitate “liberation and struggle”, but 
can only serve as an instrument for them. Understanding or claiming that “liberation 
and struggle” are important can only come from thinking, saying and performing them 
as ‘truths’, rather than from accepting them as natural truths or gifts of reason. Critique 
that cannot “justify itself through claims to universality and ‘ultimate reason’” can “only 
ever be historical and ‘experimental’; problematisation itself must “always stand open 
to critique” and allow for “(self-) correction”. Foucault must even call his own work into 
question, if he stands by his own ethos. Problematisation becomes, in a sense, a 
meta-critical affair: it becomes necessary to understand “how, and in what context” 
problematisation operates, as well as what “’dangers’ it produces and the possibilities 





to grasp...where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form 
this change should take”. 
 
VI. The Problematic of Critique 
...we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of contemporary 
reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of 
thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the 
most dangerous traditions.661 
 
 Lemke highlights a number of “points of difficulty and weakness” that Foucault’s 
critique contains, as it is the very idea of critique that admits that all critique is 
‘problematic’; any and all claims to certainty are “purely ‘theoretical’”. The first question 
that Lemke asks, with regard to critique as a “’limit-attitude’” is how it is possible to 
claim or argue that “the norms that are implied in certain struggles” are “’more just’ or 
‘better’” than those norms that they are challenging or fighting against? How do 
“conflicting norms” compare and to what rubric or criteria do we hold them to? Lemke 
asks if it is not necessary, “in order to defend our convictions”, whether they be to the 
left or to the right of the political spectrum, “to appeal to the solid foundation of human 
nature and universal values?” This problem, actually, is easier to ‘solve’ than most of 
the others that Foucault’s critique presents. If a person who holds views that are now 
considered to be on the extreme right of the political spectrum, such as the idea that 
transnational immigration should be stopped or that segregation based on skin colour 
should be legal, for example, can use the same tools for justifying their beliefs as a 
scientist or a human rights lawyer can for defending their case, then there is clearly 
something wrong with those tools for justification. If the same religious beliefs that are 
used to justify a genocide or warfare can be used to preach loving one’s neighbour 
and living modestly, then there is, again, something clearly wrong with this doctrine. 
 





Anything that does not allow for modification, revision, improvement, refinement and 
the like could be considered dangerous and geared towards authoritarianism. Lemke 
points out that Foucault’s notion of the problematic of critique does not actually imply 
that it is the only form of critique available to us: problematisation “does not represent 
the ‘correct’ form of critique—one that replaces universalism and inherits its claims”. 
Foucault’s critique operates more in the form of a “suggestion” or “invitation”, rather 
than as a command or prescription; Lemke argues that Foucault suggests grounding 
normative claims in “concrete experiences of (putative) causes of domination and 
exploitation”. When we can see and experience certain states of affair or “practical 
realities” as clearly functioning as “obstacles to a ‘better society’”, then we have no 
need to turn to “theoretical principles” or moral truths to explain to us or help us 
understand what is morally questionable and societally prejudicial. This does, 
however, raise the question of whether or not we must wait to experience that which 
is exploitative or corrupt in order to change, stop or condemn it. This goes back to 
Lemke’s point about having to appeal to something like human nature or universal 
values in order to prevent or contest that which we perceive to be unjust or immoral. 
Again, it is not clear whether projection is that much of a problem when we consider 
that truths are performed, thought and said and that one truth performed can lead to 
another and so forth. One normative valuation, so to speak, can lead to another and 
so on, though one need not necessarily justify the other. Experience can expose us to 
“practical realities” that we can then build upon and that do not necessarily need to be 
“theoretical” in nature. As Lemke claims, however, judgements that come from 
experience “are prone to a host of errors”, but: 1) “every form of critique stands 
exposed to this problem”; and 2) the way to correct an erroneous judgement that came 





whereas judgements made in error that are “rooted in general theories” are much more 
difficult to correct, if they can be corrected, at all. Another ‘problem’ that Lemke raises 
with critique is that “’experimental’ critique based on practical experience does not aim 
for changes with a scope as radical as critique built on comprehensive theories”. 
Lemke argues that this change in scope does not entail a lack of commitment to, or a 
developed ignorance of, “’global’ or ‘general structure”, nor does it entail an 
abandonment of “systematic” claims “in favour of an arbitrary and wilful analysis”. It 
entails, instead, “a shift of the ‘revolutionary perspective’”, which is articulated as: 
“great revolutionary breaks are not the precondition for, so much as the result of, local 
changes”. In this sense, Foucault “offers both too much and too little”: the former, 
because he does not offer a “theoretical grounding for the normative criteria of his 
work”; the latter, because he questions “the very connection between normativity and 
critique”. Foucault does not question “whom, what, when” nor “how to engage in 
critique”; nor does he ask “what reasons there are for resistance, and what prospects 
for reform there might be”. Instead, Foucault offers this: 
The necessity of reform mustn’t be allowed to become a form of blackmail serving to 
limit, reduce, or halt the exercise of criticism. Under no circumstances should one pay 
attention to those who tell one, ‘Don’t criticize, since you’re not capable of carrying out 
a reform’...Critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: 
this then is what needs to be done. It should be an instrument for those who fight, those 
who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and 
confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn’t have to lay down the law for the law. It isn’t 
a stage in a programming. It is a challenge directed to what is.662 
 
Foucault considers that so-called “normative questions” are, in fact, “practical 
matters” and not “theoretical problems”. These matters are justified only “within 
the historical context of praxis to which they belong”: critique, then, is, 
effectively, “’groundless’ and ‘unfounded’”; it is born “from the everyday 
functioning of power, and it is the operations of power itself that form its basis”. 
 





Critique, then, functions alongside government, i.e. power, or, rather, at its 
limits and, in this mode, offers criticism. The question, here, is why government 
is, in fact, so powerful. Why is it necessary? Is critique, itself, not powerful 
enough to end the need for power to give some sort of sense and intelligibility 
to human life and social relations? As radical as Foucault’s critique and 
government seem to be, there does seem to be a general sense of 
complacency to them, as if no other state of affairs were possible, even though 
Lemke claims that many forms of critique and government exist. This may be 
due to admitted ‘practicality’ of the critique and government problematics; we 
deal with, in a sense, what is, as opposed to what should be. If critique is more 
of a ‘suggestion’ or an ‘invitation’, rather than a directive or a necessity, then 
why even engage in it, at all? If government, qua power, is so seductive and 
positive, then why not simply submit to its promises and simplicity. Critique is 
active and, to a certain degree, too much of a risk considering how little it 
promises. It would seem that only those who are truly hurt and are suffering 
from the processes of government would be the ones to engage in Foucault’s 
critique; what incentive would those who benefit and flourish under it have to 
end or change their practices? 
 
VII. The Specific Intellectual 
 
 Foucault does not relate his critique only to knowledge and power, but also to 
subjectivity. Critique, for Foucault, is “both a means of struggle on the way to maturity 
and a ‘sign’ of its attainment”. Critique, as an attitude, not only means “independence 
from knowledge...and power”, but also an “unwillingness” to accept society as it is. 





“to make use of one’s understanding without the guidance of another”; maturity, then, 
offers us an insight “into the universal limits of knowledge and freedom that occurs in 
subordination to a general law”. The universal subject, here, is a fusion of “the ethical 
subject, the epistemological subject and the juridico-political subject”; the universal 
subject conform to universal rules and, thus, acts in accordance with nature and, 
necessarily, in a just and moral manner. Foucault, on the other hand, rejects both this 
harmony between power, knowledge and subject, as well as any conformity to any 
proposed universal law or rules. Foucault argues that “free subjectivity” is born 
precisely out of a rejection of any notion of universal rules and the construction of 
“social conditions that differ from those founded” on universal principles. Foucault is 
interested in the creation of “new subjectivities with new experiences and other 
norms”, not on the sharing of norms and convictions. He juxtaposes the concepts of 
the universal intellectual and the specific intellectual. The universal intellectual 
believes in a “’correct representation’ of the world” that “both declares and prescribes 
what should be”, all under the pretence of promoting “the universality of justice and 
the equity of an ideal law” in opposition to “power, despotism and the abuses and 
arrogance of wealth”. A universal intellectual “knows that it already possesses the 
truth” and, thus, “’judges’...’condemns’...and denounces the ‘falsehood’ of social 
conditions against the backdrop of their ‘true’ lawfulness; this intellectual practices via 
the law and not via theory. The specific intellectual, on the other hand, “speaks only” 
for him- or herself, “not for others”; the specific intellectual “only speaks for other 
inasmuch as” he or she speaks “for, and about,” him- or herself—“from the standpoint 
of [their] own experience”. Here, subjectivity is not in dialectical opposition to 
objectivity; it is, in a sense, the most objective form of experience. A subject can only 





experience of all others who make the same claim. Thus, “the specificity of 
experiences achieves general meaning through ‘the specificity of the politics of truth 





























Jonathan Crary and The Ends of Sleep 
 
I. Introduction 
 This chapter explains and engages with Jonathan Crary’s conceptualisation of 
what he calls “24/7”, a sort of universal state-of-affairs that explains how capitalism, 
which functions in a seemingly eternal and ever-present fashion, now concerns itself 
with fashioning individuals and developing subjectivities that are amenable to and, 
essentially, defined by ceaseless work and consumption. This chapter compares 
Crary’s analysis to the Platonic ideals of society and productivity, as well as to 
Hobbes’s conception of the commonwealth and Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding 
of the ‘order-word’. Crary explains how contemporary life has degenerated our 
understanding of concepts such as ‘time’, ‘productivity’, ‘democracy’, ‘the social’, 
‘leisure’ and the like. Crary’s work allows us to go further in our understanding of 
fundamentally ‘asocial’ and ‘non-social’ modes of life, where the self becomes the 
locus of capital, society and politics.  
 
Ib. How To Live A Life of Leisure 
 
…many institutions in the developed world have been running 24/7 for decades now. 
It is only recently that the elaboration, the modelling of one’s personal and social 
identity, has been reorganized to conform to the uninterrupted operation of markets, 
information networks, and other systems.663 
 
Life, taken phenomenologically (as lived experience), consists, primarily, of 
routine. Said routine(s), irrespective of how much ‘spontaneity’ is allowed, 
corresponds to the priorities, needs and quotidian desires of this phenomenological 
‘reality’. This ‘reality’, in turn, is shaped or defined by one’s ability to establish, confront 
and realise these priorities, needs, etc. Unquestionably and invariably, there are 
 





certain needs that must be met by the human subject, namely: hunger, thirst, 
fatigue/exhaustion, thought, communication of some sort and, primally, survival. The 
factors that most directly affect how well we are able to address these needs are: time, 
space, economy/means, physical capacity and social ‘circumstance’. These are all, to 
a certain extent, defined ‘socially’, i.e. through social or cultural dialogue. For example, 
if we are born without certain physical abilities, but we are born into a society that 
champions the rights of the disabled, then a certain quality of life is, to an extent, 
guaranteed by the norms of said society. This would, presumably, not hold if we were 
left to fend for ourselves. The same may be said of welfare and other social initiatives, 
with respect to the indigent. ‘Time’, in certain contexts and in many societies, is also 
viewed as a right: in some societies, for example, there are limits on how many hours 
one can, legally, work in a given period of time. These limits are a recognition of the 
value of time over labour, industry and commodities; the value of leisure, of the person 
or, at the very least, of rest. However, the division between leisure and work, as well 
as the personal and social, has become increasingly nebulous, over the past century. 
The nature of all of these concepts has changed radically. There are certain types of 
work, particularly those centred around ‘entertainment’, that are completely devoted 
to the production of ‘leisure’, albeit primarily for everyone but the producer. Those who 
work in social media, or as Jonathan Crary puts it: ‘network technologies’, or any kind 
of organisation that pretends to bring people together for a specific purpose (camps, 
schools, centres, etc.), bring the lives of others into their own and their work depends 
on well they can manage and execute this assimilation. A social worker or mental 
health counsellor must show empathy, understanding, care and a myriad of other 
affects towards their clients or cases, all while remaining ‘professional’ and personally 





is itself a job. In any case, there is one thing that most, no matter what their station, 
can rely on as a time for rest, inactivity and renewal: sleep. Sleep is, unquestionably, 
our guaranteed period of physical inactivity, when we need neither think nor manage 
anything: we simply rest and enjoy it. The utility of sleep, however, has been put into 
question since the times of Plato. In his Laws, Plato explains, through the voice of an 
Athenian citizen, “how to live a life of leisure” and outlines the role that sleep should 
play in the life of an industrious person: 
Everyone should think it a disgrace and unworthy of a gentleman, if any citizen devotes 
the whole of any night to sleep; no, he should always be the first to wake and get 
up…By nature, prolonged sleep does not suit either body or soul…Asleep, a man is 
useless; he may as well be dead.664 
 
Furthermore, 
…a man who is particularly keen to be physically active and mentally alert stays awake 
as long as possible, and sets aside for sleep only as much time as is necessary for his 
health – and that is only a little, once that little has become a regular habit.665 
 
Plato questions the very nature of sleep, but also raises the question of how natural 
sleep truly is; while Plato does not condemn the very act of sleep as unnatural, he 
does see it as immoral and aberrant to enjoy too much sleep. What is even more 
interesting, for this discussion, is that he says that a person “should always be the first 
to wake…and let himself be seen by all the servants (It doesn’t matter what we ought 
to call this kind of thing – either ‘law’ or ‘custom’ will do)”. In a way, Plato is both 
legislating and socialising the act, and abstention, of sleep. The role of sleep, and 
insomnolence, extends beyond the household: 
Officials who are wide awake at night in cities inspire fear in the wicked, whether 
citizens or enemies, but by the just and the virtuous they are honoured and admired; 
they benefit themselves and are a blessing to the entire state. And an additional 
advantage of spending the night in this way will be the courage thus inspired in 
individual members of the state.666 
 
 







Sleep (and the lack of it), here, serves a social and moral function, as well as a 
personal one. These “officials” who work, effectively, as sentinels, throughout the 
night, serve a purpose that is beyond their individual station; their lack of sleep both 
inspires and protects the state, as a whole. Care of the self, for Plato, becomes, 
logically and systematically, care of the state. Plato is clear on this, however. He 
begins with care of the self: 
Inessential business must never stop you taking proper food and exercise, or hinder 
your mental and moral training. To follow this regimen and to get the maximum benefit 
from it, the whole day and the whole night is scarcely time enough…every gentleman 
must have a timetable prescribing what he is to do every minute of his life, which he 
should follow at all times from the dawn of one day until the sun comes up at the dawn 
of the next.667 
 
This moves, almost seamlessly, to care of the state: “…a lawgiver would lack dignity 
if he produced a mass of details about running a house, especially when he came to 
the regulations for curtailing sleep at night, which will be necessary if citizens are going 
to protect the entire state systematically and uninterruptedly”. He continues: “While 
awake at night, all citizens should transact a good proportion of their political and 
domestic business, the officials up and down the town, masters and mistresses in their 
private households”. It is unclear how this life of effectively non-stop activity is meant 
to correspond with a proper diet, level of exercise and optimal mental health, but Plato 
assures us that they are all contingent upon each other. Oddly, this argument against 
excessive sleep stems from the question of what best to do with one’s leisure time, to 
which the answer seems to be: dedicate it to work. Plato claims that “leisured 
circumstances”, which exist when “a moderate supply of necessities” have been 
“assured” and “other people have taken over the skilled work”, should lead neither to 
idleness nor to frivolity. Inactivity is “not the right and proper thing” to (not) engage in; 







some other animal – one of the skinny kind, who’ve been emaciated by a life of daring 
and endurance”. Plato insists, then, that if “there is something left to do in a life of 
leisure…it’s only fair that the task imposed…be the most demanding of all”. Finally, it 
is important to point out that Plato does not believe that this ideal will ever be realised 
“fully so long as we persist in our policy of allowing individuals to have their own private 
establishments, consisting of house, wide, children, and so on”. What is interesting, 
here, is the division, or lack thereof, between the public and private sphere; it is the 
state that allows for the existence of a ‘private’ life, though what one does with one’s 
‘private’ time should be in line with what the state deems appropriate and morally 
sound. Though Plato would be “satisfied” as long as the individuals that make up a 
“private household” are industrious throughout the day and night, it does sound like 
he would feel more at ease if even households were run by an external authority. Plato 
makes it very clear that in the relationship between the public and the private, it is the 
public that takes priority and it is the state holds moral authority over the individual 
(and the ‘household’). What, then, is the purpose of leisure in Plato’s society, if it 
seems like he seeks to eradicate it? Well, the role of leisure must, clearly, be its own 
renunciation. This is echoed in what Plato says regarding ‘appetite’ and ‘pleasure’: 
“…the appetite for pleasures, which is very strong and grows by being fed, can be 
starved…if the body is given plenty of hard work to distract it”. Plato seems to allow 
for nature, for ‘natural’ states or things to exist, but only to be actively and urgently 
negated. Another contradiction arises, when he discusses sex:  
…in sexual matters our citizens ought to regard privacy – though not complete 
abstinence – as a decency demanded by usage and unwritten custom, and lack of 
privacy is disgusting. 
 
The contradiction, here, is the demand for privacy, when time and life are meant to be 
so strictly regimented and subject to public (and private) scrutiny. The main thesis, in 





be denied; to, in fact, be denied. Excess is immoral, but even certain things in 
moderation are immoral. Plato’s Athenian seems to have a moral compass that only 
ever points in one direction. This sentiment plays very well into the work of Jonathan 
Crary. In his book, 24/7, he describes a systematic tendency towards the abnegation 
of sleep and the universal ascendancy of industry, productivity and capital. While 
Crary’s ‘24/7’ system does not deny pleasure, leisure and nature in the way that 
Plato’s Laws does, it is interesting to see how a disdain for sleep, fruitlessness, 
idleness and the trivial have endured. Crary describes ‘24/7’ as “a time of indifference, 
against which the fragility of human life is increasingly inadequate and within which 
sleep has no necessity or inevitability”. He continues:  
In relation to labor, it renders plausible, even normal, the idea of working without pause, 
without limits. It is aligned with what is inanimate, inert, or unageing. As an advertising 
exhortation it decrees the absoluteness of availability, and hence the ceaselessness 
of needs and their incitement, but also their perpetual non-fulfillment.668 
 
This is, very clearly, the answer to the question: what if Plato’s Athenian were taken 
seriously and to an extreme degree? This does, indeed, answer the question, but in a 
very perverse and distorted manner. Plato believed that industry, morality, discipline 
and the like were the glue that hold a just and prosperous society together. In Crary’s 
case, it is precisely these things that are destroying not only society (or, rather, those 
that make up society), but also the very notion of ‘the social’, more generally. What 
our societies are built around now (“the uninterrupted operation of markets, 
information networks, and other systems”) has become the model for our own 
subjectivity. The fear, shame, regret, bitterness and dissatisfaction, among other 
affects, that have become associated with ‘interrupting’ our engagement with what 
has become our ‘social reality’ is so powerful that we have grown to reject and despise 
that which might pretend to separate, albeit briefly, from our world. Sleep, as rest and 
 





as a form of healthcare, is inimical to an uninterrupted flow of capital; we can certainly 
design machines and networks to watch over our investments, transactions and the 
like, even as we sleep, but what consciousness itself were a form of capital? As Crary 
puts it: 
We are long past an era in which mainly things were accumulated. Now our bodies 
and identities assimilate an ever-expanding surfeit of services, images, procedures, 
chemicals, to a toxic and often fatal threshold. The long-term survival of the individual 
is always dispensable if the alternative might even indirectly admit the possibility of 
interludes with no shopping or its promotion.669 
 
Consumption is no longer an activity that simply involves material goods, but also the 
use of services, knowledges, relationships, forms of communication and a list of other 




…24/7 is inseparable from environmental catastrophe in its declaration of permanent 
expenditure, of endless wastefulness for its sustenance, in its terminal disruption of the 
cycles and seasons in which ecological integrity depends.670 
 
 Crary describes ‘24/7’ as having created an environment that resembles a 
“social world”, but is actually a “non-social model of machinic performance and a 
suspension of living that does not disclose the human cost required to sustain its 
effectiveness”. It is the idea that human action serves only the purpose of capital, 
which is to increase without cessation, but, taken even further, that this increase is 
actually irrelevant. Growth, progress, change and the like are not necessary outcomes 
or aspirations when it comes to the effectiveness of the 24/7 system; destruction, 
chaos, failure and other typically negative outcomes, might even be seen as positive 
situations that serve to activate the mechanisms and gears of 24/7 and require them 
 
669 Ibid. 





even more. Sleep, then, as the shutdown of human activity and the cessation of 
consumption practices, is the antithesis of 24/7: 
In its profound uselessness and intrinsic passivity, with the incalculable losses it 
causes in production time, circulation, and consumption, sleep will always collide with 
the demands of the 24/7 universe. The huge portion of our lives that we spend asleep, 
freed from a morass of simulated needs, subsists as one of the great human affronts 
to the voraciousness of contemporary capitalism.671 
 
It is uncanny how these sentiments parallel those of Plato’s Athenian, but from an 
almost entirely different perspective. The obsession with productivity, industry, utility 
and the like remains, but with something of a different goal in mind. Plato appealed to 
something that he believed was independent of humans and of society-at-large, 
namely morality, truth, virtue, etc. 24/7, on the other hand, appeals to nothing beyond 
itself; in a way, 24/7 becomes more human than those who participate in its machinery: 
it must survive, at any cost. Survival, in this case, however, has nothing to do with 
basic needs or subsistence at the primal level; survival, from the perspective of 24/7, 
simply means business-as-usual, but at any costs. 24/7, in a sense, would sacrifice 
lives for the sake of selling graves, but simultaneously commit to heavily invest in 
healthcare. These are not contradictions, nor conflicts of interest, but, rather, a striving 
towards ultra-efficiency. Sleep, Crary argues, is “an uncompromising interruption of 
the theft of time from us by capitalism”, but it is easy to see how one might argue 
against this. One could say that sleep is the theft of time from us by nature, or 
something along those lines, and seek to find ways to limit sleep, make it more 














Most of the seemingly irreducible necessities of human life – hunger, thirst, sexual 





Sleep poses the idea of a human need and interval of time that cannot be colonized 
and harnessed to a massive engine of profitability, and thus remains an incongruous 
anomaly and site of crisis in the global present. In spite of all the scientific research in 
this area, it frustrates and confounds any strategies to exploit or reshape it. The 
stunning, inconceivable reality is that nothing of value can be extracted from it.673 
 
Now, this is a very powerful argument, but one would have to argue that the idea that 
sleep cannot be “colonized and harnessed to massive engine of profitability” is false 
or, at least, should be phrased differently. Fatigue, exhaustion, tiredness and the like 
cannot themselves be capitalised on (though this, too, may be false), but our dislike 
and antipathy towards these feelings and states can. Soporifics, psychoactive drugs, 
herbal remedies, forms of meditation and relaxation, entertainment, hypnosis and all 
of their related industries all capitalised on an inability to address and ‘cure’ our 
feelings and states of enervation. If anything, this further proof of the efficiency of the 
24/7 system: it wants to alleviate what it causes, but only to perpetuate how effectively 
it functions. Sleep itself, i.e. how best to sleep, how to maximise the effectiveness of 
sleep, where one sleeps, etc., has, in fact, been commodified. The interpretation, 
translation and analysis of dreams is also a lucrative business. Crary claims that 
“pressing notions of sleep as somehow natural” have been “rendered unacceptable” 
and that even though “people will continue to sleep”, sleep “is now an experience cut 
loose from notions of necessity or nature”. In other words, sleep has gone from being 
a natural fact, as something considered the opposite of being awake, to a mere animal 










conceptualized as a variable but managed function that can only be defined 
instrumentally and physiologically. Recent research has shown that the number of 
people who wake themselves up once or more at night to check their messages or 
data is growing exponentially.674 
 
Sleep has become incompatible and a logical hindrance to the achievement, 
realisation and execution of processes, activities and goals that we have come to 
regard as essential and necessary, in our lives. If exhaustion is preventing someone 
from completing a project or participating in some form of entertainment, the person 
does not consider how to pause their work or continue what they are doing at some 
other time, but, rather, how to alleviate their fatigue. Stimulants, amphetamines and 
the like are meant to treat what is considered an impediment to achieving what we 
feel that we need to achieve; sleep is a weakness that must either be cured or 
regretfully and lamentably succumbed to. As Crary states, sleep is “an irrational and 
intolerable affirmation that there might be limits to the combability of living beings with 
the allegedly irresistible forces of modernization.” This introduces the debate between 
naturalism, on the one hand, and what Crary calls “truisms of contemporary critical 
thought”; this latter type of thought argues that “there are no unalterable givens of 
nature – not even death, according to those who predict we will soon be downloading 
our minds into digital immortality”. “Celebrated critics” would argue that believing that 
“there are any essential features that distinguish living beings from machines 
is…naïve and delusional”. They argue that it is pointless to object to this, since “new 
drugs could allow someone to work at their job 100 hours straight”; furthermore, less 
sleep equals more freedom and the ability to live “further in accordance with individual 
needs and personal desires”. A naturalist might argue, on the other hand, that we are 
“meant to sleep at night…that our own bodies are aligned with the daily rotation of our 
 





planet, and that seasonal and solar responsive behaviors occur in almost every living 
organism”. The reply to this, from the critics, would be to claim that these arguments 
are akin to “pernicious New Age nonsense” or to an “ominous yearning for some 
Heideggerian connectedness to the earth”; finally, and most importantly, considering 
our discussion, here: “…within the globalist neoliberal paradigm, sleeping is for 
losers”. Sleep, in the 24/7 (neoliberalist) environment, is associated with loss, not gain, 
and is seen as a burden, rather than as something alleviating and reinvigorating. The 
more one works, the more one earns; time is money and the early bird gets the worm: 
the world of 24/7 is a world of economic clichés and tropes that lead to inevitable and 
inexorable success, irrespective of whether or not said ‘success’ is really achievable. 
24/7’s covenant, its ‘social contract’, is the promise of success, prosperity, happiness, 
etc. to those who work towards it; never mind that this work must be incessant and 
that none of these concepts are necessarily defined, nor is any sort of ‘goal line’ 
demarcated that might le one know that they have achieved said concepts. The 
promise is not an empty one, however, as one does really come to experience these 
affects and emotions, but always in flux and at the same time as other, antithetical, 
feelings. We might compare this to the myth of Erysichthon, who became hungrier, 
the more that he ate, and who was, ultimately, forced to self-cannibalise, due to his 
insatiable hunger. This might best describe the destiny of an individual, in the 24/7 
world. 
 
III. Polyphagia and 24/7 Phenomenology 
 
A modern phenomenon, which has its genesis in the (relative) ‘democratisation’ 
of a certain level of ‘luxury’ good(s), is the disposability of contemporary technologies 





consumerism. Though we will not explore it, in depth, this ‘democratisation’ and 
development have been facilitated by both the introduction of a credit-based economy 
and the rise of advertising and marketing as (pseudo-) scientific enterprises. Suffice it 
to say that the means of material, and immaterial, acquisition that are at the disposal 
of the average consumer have increased dramatically over the past century; never 
mind the fact that loans, rent, temporary possession, pawning, resale and leasing, as 
opposed to full and legal ownership, have become the dominant forms of said 
acquisition. The main question that we will be looking at, here, is: what is the point of 
buying into a certain type of technology or acquiring a new good? For example: why 
do we buy a new iPhone iteration, when we already own the previous one? One 
answer is novelty and the production of novelty; we simply desire what is new and the 
promises that this novelty brings. Though it could be argued that this ties in with a sort 
of survival instinct, it could be said that the promise of a new and, presumably, better 
future is inherent in the novelty of a new technology, product, service or good. Crary 
claims that “...the form that innovation takes within capitalism is the continual 
simulation of the new, while existing relations of power and control remain effectively 
the same”. This could, perhaps, be illustrated by the marketing of a new technology 
that promises to help make one’s job ‘easier’, but one is, nevertheless, enriching and 
giving power to the company that is selling the product, as well as those who benefit, 
economically, from said product’s continued use. Once one buys into the claim of 
enhanced, or progressively enhanced, efficiency and productivity, then one has fallen 
prey to the vicious cycle of simulated innovation: each new product, logically, will be 
more efficient than the last, with the eternal promise (ever more promising with each 
new release) of an ultimate product. This, irrespective of the fact that said ultimacy will 





For much of the twentieth century, novelty production, in spite of its repetitiveness and 
nullity, was often marketed to coincide with a social imagination of a future more 
advanced than, or at least unlike, the present. Within the framework of a mid-twentieth 
century futurism, the products one purchased and fit into one’s life seemed vaguely 
linked with popular evocations of eventual global prosperity, automation benignly 
displacing human labor, space exploration, the elimination of crime and disease, and 
so on. There was at least the misplaced belief in technological solutions to intractable 
social problems. Now the accelerated tempo of apparent change deletes any sense of 
an extended time frame that is shared collectively, which might sustain even a 
nebulous anticipation of a future distinct from contemporary reality.675 
 
Though this fits with Crary’s claim that 24/7 is a sort of post-historical and atemporal 
(yet eternal and constant) environment, it does not seem like this “futurism” has 
disappeared; if anything, it is even more pronounced and, instead of believing that the 
future is just around the corner and that available technologies are hinting at future, 
paradigmatic innovations, we now simply believe that the future is always now. Crary 
states that 24/7 is “shaped around individual goals of competitiveness, advancement, 
acquisitiveness, personal security, and comfort at the expense of others”; this egoism, 
bordering on solipsism, allows for maximum efficiency (a frictionless/ideal machine, in 
the physical sense), as one is not impeded or concerned with the needs of others, nor 
the effects of one’s actions on others. This creates a situation where the future “is so 
close at hand that it is imaginable only by its continuity with the striving for individual 
gain or survival in the shallowest of presents”. This goes back to Crary’s critique of 
“contemporary critical thought”, as discussed in the previous section: human activity 
has become machinic, automatic, but with a purpose; and that purpose is to strive 
towards a future that can only be pursued, yet will never materialise. Another myth 
comes to mind, here: that of Sisyphus; the 24/7 version of Sisyphus, however, must 
push their rock up a mountain that grows ever higher. This Sisyphus may even be 
promised lighter and smoother rocks that become increasingly easier to push up the 
 





mountain, every year; the mountain, nevertheless, continues to grow higher and 
higher. 
 
IV. The Wreckage of Day 
24/7 steadily undermines distinctions between day and night, between light and dark, 
and between action and repose. It is a zone of insensibility, of amnesia, of what defeats 
the possibility of experience. To paraphrase Maurice Blanchot, it is both of and after 
the disaster, characterized by the empty sky, in which no star or sign is visible, in which 
one’s bearings are lost and orientation is impossible.676 
 
Let us return to the idea of 24/7 and its development. Crary compares it to “a 
state of emergency”, but one that becomes permanent and normalised; an alarm has 
been raised, warning us of something, but we are both ignorant to what that 
‘something’ is and when the alarm will be turned off. The emergency becomes 
“domesticated” and we, in turn, become complicit its eternity. Said emergency has 
transformed the earth into both a “non-stop work site” and an “always open shopping 
mall of infinite choices, tasks, selections, and digressions”: the sleeplessness that is 
a both a result and the foundation of this emergency is “the state in which producing, 
consuming, and discarding occur without pause, hastening the exhaustion of life and 
depletion of resources”. One would think that all it would take for one to become free 
of this emergency, of this self-destruction and oblivion, would be to recognise it as 
such and adopt a different mode of life. This, however, becomes impossible, as there 
is a sort of fear, and accompanying paralysis, that results from both an uncertainty of 
the future and a dissatisfaction with the present, as well as the emergency state, more 
generally. The ubiquity of death, suffering and violence, which is transmitted to us via 
different forms of media (24/7), is a factor that both motivates us towards seeking 
generalised forms of security and inures and numbs us towards remote horror(s). 
Crary claims that sleep is the “major remaining obstacle…to the full realization of 24/7 
 





capitalism”, but that it “cannot be eliminated”; it can, nevertheless, be “wrecked and 
despoiled” and this wrecking is “inseparable from the ongoing dismantling of social 
protections in other spheres”. Crary equates this “construction in relation to sleep” to 
the systematic devastation of “universal access to clean drinking water”, “by pollution 
and privatization…with the…monetization of bottled water”; this manufactured scarcity 
of sleep gives rise to the “insomniac conditions in which sleep must be bought”, though 
what is bought is merely a “chemically modified state only approximating actual sleep”. 
Crary argues that no amount of soporifics or sleep-inducing methods/medications can 
bring about “an amelioration of current conditions that would allow people to sleep 
soundly and wake refreshed”; he goes even further by claiming that not even a “less 
oppressively organized world” is likely to eliminate insomnia. Insomnia, as such: 
…takes on its historical significance and its particular affective texture in relation to the 
collective experiences external to it…[it] is now inseparable from many other forms of 
dispossession and social ruin occurring globally. As an individual privation in our 
present, it is continuous with a generalized condition of worldlessness.677 
 
Insomnia, then, is not something to be cured, ameliorated or, categorically, eliminated; 
it is, rather, a ‘state of affairs’ that 24/7, as a generalised system, has both created 
and exploited. Here we can go back to what were referred to, earlier in this section, 
as ‘remote horrors’; catastrophes and miseries that, even though we do not 
experience them first-hand, we feel that we may somehow be responsible for or we 
somehow feel involved in them, merely by being aware of them. This recognition, 
coupled with inactivity and impotence, create the conditions for psychological and 
moral disorder; a disorder that is ripe for insomnia and neuroses. Crary cites Levinas 
as someone who has tried to “engage the meanings of insomnia in the context of 
recent history”: Levinas holds that insomnia is “a way of imagining the extreme 
difficulty of individual responsibility in the face of the catastrophes of our era”. All we 
 





can do, however, is observe and be witness to said catastrophes; we can neither avoid 
nor necessarily prevent the “horror and injustice that pervades the world”. Insomnia, 
as Levinas would have it, neither excludes “a concern for the other”, nor does it provide 
a “clear sense of space for the other’s presence”; insomnia is where “we face the near 
impossibility of living humanely”. This “sleeplessness” must, in any case, be 
distinguished “from an unrelieved wakefulness”, which would be characterised by an 
“almost unbearable attention to suffering and the boundlessness of responsibility that 
would impose”. It is almost as if, for the sake of some artificial form of sanity or moral 
substance, we seek to recognise horror, while simultaneously admitting our 
powerlessness in the face of its universal form. 24/7 seems to allow for just enough 
humanity for the individual to experience empathy, worry, fear and grief, but not 
enough for them to feel personally responsible nor involved. The individual prioritises 
their own self-interests, because one’s power does not appear to extend beyond self-
governance. This powerlessness beyond the self extends further, however. The desire 
for sleep, peace, security and the like, and their ultimate realisation, rests upon the 
immutability of various external factors; and these external factors, in turn, both form 
and depend upon the stability of society. Sleep, as “the most private [and] most 
vulnerable state common to all”, is “crucially dependent on society in order to be 
sustained”. Crary cites Hobbes’s Leviathan as outlining the “defenselessness of an 
individual sleeper against the numerous perils and predators to be feared on a nightly 
basis” as an example of “the insecurity of the state of nature”; this obligates the state, 
“the commonwealth”, to prioritise “security for the sleeper, not only from actual 
dangers but—equally important—from anxiety about them”. Security, protection and 
sleep thus all become social functions; they exist, in this society, as social constructs. 





order to provide the safety and guarantees necessary for society to thrive and operate. 
This, in fact, could be seen, much likes the society of Plato’s Athenian, as a 
rudimentary formulation of the 24/7 environment. Both Plato’s Athenian and Hobbes’s 
commonwealth require systematic and uninterrupted protection in order to thrive, but 
said protection must be provided for by each’s constituents. Though security and 
defence can be outsourced, it is difficult to outsource the anxiety associated with their 
need and demand, in the first place; the mind produces its own battlefields, both real 
and imagined. 
 
V. The End of the Weekend 
In spite of its insubstantiality and abstraction as a slogan, the implacability of 24/7 is its 
impossible temporality. It is always a reprimand and a deprecation of the weakness 
and inadequacy of human time, with its blurred, meandering textures. It effaces the 
relevance or value of any respite or variability. Its heralding of the convenience of 
perpetual access conceals its cancellation of the periodicity that shaped the life of most 
cultures for several millennia…678 
 
 Crary explains that 24/7 compared to what is known as an “order-word”; 
Deleuze and Guattari characterise the “order-word” as “a command…an 
instrumentalization of language that aims either to preserve or to create social reality, 
and whose effect, finally, is to create fear”. To illustrate this, we must reflect on what 
24/7 destroys, alters and redefines on an epistemological and ontological level; we 
must think of how time has been defined historically and scientifically. We define the 
week as consisting of seven days, a day as consisting of 24 hours and an hour as 
consisting of sixty minutes; we, of course, know how a year is measured, a month, a 
decade and so on. Though these are recognised as ‘objective truths’, independent of 
our own observations, we also recognise these divisions as human achievements; 
they are testaments of the order that we have imposed upon the world and universe, 
 





through our discoveries, as wrong and full of hubris this may sound. 24/7 is an affront 
to this order; 24/7, as a perverse form of eternity and of the infinite, exposes the 
“weakness and inadequacy of human time” and does away with our much-studied and 
expertly-organised “temporal differentiation[s]”. Societies have cleverly structured the 
work week and magnanimously offered us the weekend, as a distinct space and time 
for leisure, respite and the attendance of personal affairs. 24/7, however, imposes its 
own logic upon our, comparatively, arbitrary divisions of time and climatic and physical 
phenomena. The homogenous and “monotonous” nature, or lack thereof, of 24/7 
creates a world where we must confront the apparent vacuity of our own temporal 
ontology; this is aggravated by the fact that the weekend, as well as “individual days 
of the week, holidays” and “seasonal breaks”, has survived, but has its “significance 
and legibility…effaced”. Since 24/7 is antithetical to any sort of division of time and to 
the creation of any sort of space that might allow for any temporal division, it 
relentlessly incurs “into every aspect of social or personal life”. This is mirrored in the 
proliferation of “wireless technologies”, which have annihilated “the singularity of place 
and event”; phenomena seem to occur independent of space, and time, in a sort of 
ethereal non-place, when we witness them online or via a screen. This only 
exacerbates our abolishment of temporality, since we are able to see and experience 
innumerable things at any given time, but are also fully aware of what we are not 
seeing that must be happening, as well as things that may happen, due to our limitless 














An analysis of the relevant literature concerning power, in contemporary political 
science and philosophy, makes it clear that current conceptualisations are, at the very 
least, inadequate. As Byung-Chul han states: when “it comes to the concept of power, 
theoretical chaos still reigns”; while “the existence of the phenomenon itself cannot be 
doubted, the concept remains altogether ambiguous”.679 Furthermore, even theories 
and conceptualisations that present alternatives to mainstream understandings of 
‘power’ seem to either serve to make the concept even more ‘nebulous’ and 
‘ambiguous’ or are not radical enough in attempting to understand and explain the 
phenomenological experience of power as it is experienced by an individual, group or 
society. The argument, that is presented here, is that there are several reasons why 
this is the case: why it is that so many theories and conceptualisations of power 
ultimately fail in their aim(s). First, there is little to no emphasis, or, at the very least, 
very little emphasis, on the role of our biological understanding of human beings and 
the psycho-social realities present in our world, in contemporary theories of power. 
While studies in necropolitics/thanatopolitics, psychopolitics, ethopolitics and 
biopolitics, more generally, do certainly analyse the intersection between biology and 
politics and highlight the need to take seriously the demands that our ever-increasing 
technological and scientific knowledge impose upon any anthropocentric study, these 
fields of study tend to be quite specific in nature and seek to either move away from 
more ‘universal’ understandings of power or do away with them, altogether. While it 
may prove to be necessary and, indeed, a critical step in theorising power, it is 
precisely this sort of ‘anarchic’ understanding of power that raises further questions 
 





and creates more problems in praxis. For example, while a field like necropolitics may 
make the claim that the “ultimate expression of sovereignty largely resides in the 
power and capacity to dictate who is able to live and who must die”680, it is, perhaps, 
difficult to understand this concept when death, destruction, cruelty and the like are 
not immediate or, at least, immediately at-hand. Furthermore, when the meaning of 
one concept depends upon the meaning of another concept, or, worse, a group of 
concepts, then it is easy to see how debates and conflicts are bound to materialise. 
Worst of all, if the meaning of a concept is dependent upon the very meanings of 
concept, theory, methodology and the like, then the project is almost doomed to fail, 
from the start. An example of this sort of conceptual polysemousness, again citing the 
field of necropolitics, is how one defines the process of subjectivisation. Mbembe 
explains subjectivisation as such: 
…the human being thus truly becomes a subject – that is, separated from the animal – 
in the struggle and work through which death (understood as the violence of negativity) 
is confronted...Becoming a subject therefore supposes upholding the work of 
death…Politics is therefore a death that lives a human life. Such, too, is the definition of 
absolute knowledge and sovereignty: risking one’s life as a whole.681 
 
Haugaard, on the other hand, describes subjectivisation as a “process of socialization” 
and this process of socialisation is founded upon one’s “practical consciousness, which 
creates second-nature expectations that create security in the social subject”; this 
“ontological security”, in turn, is founded upon “the establishment of routine, which 
begins with the infant’s relationship with its primary carer”. It would seem that, for 
Haugaard, the subject is defined by their relation with life, while, for Mbembe, the 
subject is defined by their relation with death. The implications of these two 
conceptualisations may not be antithetical, but their foundations, authority and 
methods of legitimation are, in fact. antithetical. Second, as we have just seen, different 
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theories of power completely redefine, or seek to redefine, well known and generally 
uncontested concepts, which can confuse the reader, certainly, but, more importantly, 
force the theorist to commit to the Herculean (and Sisyphean) task of having to 
reconceptualise an entire topic and, likely, an entire field of study. This may explain, 
precisely, why biological explanations are not more prevalent in literature on power, as 
this would require not only something of a specialised understanding of biological 
principles and established truths, but also the need to introduce them into power 
debates and discussions, in order to contend with them. Third, and the last point to be 
made before moving to a proposed solution, is the idea that the process of 
conceptualisation and theorisation itself is an act of power, which is why the very 
process itself has become problematic. Institutions, organisations and individuals who 
find themselves in positions of at least some authority are those who, ultimately, define, 
debate and speculate on those concepts and ideas that are most important to society-
at-large: the phrase ‘knowledge is power’ may appear to be nothing more than a trite 
statement in favour of education, but the reality is that not only is knowledge a 
manifestation of power, but so is the definition and legitimation of knowledge itself, in 
the first place. This begins to explain why, though there may be many ‘alternative’ and 
challenging conceptualisations and theories of power, only those that are more easily 
understood and fall more in line with mainstream theories are generally accepted. This 
resonates with the idea of paradigmatic shifts in scientific theory and Quine’s two 















…it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement - - 
especially if it be a statement at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field…it 
becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold 
contingently on experience, and analytic statements which hold come what may. Any 
statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments 
elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true 
in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain 
statements of the kind called logical laws…by the same token, no statement is immune 
to revision.682 
 
Just as it is easier, empirically, to redefine ‘power’, rather than do away with it 
completely, it makes more sense to more readily accept theories that are less radical 
and require less of the reader/participant. To tell an individual that a theory is rooted in 
anarchy may well be liberating, in some sense, but, if true or accepted, then it brings 
along a whole new set of responsibilities previously supererogatory to that individual. 
When a concept or theory is proposed and defended, over the course of decades and 
even centuries, then merely the proposition of an alternative might constitute a radical 
act, as Quine points out.  
 
II. Dimensionless Power 
 As a response, then, to the question of power and the debates surrounding its 
different dimensions, origins and conceptualisations, what is proposed, here, is the 
notion of non-dimensional power. As a form of conclusion, an outline of what this 
means will be presented, though much work needs to be done to elucidate and 
elaborate upon the ideas, processes and implications that it presents. Non-dimensional 
power is, effectively, a de-conceptualisation of power that is not meant to be 
understood or apprehended, per se, but exists, rather, as a sort of ‘pure critique’ of the 
concept. By borrowing from different theories on power, but discarding each qua 
theories and qua systems, we arrive at something, though perhaps not satisfactory in 
the scientific sense of theoretical research, much better equipped to face the lacunae 
created by theories of power. The logic behind non-dimensional power is not circular, 
 





nor is it deductive or derivative. By adopting an anarchic/protean stance towards 
power, logic does not really play into the equation; it can function at the pure, 
metaphysical level, or at the applied, empirical level; whichever is contextually 
appropriate. This anarchy/proteanism, however, strips power of its explanatory power, 
as it is too fluid to be logically or nomically contained. Furthermore, concepts such as 
‘oppression’, ‘exploitation’, ‘control’ and many others typically associated with ‘power’, 
are much better served by not invoking ‘power’, at all, but, rather, by describing them 
in sociological, political, or even phenomenological, terms. Many forms of control, 
exploitation and dominance are not properly explained by ‘power’ and require the 
development of entirely novel, multi-disciplinary fields of study in order to even begin 
to unravel their complexity; these fields are still just as concerned with ‘power’, 
however, and, as a result, suffer from the same methodological issues that make the 
concepts under review so difficult to understand, in the first place. Eschewing power 
altogether, in favour of a more localised and specific mode of understanding these 
concepts, allows for a greater, and more creative, theoretical freedom, which would, 
effectively, be independent of theory. If we understand power and control as ideas that 
are rooted in biology and psycho-social interaction, then, with even just a quick glance 
at the literature on power, it is clear that there is a need for more work to be done on 
the subject. Fundamental to the questions of power, dominance, control, exploitation 
and the like is the question of what the most basic and fundamental needs of a human 
subject are and what it would take to satisfy said needs. It is no mystery why political, 
ethical and philosophical systems feel the need to contend with the question of how to 







In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the 
individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and 
physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of life but life’s 
prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round 
development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more 
abundantly—only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its 
entirety and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs!683 
 
Similarly, the authors of United States Declaration of Independence held that: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.—
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the 
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its 
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall 
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.684 
 
Finally, as discussed earlier, in chapter XII, Plato held that: 
Inessential business must never stop you taking proper food and exercise, or hinder your 
mental and moral training. To follow this regimen and to get the maximum benefit from 
it, the whole day and the whole night is scarcely time enough…every gentleman must 
have a timetable prescribing what he is to do every minute of his life, which he should 
follow at all times from the dawn of one day until the sun comes up at the dawn of the 
next.685 
 
What qualifies as a fundamental or basic human need differs, depending on the 
philosopher, theorist, organisation, ideological mouthpiece, representative or authority 
making the case. This, however, seems to be the foundation of power, control, 
domination, exploitation, etc.: whoever holds access to, controls or defines how an 
individual or group can acquire or avail themselves of what they consider to be their 
fundamental and basic needs, at any given point in time, is the one who holds at least 
some form of power. Unfortunately, it is not as easy as saying that whoever has food 
holds power over the hungry or that whoever has shelter has power over the 
homeless, but this is a symptom, or perhaps mode, of the way that power operates 
and is exploited. If we define basic and fundamental human needs in terms of 
biological and psycho-social criteria, e.g. a satisfaction of one’s hunger, thirst, need 
 
683 Marx, Karl. Karl Marx: Selected Writings (D. McLellan, Ed.). Oxford University Press; 2000. 615. 
684 Beeman, Richard. The Penguin Guide to the United States Constitution. Penguin Books; 2010. 2. 





for shelter, emotional needs, etc., then we give power to biologists, psychologists and 
sociologists to determine: first, what qualifies as hunger, thirst, etc.; second, what 
qualifies as having satisfied these ‘needs’; and, finally, who is even allowed to 
determine this and who is responsible for carrying it out and managing their 
satisfaction. This, as Plato argued and maintained via Socrates, should fall to the 
philosopher-kings: 
The society we have described can never grow into a reality or see the light of day, and 
there will be no end to the troubles of states, or indeed, my dear Glaucon, of humanity 
itself, till philosophers become kings in this world, or till those we now call kings and 
rulers really and truly become philosophers, and political power and philosophy thus 
come into the same hands, while the many natures now content to follow either to the 
exclusion of the other are forcibly debarred from doing so. This is what I have hesitated 
to say so long, knowing what a paradox it would sound; for it is not easy to see that 
there is no other road to real happiness either for society or the individual.686 
 
Proudhon, and Engels after him, argued in favour of ‘scientific socialism’ and that a 
person’s “true chief and his king is the demonstrated truth; that politics is a science, 
not a stratagem; and that the function of the legislator is reduced, in the last analysis, 
to the methodical search for truth”.687 This “search of truth”, like Plato’s kingdom of 
philosophers, leaves us at the mercy of those who define and claim to scientifically 
demonstrate the truth. Though non-dimensional, or dimensionless, power is meant to 
be understood as rooted in the biological and psycho-social needs of human beings, 
this does not exhaust its meaning. Recognising this is merely the beginning of a 
dimensionless analysis of power. It is not precisely quantifiable to explain how hunger 
and nourishment are a part of our lives, but the fact is incontestable. To begin to 
attempt to quantify it is, however, a biological and scientific task, as we would 
understand it. The scope, meaning and impact of a scientific task is determined by the 
organisation and individuals behind said task and so on. Knowledge of our needs, as 
basic and essential as they may be, is delegated to science and science is delegated 
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to the experts. There is nothing inherently wrong with this, but it is clear how great the 
responsibility is and how high the stakes are, here. Even the act of calling information 
concerning these needs is a form of power, as the needs themselves control us and 
determine our lives unquantifiably, until we assign quantities to them. How powerful is 
fear or happiness? How powerful is hunger or thirst? How powerful are success and 
failure and how are they determined? These questions lie beyond the realm of the 
immediately empirical and require conceptualisation and empirical grounding, in order 
to be understood, though such a task would not exhaust the meaning nor scope of the 
questions themselves. The answers to these questions, nevertheless, can lead us to 
new understandings in the fields of psychology, sociology, politics, economics, 
philosophy and beyond, since these are the fields of knowledge that we have tasked 
with explaining power, and powerlessness, to us. Whether they are successful or not 
is determined by their application. 
 
III. Dimensionless Power in Praxis 
 ‘Understanding’ power as something that is dimensionless requires action and 
that action is an ongoing process of critique. Once we place ‘power’ within the realm 
of the psychosocial, we give it new dimensions, certainly, but we must understand that 
these new dimensions are neither necessarily helpful, nor should we see them as our 
target of analysis. The same happens when we place it within the realm of biology (or 
chemistry). Understanding that power, and control, are rooted in biology and in 
psychosocial interaction is to recognise that when decisions are made, when events 
occur, when someone has a thought or conveys something and when all sorts of 
observable human phenomena occur, there are myriad processes and factors that are 
at play that we simply cannot observe, though we may try to understand and analyse 





someone, but never truly indicates why he commits the crime and, in fact, he even 
recognises that “all I had to do was turn around and walk away and it would be 
over…[b]ut an entire beach pulsating with sun pressed me to go on”; he then shoots 
a man several times after seeing him pull out a knife, though the man neither moves 
towards him nor seems to want to attack him, and seems to explain that he did it 
because: 
the sweat that had gathered on my eyebrows suddenly rushed down into my eyes, 
blinding me with a warm veil of salt and tears…I could feel…the sun crashing like 
cymbals against my forehead, and the knife, a burning sword hovering above me. Its 
red-hot blade tore through my eyelashes to pierce my aching eyes.688 
 
Again, Meursault never really goes on to explain exactly why he did what he did and 
his only ‘salvation’ is to simply accept what did and accept the consequences.689 The 
relevance of this example, though fictional, is that it shows the possibility that actions 
and choices, particularly those which are quite extreme, ostensibly senseless or tragic, 
may not have a ‘logic’ behind them and are simply motivated by the body, the mind or 
nothing explicable, at all. Something similarly tragic happens in Richard Wright’s 
Native Son, where the protagonist, Bigger Thomas, is put in a situation where he fears 
for his life and he ends up killing the daughter of the family who have just hired him. 
Wright’s novel predates Camus’s by two years, but the descriptions of the murders 
feel very similar: 
Frenzy dominated him. He held his hand over her mouth and his head was cocked at 
an angle that enabled him to see Mary and Mrs. Dalton by merely shifting his eyes. Mary 
mumbled and tried to rise again. Frantically, he caught a corner of the pillow and brought 
it to her lips. He had to stop her from mumbling, or he would be caught. Mrs. Dalton was 
moving slowly toward him and he grew tight and full, as though about to explode.690 
 
Though he was initially trying to help, Bigger, panicked, ends up suffocating Mary 
while trying to silence her with a pillow, because of his overpowering and debilitating 
fear of being caught, alone, in the room of a white woman, especially since she had 
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been drinking. His fear of a particularly horrible outcome led him to do something even 
more horrible and the realisation hits him, profoundly: 
The reality of the room fell from him; the vast city of white people that sprawled outside 
took its place. She was dead and he had killed her. He was a murdered, a Negro 
murderer, a black murderer. He had killed a white woman. He had to get away from 
here…In the darkness his fear made live in him an element which he reckoned with as 
“them.”691 
 
Again, though this example is fictional, we imagine the weight of both Bigger’s 
psychological and physical traumas pressing down upon him and taking control of 
him, in this situation, while also imagining the weight of the pressures of existing in a 
society that might criminalise any one of his actions, simply because of the colour of 
his skin. These are realities that criminal justice systems all over the world must 
grapple with every day; what is the role of compassion in enforcing the law and how 
seriously must we take the motives of someone convicted of a crime, especially if the 
crime is qualified as particularly ‘heinous’? A non-dimensional understanding of power 
understands that not everything, perhaps going so far as to say nothing, can be 
understood as easily as A because B or A did C because of B and D. The motivations 
and processes behind just a single thought are uncountable, but we make them 
quantifiable because it simplifies things, we can understand things this way and 
because being able to communicate things is a vital element of social coexistence. In 
fact, the imagination, particularly when reading a novel or other work of fiction, is 
triggered (or not) by our ability to empathise or sympathise with characters in fictional 
situations. Asylum laws and social welfare, for example, exist not only for those who 
need them now or for those who have already found help, but more so for those who 
will come to need help and for those who we imagine might one day need sanctuary. 
These laws and social structures exist so as to say ‘we understand that you need or 
 





may need help, at some point, and we would like to provide it’; there is an empathy 
and a compassion that are meant to exist outside of time and independently of the 
person or situation, but these feelings rest in the imagination, in the mind and in the 
body, originally. Society extends these same feelings towards the homeless and the 
hungry, at least to a certain extent. Everyone needs food and some form of shelter in 
order to survive and we know this because most of us are able to experience suffering, 
hunger, cold, pain and sadness. A society understands pain because its constituents 
are able to feel it; the values and realities of a community are held as priorities and 
codified into its laws and mores. We can ask, ‘how much does suffering affect and 
inform what a community or a person does?’, but we could never really know the 
answer. We can see and experience certain manifestations of a person or society’s 
understanding of suffering, but to quantify how much it informs the entire existence of 
said entities would be all but impossible. The same could be asked of most emotions 
and biological processes and sensations: how much do fear and anger inform your 
decisions; how much does thirst motivate what you do; and so on. Certainly, we could 
provide some answer, but quantifying these things, with precision, is almost 
nonsensical, even though we can recognise it. The point is that power and control, 
when understood dimensionlessly, operate at levels beyond those theories in other 
conceptualisations of power and control and they operate, as a matter of course, in 
ways that we cannot immediately or very simply explain. 
 
IV. Conclusion: A Critique of Dimensionless Power 
 We have seen some of the deontological consequences of accepting that power 
and control operate at and are rooted in the biological and psychosocial realms: 
understanding the role that biological processes play in our lives, however limited that 





factors that motivate our actions, thoughts, decisions, impulses and the like. A shift in 
focus towards the body and the mind, while recognising the relevance and trying to 
understand the importance of our interactions with others, forces a prioritisation of the 
personal and the interpersonal. We see what it means to prioritise the power of 
violence, the power of economy or the power of international and supranational 
organisation: a vast number of resources being invested in warfare and buying and 
selling armaments, protecting corporations and their assets at all costs and protecting 
the actions of state actors all around the world, if they cooperate with other powerful 
state actors. How we define power very clearly defines policy and our policies dictate 
the lives of millions, at least. Personalising our understanding of power, with all the 
questions and lacunae it leaves in our understanding of the self, is a step towards a 
more empathetic and responsible world. Just like diagnosing a mysterious illness or 
malady can lead to the beginning of a recovery process or cure, or at least an 
understanding of one’s situation, while raising even more questions and unknown 
variables, dimensionless power is a move away from the violence, greed, corruption 
and extra-legal anarchy of the governments and societies of now. Though 
dimensionless power is a critical process of deconceptualising and demands further 
elucidation, it seems to be particularly useful at explaining away the deficiencies of so 
many other conceptualisations of power. While power and control are misunderstood 
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